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INTRODUCTION 
The notion ‘standard of judicial review’ is used to indicate the intensity with which a 
court will review an act or measure brought to its attention on appeal or, conversely, how 
large a margin of discretion is left to the decision-making authority. In the competition 
field, in the exercise of their judicial function, the EU Courts1 apply different standards of 
review depending on the nature of the assessments they are called upon to evaluate. 
Articles 261 and 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter “TFEU”) 
contain the general discipline on actions for annulment and unlimited jurisdiction in 
relation to fines which finds application also in the competition field. The first provision 
enables the granting of unlimited jurisdiction to the European Courts with regards to the 
determination of penalties. This power finds further specification in the antitrust field in 
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 and in the merger field in Article 16 of the EU Merger 
Regulation, in relation to fines and periodic penalty payments. It entails that EU Courts can 
cancel, reduce or increase fines imposed by the Commission and in doing so they can 
substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission. Conversely, having regard to 
the review of the Commission’s substantial findings, Article 263 TFEU allows the 
European Courts to review only the legality of the measure adopted, i.e. the EU Courts are 
only able to annul an act on the basis of specific grounds of appeal and to refer the case to 
the Commission for re-examination, without, however, having the power to examine the 
merits or the opportunity of the measure. Consequently, the Courts cannot substitute with 
their own assessment the economic and legal appraisal contained in the decision. 
Over the years, in the exercise of their judicial review powers in the competition field, 
and in the absence of express indications in the EU Treaties, the EU Courts have 
progressively clarified the intensity with which they would subject to review the 
                                                     
1 In the following pages the expression “EU Courts” or “European Courts” will be used to identify the EU 
General Court and the European Court of Justice (formerly Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities), while the expression “Court” will be used for both judicial organs, where 
appropriate. 
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Commission’s assessments. The standards of review applied thus vary depending on the 
nature of the findings under consideration. When it is alleged that the Commission 
committed an error in the statement of the facts at issue or in the interpretation of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU 2 or of the EU Merger Regulation, the EU Courts will exercise a 
comprehensive review of the decision, namely a careful and exhaustive examination of 
findings of fact (except for appeals on points of law only to the Court of Justice) and of the 
assessment of whether the Treaty rules and secondary legislation have been complied with. 
By contrast, when applicants seek to challenge complex economic assessments and/or 
complex technical appraisals made by the Commission, the power of judicial control 
exercised by the EU Courts is less intense. In these cases, the EU Courts confine 
themselves to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, 
whether the statement of the reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have 
been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a 
misuse of powers. Moreover, in reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information 
of an economic nature, the EU Courts will limit their control to establishing whether the 
evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, whether that evidence 
contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. This is 
known as the so-called ‘manifest error’ or ‘limited’ judicial review standard.  
This practice of the EU Courts of subjecting to less intense scrutiny complex economic 
and/or technical assessments undertaken by the Commission has generated over the past 
years an intense debate as to whether the existing system of judicial review in the 
competition field is effective and comprehensive, thus requiring no further changes, or 
rather whether the system should and could be improved by increasing the EU Courts’ 
powers of control. 
                                                     
2 With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(the “EC Treaty”) have become Articles 101 and 102, respectively, of the TFEU. The two sets of provisions 
are in substance identical. For the purposes of this work, references to Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU 
should be understood as references, respectively, to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and, before them, to 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the “EEC Treaty”). The 
TFEU also introduced certain changes in terminology, such as the replacement of “Community” by “Union” 
and “common market” by “internal market”. The terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this 
work.  
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Against this background, the present work intends to analyse the characteristics of the 
‘limited’ standard of review in the competition field, its evolution over time, and the main 
criticisms which have been advanced against its alleged shortcomings, in order to 
understand whether a system of more intense or full judicial review is necessary and 
warranted. Part of the analysis will also focus on attempting to understand whether the 
current EU constitutional framework and the EU Courts, respectively, already provide or 
have the necessary legal instruments and powers that allow for the introduction of such a 
system. The various proposals advanced advocating concrete changes will also be presented 
with a view to ascertaining their plausibility and concrete chances of success in the near 
future. 
 
Chapter 1 of this work has a descriptive intent: Section I presents the legal framework 
concerning judicial review of competition decisions. This Section is dedicated to the 
analysis of the relevant legal provisions that represent the legal basis of the current system 
of judicial review and illustrates the general approach of the EU Courts to judicial review in 
the competition field. Particular emphasis is placed here on the standards of review that are 
typically applied by the EU Courts when carrying out their judicial function, with a special 
focus on the origins of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard and on the complex issues 
which arise from the difficulties inherent in identifying the concrete circumstances that 
trigger the application of this standard. Section II of the Chapter is dedicated to the 
presentation of the terms of the debate on the intensity and scope of the EU Courts’ 
powers of review. The arguments that have been developed for and against the 
introduction of a system of more intense or full judicial control by the EU Courts will be 
illustrated and the level of dissatisfaction that in certain instances the present system has 
reached will be analysed and its merits reviewed. Considerable attention is also given to the 
increased relevance of fundamental rights in the EU framework since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, and to the consequences this may have for the debate on the 
compatibility of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard with the right to a fair trial enshrined 
in both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European 
Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this context 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Menarini judgment and the EFTA Court’s Posten 
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Norge judgment will be analysed, together with their implications for the system of EU 
judicial review in the competition field. 
 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the analysis of the case law in the fields of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, in order to examine under a closer lense the intensity with which the EU 
Courts are willing to scrutinize and review complex economic and/or technical matters. 
This is done in a historical perspective in order to understand which factors, internal or 
external to the EU system, have contributed to stimulate changes in the intensity of the 
control exercised by EU judges or have led the latter to expand the realm of application of 
the ‘limited’ review standard. As will emerge from the analysis of the case law, the EU 
Courts initially elaborated and applied the ‘manifest error’ standard only in relation to cases 
decided under Article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(hereinafter “EEC”, later Article 81 of the EC Treaty, now Article 101 TFEU). Over the 
years, the EU Courts progressively expanded the use of the manifest error test by applying 
it to new domains. The EU Courts did not only expand the use of this standard to new 
heads of Article 101 TFEU and to abuse of dominance cases under Article 102 TFEU, but 
also intervened to increase the categories of assessments that could be caught by this test 
and thus be subject to more limited review (for example, an expansion occurred to cover 
not only ‘complex economic’ but also ‘complex technical’ assessments). More recently, with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the increased relevance of fundamental rights 
in the EU framework, the case law in the competition field has become more attentive to 
discussions on the ‘criminal’ nature of antitrust sanctions, the compatibility of the ‘limited’ 
judicial review standard with the right to a fair trial, and, in particular, on the consequences 
this may have for the required intensity of judicial review. In this context the 2011 KME 
and Chalkor judgments, representing the first rulings in which the Court of Justice openly 
adopts a position in relation to the compatibility of the current system of judicial review of 
competition decisions with the fundamental right to a fair trial, will be critically analysed. 
The last part of the Chapter explores the more recent case law in order to understand the 
extent to which the EU Courts continue to consider the existence of the limited judicial 
review standard not only legitimate but also fully compatible with the right to a fair trial. 
 
XV 
 
In Chapter 3 the relevant case law on the standard of review in EU merger control cases 
will be analysed. Due to the specific characteristics of these proceedings, which leads to 
differentiate them from antitrust cases, here the standard of review used by the EU Courts 
has evolved in ways which deserve autonomous consideration. Three phases can be 
identified in the merger field: (i) the early cases in which the EU Courts had a more ‘hands-
off’ approach and were particularly respectful of the Commission’s margin of appreciation 
in the case of complex economic and/or technical appraisals; (ii) the so-called ‘merger 
revolution’ or ‘watershed cases’ that occurred in 2002, year in which the EU Courts 
annulled three distinct merger prohibition decisions and started to scrutinize intensely the 
Commission’s assessments; and (iii) the more recent cases in which the EU Courts have 
consolidated their more dynamic approach to the review of merger decisions.  
 
From the analysis of the case law in both Chapters 2 and 3 various lessons will be 
derived. In the first place, the lack of guidelines on the application of the ‘limited’ standard 
of review has given the EU Courts the opportunity to clarify the degree of review that they 
should undertake, endorsing the view that the standard of review is a product of 
interpretation of the EU Courts which has evolved over time and could be modified by the 
EU Courts themselves.  
Another lesson that can be derived from the various judgments examined is that 
complex decisions involving in-depth economic analysis could be assessed by the EU 
Courts, as the latter have shown their ability to adequately engage in particularly intense 
judicial scrutiny of intricate cases.  
On the other hand, under the ‘limited’ judicial review standard, the EU Courts have 
been able to shield the Commission’s decisions, in both the antitrust and merger field, from 
comprehensive review which, if it had effectively taken place, could have allegedly led to 
different conclusions and outcomes than those reached by the Commission. The existence 
of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard entails that once the Commission has exercised its 
discretionary margin of appreciation and opted for one assessment, when the factual and 
evidential situation of a case allows for a number of equally plausible ones, the EU Courts 
refrain from substituting their own appreciation for that of the Commission. The most 
contentious aspect of the existence of the ‘limited’ review standard remains the 
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circumstance that while the EU Courts may annul a decision when the Commission has 
committed a manifest error that calls into question the validity of the conclusions reached, 
in the absence of a manifest error, EU judges refrain from overturning the decision when 
the Commission’s assessment was reasonable and plausible in the circumstances, even if 
the same evidence might have led to different conclusions depending on the methodology 
used in interpreting it.  
 
Finally, Chapter 4 is dedicated to the analysis of the proposals that have been made to 
reform the current system of judicial review in competition cases and that may lead to 
change and affect in the future the intensity with which EU judges review cases. A number 
of proposals entail structural changes to the current system while others could be 
implemented without impacting the general EU architecture in competition cases. An 
attempt will be made to understand the likelihood that institutional changes may be 
implemented considering the positive or negative views accompanying them. As to those 
proposals that are essentially centred on the EU Courts’ willingness to intensify the judicial 
review they carry out, an attempt will be made to understand the likelihood that judicial 
control may effectively become more intense in the future and, if so, which areas of 
competition law are likely to be interested by this change. On the basis of the case law 
findings made in Chapter 2 and 3, estimates will be made of whether and how and in which 
fields it is most plausible that future changes will occur and conclusions will be drawn on 
the plausibility of the different theories that advocate for particular changes in the scope 
and intensity of the review carried out by the EU Courts. 
 CHAPTER 
1 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, HISTORY AND TERMS OF 
THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
A SYSTEM OF MORE INTENSE OR FULL JUDICIAL 
REVIEW BY THE EU COURTS IN COMPETITION CASES 
2 
 
3 
 
 
SECTION I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS 
 
The jurisdiction of the EU Courts to review the Commission’s decisions in the 
competition field stems directly from the Treaties. According to Article 19 of the Treaty on 
the European Union (“TEU”) ‘[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the 
General Court and specialized courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation of the Treaties the law is 
observed”. In the field of competition law, the EU Courts can achieve this objective primarily 
through the review of Commission’s decisions under Article 263 TFEU, as well as under 
Article 261 TFEU in respect to fines.3 
 
1. 1 R e vi e w  of l e g a l i ty  
The jurisdiction exercised by the EU Courts in the framework of annulment decisions 
under Article 263 TFEU is considered a review of legality. Under this provision EU judges 
are called upon to decide whether the act of the institution under examination is legal or 
                                                     
3  Most studies relating to actions for annulment are general researches that don’t focus specifically on 
competition law, however, a number of authors do focus their analysis on the competition field; see, inter alia, 
BELLAMY&CHILD, European Union Law of Competition, edited by ROTH P., ROSE V., 7th edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2013; ORTIZ BLANCO L., EU Competition Procedure, 3d ed., Clarendon Press – Oxford, 
2013; KHAN N., EC Antitrust Procedure, 6th ed., Thomson – Sweet & Maxwell, 2012; GERADIN D., PETIT 
N., Judicial Remedies Under EC Competition Law: Complex Issues Arising from the Modernization Process, Fordham 
Corporate Law, 2005; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877967. On Article 261 TFEU see 
GERADIN D., The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment, October 2011, TILEC Discussion Paper 
No. 2011-052, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937582 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937582; VESTERDORF B., The Court of Justice and Unlimited Jurisdiction. 
What Does it Mean in Practice?, (30 June 2009) Global Competition Policy, available at 
globalcompetitionpolicy.com; VESTERDORF B., The General Court’s Unlimited Jurisdiction Over Fines, in The 
Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences 
Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 139-145; FORRESTER I., A Challenge 
for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 147-191; BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., Unlimited jurisdiction: the end of a 
misnomer?, in Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 12 September 2011; BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., 
WINCKLER C., A Landmark Year for the Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings, Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 4; BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., WINCKLER 
C., A Survey of Legal Issues Regarding Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings (2010), Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 4. 
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illegal. This system of a posteriori control is considered to have been inspired by the judicial 
systems of the Member States, in particular the French administrative system.4 
According to Article 263(1) TFEU:  
‘[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of 
the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations 
and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to 
produce legal effects vis à vis third parties. It shall review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis à vis third parties’.   
Article 263(2) TFEU also states that:  
‘[i]t shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application, or misuse of powers’.  
Under its current formulation, Article 263 TFEU gives the EU Courts jurisdiction to 
review the legality of acts adopted by the institutions, including the Commission. The EU 
Courts can only annul these acts on the grounds provided for by Article 263(2) TFEU5 
and, in case of annulment, the Commission has the obligation to draw the legal 
consequences of the Courts annulment decision. In this regard, according to Article 266 
TFEU, ‘[t]he institution whose act has been declared void or whose failure to act has been declared contrary 
to the Treaties shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’. It stems from the combined reading of Articles 263 and 266 
TFEU that the EU Courts can only annul the Commission’s decision and cannot substitute 
their own decision for that of the Commission.6 The EU Courts therefore are not called 
                                                     
4 See DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 74-75. It is considered that most of the concepts of judicial review in the 
original Treaties trace their origins back to French administrative law and the wider continental European 
legal tradition. This is also due to the circumstance that in the 1950s, at the time when the original Treaties 
were drafted, none of the Member States were common law jurisdictions; see MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., 
Due Process in EU Competition Cases, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5, 
footnote 65. 
5 Article 263 TFEU indicates limited grounds of review of how a decision has been adopted which do not 
include a review of the merits of the decision itself. A distinction is usually made between the “external” and 
“internal” legality of an act. The external legality can be challenged for lack of competence or an infringement 
of an essential procedural requirement, while the internal legality of an act can be challenged on the basis of 
an error of law or a misuse of powers. 
6 From the point of view of legal terminology, the term ‘appeal’ indicates the exercise of judicial review by 
courts which can lead to overturning the measure under examination and the replacement of their own 
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upon to agree or disagree on the opportunity of the decision challenged and do not have 
the power to reform or modify the measure nor to adopt a new one.7 The Commission 
however is under an obligation to draw the relevant legal conclusions and consequences in 
case of annulment of one of its acts.  
 
1. 2  U nl i m i te d  j u r i s d i c t i on  i n  re l a t i on  to fi n e s  
According to Article 261 TFEU: ‘[r]egulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and 
the Council, and by the Council, pursuant to the provision of the Treaties, may give the Court of Justice of 
the European Union unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided for in such regulations’. 
This possibility of granting unlimited jurisdiction to the EU Courts has been introduced in 
the antitrust and merger field. In the antitrust field, Article 31 of Council Regulation No 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (“Regulation 1/2003”)8 states that ‘[t]he Court of 
Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or 
periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed’. In 
the merger field, Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the “EU Merger Regulation”) 
states that ‘[t]he Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 229 of 
the Treaty to review decisions, whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payments; it 
may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed’.9 
The TFEU does not define unlimited jurisdiction. In practice, it means that the EU 
Courts can cancel, reduce, or increase fines imposed by the Commission and in doing so 
they can substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission.10 In other terms, the 
                                                                                                                                 
findings for those of the decision-maker (also referred to as ‘full appellate review’ or ‘full appellate 
jurisdiction’). The characteristics of the review of legality and the limited powers EU judges exercise in the 
framework of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU have led to consider the use of the notion of 
‘appeal’ for applications made to the EU Courts under this provision a misnomer; see DERENNE J., The 
Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) 
Bruylant, 2010, p. 76. In this work the term “appeal” will be used in the more widespread sense to indicate 
any application made to the EU Courts. 
7 The EU Courts are not entitled to uphold a contested act as this might be annulled in different proceedings 
based on different grounds. 
8 In OJ [2003] L1/1. 
9 In OJ [2004] L24/1. 
10 Over the years, a scholarly debate has developed concerning the scope of application of the EU Courts’ 
unlimited jurisdiction. The controversy find its origin in the conflicting wording used in Article 261 TFEU 
and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. While Article 261 TFEU refers to ‘unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the 
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EU Courts are empowered not only to control the legality of the fines imposed but also to 
second-guess the Commission’s policy and/or opportunity decisions when fixing the 
amount of the sanction, this regardless of whether or not the Commission has made any 
error of fact/law or any manifest error of assessment. 
 
1. 3  T he  e a r l y  c a s e  l a w  on  j u d i c i a l  re vi e w  of c om pe t i t i on  d e c i s i ons  
The combined reading of Articles 263 and 266 TFEU indicates that the EU Courts 
cannot substitute their own decision for that of the Commission. However, these 
provisions remain silent as to the standard and intensity of the review of legality which 
must be carried out. In the earlier case law, when interpreting these provisions, the EU 
Courts accepted the view that there was a need to respect an inter-institutional balance 
where the Commission and the Courts focused on their respective primary functions: 
competition policy and enforcement on the one hand and judicial review on the other. 
According to this case-law:  
‘although a Community Court may, as part of the judicial review of the acts of the Community 
administration, partially annul a Commission decision in the field of competition, that does not 
mean that it has jurisdiction to remake the contested decision […and] the Court considers that it 
                                                                                                                                 
penalties provided’, Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 refers to ‘unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions’. This different 
wording has led a number of scholars to argue that unlimited jurisdiction can be or should be exercised in 
relation to the whole decision imposing a fine; see, inter alia, FORRESTER I., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The 
Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 38-40. Forrester contends that ‘it 
is too cautious to hold that the European Courts have unlimited jurisdiction only over the level of the fine in antitrust cases. The 
CFI has, should have, and should exercise, the broadest possible scope of judicial review under Article 229 EC in antitrust 
cases’ (p. 39). See also GERARD D., EU Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: Why wait? Full Appellate Jurisdiction, Now, 
in CPI Antitrust Journal, December 2010, p. 7: ‘the case law settled in favor of the narrow solution…time has come, it is 
argued, to reverse the trend and to interpret the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction as applying to the review of the decisions 
whereby the Commission imposes fines, i.e., full appellate jurisdiction’. See always GERARD D., EU Cartel Law and the 
Shaking Foundations of Judicial Review (10 July 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675451 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1675451. While the GC has not yet expressed itself clearly on this point, the 
ECJ in the Prym judgment (Case C-534/07 P Prym and Prym Consumer v Commission [2009] ECR I-7415, para 86) 
seems to express the view that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is not limited to the sole amount of the 
fine: ‘the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the [General Court] by Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 in accordance with 
Article [261 TFEU] authorizes the court to vary the contested measure, even without annulling it, by taking into account all of 
the factual circumstances, so as to amend, for example, the amount of the fine’. As indicated by the President of the GC 
Mr. Jaeger: ‘the Court of Justice seems to consider that the contested measure can be amended but not only as regards the 
amount of the fine’; JAEGER M., Standard of Review in Competition Cases: Can the General Court Increase Coherence in 
the European Union Judicial System?, in Today’s Multi-layered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, 
Liber amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H. MEIJ, Paris Legal Publishers, Paris 2011, pp. 120-121. 
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is not for itself…to carry out a comprehensive re-assessment of the evidence before it, nor to draw 
conclusions from that evidence in the light of the rules of competition’.11 
As to the Commission’s role, the EU Courts have stated that:  
‘the supervisory role conferred upon the Commission in competition matters includes the duty to 
investigate and penalize individual infringements, but it also encompasses the duty to pursue a 
general policy designed to apply, in competition matters, the principles laid down by the Treaty and 
to guide the conduct of undertakings in the light of those principles’.12   
With regard to the Courts’ role in assessing so-called complex economic appraisals, the 
EU Courts also expressed the view that:  
‘the exercise of the Commission’s powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic 
matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself 
to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission 
deduces therefrom’.13   
Advocate Generals have also stated that:  
‘the rules on the division of powers between the Commission and the Community judicature, which 
are fundamental to the Community institutions system, do not […] allow the judicature to go 
further, and […] to enter into the merits of the Commission’s complex economic assessments or to 
substitute its own point of view for that of the institution’.14  
Accordingly, while on the one hand the Treaty provisions make a distinction between 
the extent of judicial review the EU Courts can undertake in relation to competition 
decisions (limited) and fines (unlimited), on the other hand, the early case law on the 
intensity of the EU Courts’ review granted the Commission a significant degree of 
deference with regard to so-called complex economic assessments.15 In subsection 2.1 in 
                                                     
11 Joined Cases T-68, 77-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, paras. 
318-320. 
12 Joined Cases T-305 to 307/94, T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 LVM v 
Commission (PVC case) [1999] ECR II-931, paras. 148-149. 
13 Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Ètablissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission, ECR-299, 
p. 347 (“Consten and Grundig”). Consten and Grundig is the first judgment in which the EU Courts exercised 
deferential judicial scrutiny towards the Commission’s complex economic assessments in a competition case; 
see infra subsection 2.1.1 in Chapter 2. 
14 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, 
para 89. 
15  Certain commentators criticize the use of the expression ‘deference’ to describe the limited control 
exercised by the EU Courts within the framework of their review of legality. The President of the GC, Mr. 
Jaeger, by way of example, ‘fiercely disagree[s] with the expression “judicial deference” to the extent that it implies that the 
General Court would be biased, a critical violation of its duty of impartiality’; JAEGER M., Standard of Review in 
Competition Cases: Can the General Court Increase Coherence in the European Union Judicial System?, in Today’s Multi-
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Section I of this Chapter the different standards of review applied by the EU Courts will be 
illustrated and analyzed. 
                                                                                                                                 
layered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, Liber amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H. MEIJ, Paris 
Legal Publishers, Paris 2011, p. 138. A number of commentators consider in fact that the GC’s review is 
comprehensive as it ‘generally exercises an extensive review over the Commission’s findings. It may be that it does not “re-
hear” and “re-find” all the evidence […] but in general it appears to undertake a very thorough review’; see RATLIFF, Judicial 
Review in EC competition cases before the European Courts: Avoiding double renvoi, in European Competition Law 
Annual: 2009. The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (editors 
EHLERMANN Claus-Dieter and MARQUIS Mel), European University Institute, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
& Portland Oregon, 2011, p. 457.  
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2. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
 
The standard of review is the intensity used by the EU Courts when reviewing a 
Commission decision brought to them on appeal.16 Given the absence of guidelines on the 
definition of such standards, the latter have been developed by the EU Courts’ case law. 
Within the grounds for review set out in Article 263 TFEU, the EU Courts have adopted a 
flexible approach and developed different standards depending on the nature of the 
assessment under consideration. This raises the question, which will be dealt with further in 
this work, of whether the EU Courts have the possibility to modify of their own initiative 
the intensity of the scrutiny to which they subject Commission decisions. As will be seen 
infra, the EU Courts’ scrutiny of Commission antitrust and merger decisions has evolved 
and progressively adapted to the increased complexity of the Commission's decisions. The 
following subsection will provide an overview of the different standards of review. A 
detailed analysis of how these standards have developed and changed over time in the 
antitrust and merger field will be dealt with respectively in Chapters 2 and 3.  
                                                     
16  REEVES T, DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, (2005) 
Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Barry E. 
Hawk, ed.), Juris Publishing Inc., 2006, p. 119. For a similar definition see BAILEY D., Standard of Proof in EC 
Merger Proceedings: A Common Law Perspective, in CMLR, Vol. 40, 2003, p. 850: ‘[t]he standard of review refers to the 
intensity with which a court reviews the procedural propriety, factual and legal correctness and merits of a particular case’; 
FORRESTER I., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, in European 
Competition Law Annual, 2009, p. 7: the ‘standard of review is the nature and extent of the enquiry the Court will 
undertake when faced with an appeal concerning a Commission decision’; GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust 
Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts, in European Law Review, 2011, Vol 36(4), p. 468: ‘the notion of 
standard of review is commonly used to refer to the intensity of the scrutiny exercised by the EU Courts over the legality of the act 
subject to review’; ROSCH J. T., Observations on Evidentiary Issues in Antitrust Cases, in European 
Competition Law Annual: 2009. The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases 
(editors EHLERMANN Claus- Dieter and MARQUIS Mel), European University Institute, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford & Portland Oregon, 2011, p. 557, p. 559: ‘[t]he “standard of judicial review” refers, by contrast, to the degree of 
deference that an appellate court accords o the decision of a competition court or agency’; and JAEGER M., Standard of Review 
in Competition Cases: Can the General Court Increase Coherence in the European Union Judicial System?, in Today’s 
Multi-layered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, Liber amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H. MEIJ, 
Paris Legal Publishers, Paris 2011, p. 139: ‘standard of review is an expression of how intense the jurisdiction exercise its 
control over administrative decisions or, in other words, how large a margin of discretion is left to the administration’. See also 
LEGAL H., Standards of proof and standards of judicial review in EU competition law, in Hawk B. (ed.), Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 2006, Vol. 32; and BRUZZONE G., SAIJA A., Non 
varcare quella soglia? Limiti al controllo del giudice sulle decisioni antitrust nell’era della modernizzazione e dell’approccio 
economico, in Mercato, Concorrenza, Regole, No. 1, 2010, p. 7; CAMILLI E. L., CLARICH M., Poteri quasi-
giudiziali delle Autorità indipendenti, in M. D-Alberti, A. Pajno (eds.), Arbitri dei mercati, Bologna 2010; and 
DENOZZA F., Discrezione e deferenza: il controllo giudiziario sugli atti delle autorità indipendenti “regolatrici”, in 
Mercato, Concorrenza, Regole, No. 3/2010. 
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2. 1 T y pe s  of s ta n d a rd s  of re vi e w  
The EU Courts apply different standards of review. The classical formulation of the 
standard of review applied currently in competition cases is as follows: ‘[a]ccording to settled 
case-law, when the Court is faced with an application for the annulment of a decision applying Article 
81(1) EC, it undertakes a comprehensive review generally of the question whether or not the conditions for 
the application of Article 81(1) EC are met’.17 A distinction however can be made between so-
called ‘limited’ or ‘marginal’ review, where the Courts only correct manifest errors, and 
‘comprehensive’ review, where the Courts’ review is more exhaustive and not limited to 
correcting only manifest errors of assessment.18 Indeed, the intensity of judicial control will 
vary depending on the nature of the assessments that the Courts are reviewing.19 
 
2.1.1 Law 
When it comes to the correct interpretation and application of the law, the EU Courts 
exercise full control under Article 19 TEU. Indeed, both the GC and the ECJ have 
unfettered jurisdiction to review any errors of law regarding the scope and interpretation of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 20  as well as any piece of secondary legislation such as 
                                                     
17 Case T-18/03 CD-Contact Data GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-1021, para 50, and case-law cited therein 
discussed infra in Chapter 2 (Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 34, and 
Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 British-American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v Commission 
[1987] ECR 4487, para 62). 
18 See WAHL N., Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited? European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 1-p; see also 
BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. 
and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 105. 
19 For an analysis of the interplay between the standard of review, which refers to the intensity with which the 
EU Courts review Commission decisions, and the standard of proof, which refers to the standard incumbent 
on the Commission in concluding that certain behavior infringes the competition rules see, inter alia, 
CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009; REEVES T., DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and Standards 
of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, (2005) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Barry E. Hawk, ed.), Juris Publishing Inc., 2006; and SIBONY A., 
BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit communautaire de la concurrence: pour 
un changement de perspective, in Revue trimestrielle du droit européen 43 (2), April-June 2007. On more general 
issues on evidence and procedure in EU competition law see, inter alia, LENAERTS K., Some Thoughts on 
Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law, in Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 
No. 5, 2007. 
20 From the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
(ex Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty) became Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. References to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be understood as references to 
Articles 81 and 82 EC and, before them, to Articles 85 and 86 EEC. 
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Regulation 1/2003 or the EU Merger Regulation. Concerning issues of law, the standard of 
review is the highest, as the Courts can control any error of law whether manifest or not. A 
typical example is that of the notion of ‘agreement’ under Article 101 TFEU; it is now 
uncontroversial that the interpretation and application of this concept is an exclusive 
prerogative of the EU Courts.21 Furthermore, according to certain authors, the EU Courts 
have contributed to clarify the interpretation and application of both procedural and 
substantive aspects of competition law.22 Concerning the former, the EU Courts’ main 
contribution has been to clarify and enforce the procedural rights and guarantees of parties 
to Commission antitrust proceedings; as to the latter, the EU Courts have contributed to 
develop the legal tests that need to be used to determine the compatibility of certain 
practices with competition law. The amount of economic reasoning that is required from 
the EU Courts when developing and enunciating such tests is also considered indicative of 
the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and economic issues (see infra subsection 2.3 of 
Section I in this Chapter).23 
A comprehensive review is carried out by the EU Courts not only in relation to the law 
but also to the facts, as will be examined in the following subsection. The GC had in fact 
occasion to state in the Cement case that: ‘[w]hen the General Court reviews the legality of a decision 
finding an infringement of Article [101(1)] and/or Article [102], the applicants may call upon to 
undertake an exhaustive review of both the Commission’s substantive findings of fact and its legal appraisal 
of those facts’.24 
 
2.1.2 Facts 
As regards the correctness of facts, the EU Courts exercise a comprehensive control. 
There is no room for discretion for the Commission as to whether a fact is either correct 
                                                     
21 In the Bayer case, the GC and ECJ rejected the Commission’s arguments that Bayer’s practices amounted to 
an agreement under Article 101 TFEU; see Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383, para 62, 
upheld on appeal in Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P BAI and Commission v Bayer [2004] ECR I-23. 
Examples of cases where the EU Courts annulled Commission decisions on the basis of errors of law are also 
Case 258/78 Nungesser v Commission [1982] ECR 2015 and Case 40/74 Suiker Unie v Commission [1975] ECR 
1663. 
22 See GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 46-47. 
23 Ibid., p. 47. 
24 See Joined Cases T-25/95 et al. Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission [2000] ECR II 491, para 719. 
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or not.25 This also reflects the purpose for which the Court of First Instance (“CFI”, now 
the GC) was established, i.e. to strengthen the judicial review of factual assessments by the 
EU system.26 An adequate review of the facts was one of the main reasons for the creation 
of the GC, established in order to assist the ECJ with the increasing case workload.27 As 
the ECJ stated in the judgment in Baustahlgewebe: ‘the purpose of attaching the Court of First 
Instance to the Court of Justice and of introducing two levels of jurisdiction was, first, to improve the judicial 
protection of individual interests, in particuliar in proceedings necessitating close examination of complex 
facts, and, second, to maintain the quality and effectiveness of judicial review in the Community legal 
order’.28  
The importance of the review of factual findings has been recognized by Advocate 
Generals such as Tizzano, which in his Opinion in the Tetra Laval case stated that: 
‘[w]ith regard to the findings of fact, the review is clearly more intense, in that the issue is to verify 
objectively and materially the accuracy of certain facts and the correctness of the conclusions drawn 
in order to establish whether certain known facts make it possible to prove the existence of other 
facts to be ascertained’.29 
Similarly, Advocate General Kokott, in her Opinion in Bertelsmann and Sony stated: 
                                                     
25 Errors of fact are not expressly stated in Article 263 TFEU as a ground for annulment. However, they 
represent the basic foundation for the conclusion that the contested measure is wrong. For this reason, issues 
of fact can also be viewed as raising issues of law; see CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and 
Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 
560. For an overview of the extent of the EU Courts’ jurisdiction to review matters of fact in competition 
cases and the powers they may exercise to this end see, inter alia, LASOK K. P. E., Judicial Review of Issues of Fact 
in Competition Cases, 4 ECLR, 1983, pp. 85-96, and authors cited therein.  
26  ROSE V., Margins of Appreciation: Changing Contours in Community and Domestic Case Law, 30 April 2009, 
available at globalcompetitionpolicy.com (https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margins-of-
appreciation-changing-contours-in-community-and-domestic-case-law), p. 5. The CFI was set up with the 
purpose to hear ‘actions requiring close examination of complex facts [to] improve the judicial protection of individual 
interests’; see Recitals to Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities, in OJ [1988] L319/1.  
27 Errors of fact are subject only to the GC’s review, as the ECJ’s review of GC judgments is limited to 
questions of law (see Article 256 TFEU and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice). Only if the GC’s 
judgment contains a ‘distortion’ of the facts, i.e. factual assumptions in clear contradiction with the case file, 
this may constitute an illegality leading to the annulment of the judgment by the ECJ. See O’ CAOIMH A., 
Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof, Standards of Review and Evaluation of Evidence in Antitrust and Merger Cases: 
Perspective of Court of Justice of the European Union, in European Competition Law Annual: 2009. The Evaluation 
of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (editors EHLERMANN Claus- Dieter and 
MARQUIS Mel), European University Institute, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Portland Oregon, 2011, p. 271 
onwards. 
28 Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, para 41; see similarly the comments 
of Advocate General Cosams in Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd [2000] ECR I-11369 para 
54. 
29 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, 
para 86. 
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‘it would be an error to assume that the Commission’s margin of discretion precludes the 
Community Courts in any event from giving their own analysis of the facts and the evidence. On 
the contrary, it is essential for the Community Courts to undertake such an assessment of their 
own where they are assessing whether the factual material on which the Commission’s decision was 
based was accurate, reliable, consistent and complete, and whether this factual material was 
capable of substantiating the conclusions the Commission drew from it. Otherwise, the Community 
Courts could not sensibly assess whether the Commission had stayed within the limits of the 
margin of discretion allowed to it or had committed a manifest error of assessment’.30 
The importance of the appraisal of facts has been recognized also by the GC that has 
stated that ‘it is incumbent on it [...] to check meticulously the nature and importance of the evidence 
taken into consideration by the Commission in the decision’. 31  The EU Courts will check 
methodically the soundness of the evidence relied upon by the Commission in its 
decisions.32 Decisions based on incorrect facts may lead the EU Courts to set aside the 
Commission’s assessments. The ICI case provides an example of an instance where the 
ECJ partially annulled a Commission decision in so far as the factual evidence relied upon 
did not support the Commission’s conclusions concerning the duration of the 
infringement. In this case the Commission’s assessment that the applicant’s abusive 
behaviour had started in a particular year did not find support in the case file and had to be 
annulled, leading to a reduction of the fine.33 
However, one particular difficulty lies in distinguishing between assessments concerning 
matters of fact and assessments concerning economic matters.34 As will be seen infra, this 
distinction is not merely theoretical but will determine a different intensity of the review 
carried out by the EU Courts, comprehensive in the first case and limited in the second. 
On the other hand, the distinction between matters of fact and matters of law is less 
                                                     
30 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v 
Impala [2008] ECR I-4951, para 239. 
31 Joined Cases T-68, 77-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, para 95. 
32 According to certain authors, the EU Courts willingness to scrutinize facts has increased over the years in 
response to calls for more judicial review; see CRAIG P., EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, 
2012, pp. 400-445. See contra CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, 
in World Competition Law and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 562: ‘I do not think that such 
willingness to carefully review findings of fact is so new…an examination of the first judgments of the Court of Justice show great 
willingness to examine in detail the facts’. 
33 Case T-66/01 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Commission [2010] II-02631, paras. 397-401. 
34  For an overview of the difficulties in distinguishing between facts, appreciation of facts or their 
qualification see, inter alia, SIMON D., Une Théorie de l’Intensité du Contrôle Juridictionnel est-elle Possible?, Europe – 
Editions du Juris-Classeur, April 2002, p. 3. 
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relevant from the standpoint of the intensity of the review carried out as the EU Courts 
will scrutinize comprehensively both categories of matters. 35  In the EU case law the 
following assessments, among others, have concerned matters of fact and called for a 
comprehensive review by the EU judiciary: the existence of meetings between competitors, 
their dates and individual participants; the substance of the decisions taken at meetings 
between competitors and whether and how they have been implemented;36 the existence of 
a competitive relationship between two undertakings;37 etc. The categorization of a matter is 
however not always straightforward and this uncertainty may reflect negatively on the 
applicants’ expectations that the EU Courts carry out a more or less intense review.38 
 
2.1.3 Policy choices, complex economic appraisals and/or complex technical appraisals 
When it comes to policy choices, complex economic appraisals and/or complex 
technical appraisals, the review of the EU Courts is limited. The classical formulation of 
this so-called ‘limited’ or ‘marginal’ standard of judicial review in relation to the 
Commission’s complex economic assessments is the so-called ‘manifest error standard’. In 
the first place, the importance of distinguishing appraisals of an economic nature from 
other assessments has been expressly recognized in EU case law. By way of example, in the 
General Electric case the General Court emphasized that: 
‘[a]s to the nature of the Community judicature’s power of review, it is necessary to draw attention 
to the essential difference between factual matters and findings, on the one hand, which may be 
found to be inaccurate by the Court in the light of the arguments and evidence before it, and, on the 
other hand, appraisals of an economic nature’.39 
According to the ‘limited’ review standard, the EU Courts’ review of the above-
mentioned appraisals made by the Commission is limited to checking ‘whether the relevant 
rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately 
                                                     
35 On the difficulties of distinguishing between errors of fact, errors of law and errors of appreciation see, inter 
alia, REEVES T., DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, (2005) 
Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Barry E. 
Hawk, ed.), Juris Publishing Inc., 2006, pp. 134-138.  
36 See GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 48. 
37 Case T-374/95 European Night Services v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141. 
38  For an in-depth analysis of the difficulties of categorizing complex economic assessments, see infra 
subsection 2.3 of Section I in this Chapter. 
39 Case T-210/01 General Electric Company v Commission [2005] ECR II-05575 (“General Electric”), para 62. 
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stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers’.40 In light of 
the distinction introduced by this formula, while the establishment of facts and the respect 
of the law, whether substantive or procedural, is subject to a standard of correctness, 
Commission complex appraisals of an economic or technical nature are subject to a 
‘manifest error’ standard.41 As will be seen infra, this manifest error standard has evolved in 
the case law of the EU Courts and currently, when reviewing these kind of assessments 
made by the Commission, EU judges not only must, inter alia, establish ‘whether the evidence 
relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the 
information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is 
capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.42 
The limitation of the intensity of judicial review depending on the nature of the 
assessment under examination is not an exclusive prerogative of competition law. Other 
areas of EU law, including the common agricultural policy, anti-dumping measures and the 
medical-pharmacological field, among others, also limit the scope of review of certain kinds 
of assessments.43 It is considered that these areas all have in common the formulation of 
non-legal complex assessments of a scientific, technical or economic nature which involve 
value judgments and/or expert appreciations. The following subsection is dedicated to the 
analysis of the so-called limited standard of review, from its origins to its applications over 
time in the competition field. 
 
                                                     
40 See Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission (“Microsoft”) [2007] ECR II-3601, para 87; see also to that 
effect, with respect to Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU), Case 42/84, Remia BV and Others v Commission, 
[1985] ECR 2545, para 34, and Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v Commission, [1987] ECR 
4487, para 62. These cases will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2; in the merger field see infra Chapter 3. 
41 See NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 994. According to this author the 
EU Courts also apply a deferential standard to the evaluation of evidence or to issues inextricably intertwined 
with the evaluation of evidence in those instances where they consider that the Commission is better placed 
to carry out the task. 
42 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
43 See BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 106. For examples of the application of marginal review 
in the agriculture, dumping and State aid fields; see also FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic 
Approach, Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 5. 
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2.2.  The orig ins of the limited standard of judicial review 
Historically, the so-called ‘limited’ or ‘marginal’ standard of review finds its roots in 
Article 33 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the “ECSC 
Treaty”). According to this provision, the Court had jurisdiction over appeals concerning 
decisions of the Commission on grounds practically identical to those of Article 263 
TFEU. Under Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty: 
‘[t]he Court may not review the conclusions of the Commission, drawn from economic facts and 
circumstances, which formed the basis of such decisions or recommendations, except where the 
Commission is alleged to have abused its powers or to have clearly misinterpreted the provisions of 
the Treaty or of a rule of law relating to its application’.44 
There is no equivalent provision in the TEU or in the TFEU. However, this 
formulation is almost identical to that used by the ECJ in 1966 in the Consten and Grundig 
judgment,45 the first example of deferential judicial scrutiny in a competition related matter. 
The ECJ here stated that ‘the exercise of the Commission’s powers necessarily implies complex 
evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their nature by 
confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the 
Commission deduces therefrom’.46 In this case, the ECJ was confronted with the application of 
Article 85(3) EEC (now 101(3) TFEU). At the time the Commission enjoyed a monopoly 
in the application of this provision, which expressly states that Article 85(1) EEC ‘may be 
declared inapplicable’, a term indicative of discretion. 47  Since this first judgment, the EU 
                                                     
44 Article 33 ECSC has been interpreted in the case law as follows: ‘[t]he first part of the second sentence of Article 33 
thus states the limits upon the power of the Court, in its examination of the legality of a measure, to review the choices of economic 
policy made by the Commission; the second part removes those limitations, provided that the applicant alleges a manifest failure to 
observe the Treaty or a misuse of powers. According to the case-law of the Court […] Article 33 does not require that the 
objection raised be supported by full proof in advance; this moreover would immediately entail the annulment of the decision. 
Therefore, when considering the admissibility of the arguments intended to induce the Court to examine the evaluation of the 
situation resulting from the economic facts or circumstances of the case, it is necessary and sufficient that the objections of manifest 
failure or misuse of powers be supported by appropriate evidence. A stricter requirement would amount to confusing the 
admissibility of the argument with the proof of its substance; a more liberal interpretation, whereby the mere assertion of one of the 
claims referred to would be sufficient to open the way to review by the Court of the economic evaluation, would reduce that claim to 
a mere formality’; see Joined Cases 154, 205, 206, 226 to 228, 263 and 264/78, 39, 31, 83 and 85/79 SpA Ferriera 
Valsabbia and others v Commission [1980] ECR 907, para 11. 
45 Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 429. 
46 Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 429, p. 347. 
47 SCHWEITZER H., The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial Review, in 
European Competition Law Annual: 2009. The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases (editors EHLERMANN Claus-Dieter and MARQUIS Mel), European University 
Institute, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Portland Oregon, 2011, p. 98. 
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Courts have developed a practice of according deference, a so-called ‘margin of appreciation’, 
to the Commission when undertaking complex economic assessments also in other areas of 
competition law. 48  Over time, such deference has extended from concerns relating to 
Community and EU policies to all ‘complex economic assessments’ and more recently also to 
‘complex technical appraisals’.49 
In practice, this limited standard of judicial review in relation to the Commission's 
complex economic and/or technical assessments boils down to assessing whether the 
Commission has made a so-called ‘manifest error of assessment’. 50  Indeed, the Courts 
confine themselves to verifying whether there has been no misuse of powers, that the rules 
on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts have 
been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error of appraisal. Over time the 
EU Courts have also had occasion to clarify how and what they would review under the 
manifest error test by stating that in reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of 
information of an economic nature, the EU Courts would ‘establish whether the evidence relied 
on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information 
which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.51 
 
2. 3.  T he  i m porta n c e  of d e fi n i ng  c om p le x  e c onom i c  or te c h n i c a l  
a s s e s s m e n ts  i n  c om pe t i t i on  c a s e s  
One of the most controversial issues in the debate on the intensity of the review carried 
out by the EU Courts in competition cases is the meaning of ‘complex economic 
                                                     
48 REEVES T., DODOO N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, (2005) Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Barry E. Hawk, 
ed.), Juris Publishing Inc., 2006, p. 137 
49 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, paras. 87-89, 482. 
50 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para 3: ‘The Court must 
undertake a comprehensive review of the examination carried out by the Commission, unless that examination entails a complex 
economic assessment, in which case review by the Court is confined to ascertaining that there has been no misuse of powers, that 
the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts have been accurately stated and that 
there has been no manifest error of assessment of those facts’. See also Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 
P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland A/S and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, 
para 279: ‘Examination by the Community judicature of the complex economic assessments made by the Commission must 
necessarily be confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, 
whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers’.  See 
also Case T-48/04 Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v Commission [2009] ECR II-2029, para 92; 
Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 34 and Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 
British-American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para 106. 
51 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-00987, para 39. 
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assessments’ and the definition of the situations and circumstances that can be considered 
to fall within this notion.52 The basic premise of the ‘limited’ or ‘marginal’ review standard 
is that EU judges recognize the existence of a particular discretion to the Commission not 
for all assessments, but for those that can be considered economically or technically 
complex. Identifying which assessments fall within this concept is crucial to understand 
which intensity of review applies, in particular when EU judges will restrain themselves and 
carry out only a ‘limited review’. The difficulty inherent in this distinction has been pointed 
out by a number of authors,53 given that controversies may arise in distinguishing between 
issues of fact (which call for unrestricted review), and economic assessments,54 in particular 
when judges are confronted with ‘facts of an economic nature’, as defined by former Judge 
David Edward. 55  Difficulties may also arise in distinguishing, among economic issues, 
between those that can be considered complex (limited review) and those that can be 
considered simple (unrestricted review). The risk inherent in these difficulties is that, 
considering also the Commission’s more ‘economic’ and ‘effects based approach’ to 
competition cases, if the notion of ‘complex economic assessment’ is applied 
indiscriminately and too extensively, the result will be an excessive broadening of the 
Commission’s discretion, ultimately increasing the number of assessments that are not 
                                                     
52 ‘[C]ette notion d’appréciation économique complexe n’est pas définie ni dans les traités, ni de façon claire dans la jurisprudence 
communautaire’; see VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, 
in Revue des affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 441. ‘[C]i si chieda quali siano gli elementi che consentono al 
giudice di distinguere […] tra controllo del diritto e del fatto, da una parte, e valutazione economica complessa, dall’altra. E nel 
far cio’ chiediamoci prima di tutto quali siano le valutazione economiche complesse, premesso che una definizione di tale nozione 
non è data nella giurisprudenza di Corte e Tribunale’; OSTI C., Un giudice a Berlino: equità ed efficienza nelle decisioni 
dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza, in Giur. Comm., 2008, Vol. 35, No. 5, p. 879. 
53 See, inter alia, GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 46-54; SIRAGUSA M., Access to the Courts in 
a Community based on the rule of law, contribution for the workshop ‘Access to Justice’ organized at the occasion 
of the ‘Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities’ on 25 
September 2009 (n 1), p. 133; BELLAMY C., ECHR and competition law post Menarini: An Overview of EU and 
national case law, in e-competitions, No. 47946, p. 4; JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases 
Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011; WAHL N., Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited?, 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 5-6. 
54 The distinction between issues of fact and legal questions is less relevant for the discussion on the intensity 
of judicial review as both call for unrestricted review by the EU Courts, see supra subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of 
Section I in this Chapter. 
55 GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 48. 
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subject to intense scrutiny. This risk has been well-described by the President of the 
General Court, Mr. Jaeger, who has stated that:  
‘an issue could however emerge if Courts hesitate in determining the limits of the Commission’s 
discretion area. Indeed, it would lead them to refrain from applying the intensity contained in this 
standard of review to situations where they should not…A clear determination of the limits of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine…and, thus, the type of situations where the judge applies a less 
intensive standard of review would probably be welcome. For this purpose, the meaning of the 
expression “complex economic assessments” needs to be cleared up. I should add that this call for 
clarity is more than a wish but a must’.56 
To draw a dividing line between cases of unrestricted factual review and cases of 
deference to the Commission’s discretion is considered a challenging exercise.57 Examples 
of how hard it is to understand which kind of assessments are subject to limited or 
comprehensive review arise directly from the case law where, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, certain evaluations, such as those concerning market definition, 
have been considered to not involve complex economic assessments - calling for 
unrestricted review -, 58  while in other cases the definition of the relevant market was 
considered to involve complex economic assessments - triggering only limited review -.59 
Identifying when an assessment is ‘complex’ in nature is another issue which raises 
controversies. Is it sufficient for an assessment to be difficult in order to be considered 
                                                     
56 JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, 
pp. 305 and 309. 
57  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 17. 
58 According to Siragusa, in a number of cases, although the EU Courts engaged in a full and thorough review, 
issues such as the definition of the relevant market apparently were not considered to require complex 
economic assessments on the part of the Commission (for example, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] 
ECR 462, Case 322/81 Michelin [1983] ECR 3461, and Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2008] 
ECR II-477); SIRAGUSA M., Annulment Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. 
and DERENNE J.), Bruylant, 2010, p. 129. 
59 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 482: ‘The Court notes at the outset that in 
so far as the definition of the product market involves complex economic assessments on the part of the Commission, it is subject 
to only limited review by the Community judicature…’. According to certain commentators, ‘in certain cases the EU 
Courts’ limited review has spilled over into certain factual issues that did not involve complex appreciations. For instance in 2011 
the General Court applied twice the standard of the manifest error of appreciation to the question of whether an undertaking had 
contested the facts on which the Commission based its allegations (Case T-33/05 Cetarsa v Commission, paragraph 271; Case 
T-37/05 World Wide Tobacco España v Commission, paragraph 197). Why did this factual finding require the kind of 
complex appreciation that normally justifies limited review?’; see BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., A Lesson of Judicial 
Review from the other European Court in Luxembourg, in Kluwer Competition Law Blog, April 27, 2012, p. 3. 
20 
 
complex, or should the threshold of ‘complexity’ be higher and embrace only particularly 
problematic and challenging assessments? The circumstance that the EU case law has not 
been straightforward in this regard, and that the Courts have even overturned what 
appeared to be complex assessments, underlines even more the ambiguity of defining what 
is a complex assessment.60 Certain authors, however, aware of the increasingly central role 
of economic analysis in competition cases, consider that an assessment which is difficult 
should not be considered for this reason alone ‘complex’.61 In particular, the existence of a 
complex economic assessment should not be confused with the complexity of the case or 
of the evidence. The circumstance that a case involves consideration of difficult economic 
arguments and theories, or of evidence of an economic nature, does not necessarily make 
these assessments ‘complex’ ones. According to certain authors, ‘complexity’ should be 
interpreted as referring to the nature of the assessment that needs to be made, not to its 
technical or evidential difficulty. Value judgments ultimately would exemplify these kind of 
assessments.62 It has also been contended that ‘complexity’ should embrace only situations 
where the Commission makes economic policy choices, which would thus be excluded 
from a comprehensive review, leaving all other economic assessments, irrespective of their 
level of difficulty, subject to full review.63  
                                                     
60  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 25. According to Wahl, the circumstance that, notwithstanding the 
statement of the existence of a margin of appreciation for the Commission the EU Courts have nonetheless 
closely examined the evidential basis for the Commission’s findings, has led to question ‘to what extent the actual 
content or the review carried out under each of the two labels [comprehensive review and limited review] is equally 
coherent’; see WAHL W., Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited?, in Ehlermann & Marquis European 
Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, p. 285. 
61  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 17; see also JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving 
Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, pp. 309-310. 
62  FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic Approach, Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the 
Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 10-13; see 
also SIRAGUSA M., Annulment Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.), Bruylant, 2010, p. 133. 
63 JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, 
pp. 310 and 312: ‘Complex economic assessments should be understood as situations where the Commission has to make an 
economics-based choice of policy. It should only be in such situations that marginal review should be applied’. 
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The above considerations on assessments of an economic nature apply equally to 
assessments of a technical nature. 64  In other areas of EU law, such as custom duty 
exemptions and medical staff cases, the ECJ has held that EU judges must address and 
examine also technical issues, which can thus not be subtracted from their review, and 
should do so with the help of experts whose opinions they can’t substitute for their own.65 
In light of the above, certain authors claim that in relation to technical assessments in the 
competition field it is not easy to understand ‘why the Courts should defer to the Commission’s 
expertise in a particular technical or economic controversy when the Courts themselves have the power to 
appoint experts, economic and otherwise’.66  
In the following Section, the arguments in favour and against the modification of the 
current system of judicial review in competition cases, in particular from the point of view 
of its scope and intensity, will be analysed. 
                                                     
64 As will be seen infra in subsection 3.1.3 of Chapter 2, the broadening of the marginal review standard to 
technical assessments occurred in the Microsoft case. 
65 DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 77 and 82. 
66  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 18. 
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SECTION II: ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR AND AGAINST THE 
INTRODUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF MORE INTENSE OR FULL 
JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE EU COURTS IN COMPETITION 
CASES 
The practice of the EU Courts of according deference, within the exercise of their 
review of legality, to complex economic and/or technical assessments undertaken by the 
Commission is not expressly mandated by the EU Treaties. A number of authors however 
believe that the Commission is entitled to a certain amount of discretion in relation to these 
assessments, and that an expansion of the EU Courts’ judicial review powers would 
subvert the EU’s judicial process and encroach on the Commission’s prerogatives in the 
competition field. This view is contested, in a variety of forms and intensities, by a number 
of authors and commentators that criticize the EU judiciary’s indulgent approach and 
demand that the EU Courts do not leave any discretion to the Commission’s assessments 
in the competition field. Accordingly, over the years, the effectiveness of judicial review in 
EU competition cases has been the object of intense scholarly debate.67 
                                                     
67 The present work focuses on the debate concerning the exercise of limited control by the EU Courts 
within the framework of their powers of review in relation to the review of legality ex Article 263 TFEU. It is 
worth mentioning however that over the years another debate has picked up momentum that concerns the 
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction by the EU Courts in relation to fines. Here the main criticism is against the 
EU Courts’ restrictive use of their powers of review under Article 261 TFEU. It has been pointed out that 
the EU Courts have rarely exercised their unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines, and even more rarely in 
the absence of a finding of illegality of the decision under examination. See, inter alia, BARBIER DE LA 
SERRE E., Unlimited jurisdiction: the end of a misnomer?, in Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 12 September 2011; 
SIRAGUSA M., Annulment Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 130: ‘[i]n reality, the control of legality performed by the General Court is quite often 
seriously deficient, its scope being restricted to certain elements of the calculation of the fines. Instead of performing a comprehensive 
review of the Commission decision…the Court takes a deferential approach to the way in which the Commission exercised its 
fining powers, and its review is limited to determining the absence of a manifest error of assessment’. See also VESTERDORF 
B., The Court of Justice and Unlimited Jurisdiction: What Does it Mean in Practice?, 30 June 2009, Global Competition 
Policy, available at globalcompetitionpolicy.com (https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-
court-of-justice-and-unlimited-jurisdiction-what-does-it-mean-in-practice), pp. 2-3: ‘the reality is that, almost 
without exception, the Court limits itself to performing a control of the legality of the fine or, rather, to verifying whether the 
Commission has applied the Guidelines for the calculation of fines correctly...the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is, in practice, 
the very rare exception’; and WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in World Competition, Volume 33, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 28-29: ‘If…the General 
Court were ever to refuse to assess the appropriateness of the fine, exercising its full jurisdiction, when requested to do so by the 
parties, or if the Court were to consider, when exercising its full jurisdiction, that it is not empowered to depart from the 
methodology used by the Commission, this would be mistaken, and would indeed provide a ground for appeal to the Court of 
Justice against such a judgment of the General Court’. 
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This Section is dedicated to the analysis of the various positions that have been adopted 
by commentators advocating for or against a change of the current intensity of review 
applied by the EU Courts in the competition field. The controversial factors of the current 
system of review that continue to be the object of criticism will be identified and analysed. 
The theories that have been developed in the literature to justify a review of the status quo in 
the antitrust and merger field will also be illustrated and confronted with the theories of 
those authors who believe no changes are needed nor warranted. 
 
1. INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND THE COMMISSION’S ROLE AS 
COMPETITION AUTHORITY TODAY 
 
One of the main arguments in favor of keeping the current system of judicial review 
unchanged relates to the perceived need to preserve the inter-institutional balance provided 
for by the Treaties.68 The principle of institutional balance implies that each institution has 
to act in accordance with the powers conferred on it by the Treaties and prohibits any 
encroachment by one institution on the powers conferred on another.69  
According to this argument, the Treaty introduced a clear-cut separation of powers in 
the competition field between the Commission as policy maker and enforcer and the EU 
Courts as guarantors of the lawfulness of the Commission’s exercise of its enforcement 
powers.70 The Commission must ensure the application of competition law and in doing so 
                                                     
68 See, inter alia, the former President of the GC, Mr. Bo Vesterdorf: ‘[i]n the light of this respect of the institutional 
balance between the Community courts and the Commission, we have traditionally afforded the Commission a margin of 
discretion when reviewing its assessment of complex economic matters’; VESTERDORF B., Chapter 13: The European 
Court’s Case Law in Merger Control, in Competition Law and Economics (edited by A. M. Mateus and T. Moreira), 
International Competition Law Series Volume 31, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 245. See also TIILI V. 
and VANHAMME J., The “Power of Appraisal” (Pouvoir d’Appréciation) of the Commission of the European 
Communities vis-à-vis the Powers of Judicial Review of the Communities’ Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, in 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1999, pp. 885-901. According to the authors ‘[w]hen 
authorities exercising policy-making powers and judicial authorities are brought together in a functional relationship, as is the case 
with the Commission and the Courts of the European Communities, “marginal review” is an attractive notion. It is an almost 
natural response to the difficulty inherent in separation of administrative and judicial powers. In its primitive form, the idea 
behind the marginal review approach is more or less that: the Courts must not redo the Commission’s work, but must nevertheless 
do something, so they solely check for manifest mistakes in the Commission’s assessments, thereby cutting the separation of powers 
knot nicely through the middle’ (p. 898). 
69See the EU Glossary at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/institutional_balance_en.htm. The 
principle itself is not expressly defined in the Treaties but was clearly referred to for the first time in the 
judgment in the Meroni case (Case 9/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community [1958] ECR 11). 
70 Article 17 TEU establishes that the Commission ‘shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate 
initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to 
them. It shall oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union’. Article 19 
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may need to elaborate economic or technical assessments. In order to allow it to fulfill its 
duties, a margin or power of appraisal is recognized to the Commission for certain 
assessments that call for value judgments. The Commission’s technical expertise and 
experience would also place it in a better position to conduct in-depth economic analysis 
and would justify recognizing it this prerogative. Against this background, if the EU Courts 
were given the power to control fully the Commission’s appraisal of so-called complex 
economic and/or technical assessments this would inevitably alter the existing inter-
institutional balance, invading the Commission’s sphere of competence as a policy maker.  
As a former president of the General Court has had the opportunity to state ‘[i]n light of 
this respect of the institutional balance between the Community Courts and the Commission, we have 
traditionally afforded the Commission a margin of discretion when reviewing its assessment of complex 
economic matters’. 71 The importance of the division of powers as a limiting factor to the 
judges’ possibility to review the merits of the Commission’s complex economic 
assessments was emphasized also by Advocate General Tizzano in the Tetra Laval case 
where he stated that ‘[t]he rules on the division of powers between the Commission and the Community 
judicature, which are fundamental to the Community institutional system, do not however allow the 
                                                                                                                                 
TEU on the other hand establishes that the EU Courts ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed’. In relation to competition law, on the basis of Article 103(2)(d) TFEU, Regulation 
1/2003 enacts a system where the Commission is responsible for the development of EU competition policy 
and with the uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. See, inter alia, WAHL N., Standard of Review – 
Comprehensive or Limited?, in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis, eds., European Competition Law 
Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases, forthcoming, Hart 
Publishing, p. 4; and M. JAEGER, The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic 
Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, p. 296: ‘The application of a standard of review of a lower intensity reflects the institutional 
partition of competences between the Commission, entrusted for instance with the enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, 
the control of concentrations, and more generally the shaping of EU competition policy, on the one hand, and the EU Courts in 
charge of reviewing the legality of the Commission decisions, on the other’. Always Jaeger: ‘[t]he role of the Community judge, 
therefore, it is not that of substituting its own appreciation to that of the Commission; it is instead that of sanctioning, if 
necessary, any manifest error of appreciation. This reflects the institutional partition of competences between the Commission, 
entrusted with the enforcement of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, the control of concentrations, and the shaping of the EC 
competition policy, on the one hand, and the Community Courts in charge of reviewing the legality of the Commission decisions, 
on the other’; see JAEGER M., The Court of First Instance and the Management of Competition Law Litigation, in EU 
Competition Law in Context, Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, H. Kanninen, N. Korjus and A. Rosas (eds.), 
Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009, p. 10. For some authors the separation of powers is the only justification for a 
dual system of intensity of review; see FRITZSCHE A. , Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance 
in European Law, CMLR, Vol. 47, 2010, pp. 380-387. 
71  VESTERDORF B., Chapter 13: The European Court’s Case Law in Merger Control, in Competition Law and 
Economics (edited by A. M. Mateus and T. Moreira), International Competition Law Series Volume 31, Kluwer 
Law International, 2007, pp. 243-254.  
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judicature to go further, and particularly […] to enter into the merits of the Commission’s complex economic 
assessments or to substitute its own point of view for that of the institution’.72 
This view is challenged by a number of scholars who argue that limited judicial review 
could have made sense in the past, at the very offset of the construction of the EU’s 
competition policy, in light of the Commission’s specific tasks and role. However, the 
changes that have occurred over time in the EU antitrust system would no longer justify 
judicial deference.73 According to this argument, originally the Commission played a role of 
advocacy in shaping, promoting and spreading the principles of competition law. It also 
had exclusive jurisdiction to apply Article 81(3) EC (now 101(3) of the TFEU) and an 
advisory role through the notification system. In the early years of the EU construction, the 
Commission therefore had a major role in regulating markets, rule-making and policy 
building. At the time, its role was rather of guidance than of prosecution and, even when 
prosecuting, imposed low fines. These activities called for common interest assessments 
and opportunity choices and could justify a certain degree of judicial deference.74  
Over the years the competition landscape has increasingly changed. The principles 
elaborated by the Commission started to be widely accepted and applied in most Member 
States, with a consequential loss of its advocacy ‘monopoly’. With the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003 the Commission also no longer had exclusive jurisdiction to apply 
Article 101(3) TFEU, and with the elimination of the notification system, its advisory role 
also vanished. 75 The circumstance that the Commission now exercises a predominantly 
                                                     
72 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] I-987, para 89. 
73 See, for an overview on this argument, the paper presented by SIRAGUSA M., Access to the Courts in a 
Community based on the rule of law, Contribution for the workshop ‘Access to Justice’ organized at the occasion 
of the ‘Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities’ on 25 
September 2009 (n 1) 129-134 for the 20th CFI celebration. According to this author, ‘the judicial deference 
doctrine historically may have been justified in the early days of EU competition law enforcement. Back then the Court may have 
felt unprepared, or not confident enough, to deal with matters which were at the time perceived as involving questions uniquely 
within the Commission’s expertise and experience…However, the limitations to full judicial review that are inherent in that 
doctrine are no longer appropriate in the current phase of our competition law enforcement system, over 40 years after the first 
antitrust cases’; see SIRAGUSA M., Annulment Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. 
and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 134. 
74 DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 83. 
75 Prior to the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 which abolished the centralized notification and authorization 
system for Article 81(3) EC (now 101(3) TFEU), the Commission was the sole authority competent to assess 
the compatibility of agreements with the provisions of Article 81 EC. As stated by one commentator, the 
reason for this was that ‘the prohibition on restrictive agreements was entirely revolutionary in Europe…[t]he revolutionary 
character of Article 85 EEC (now Article 81 EC) pleaded for a centralized notification and authorization system. Indeed, 
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prosecutorial role, which finds its most evident expression in broader powers of 
investigation and the imposition of high fines in the antitrust field, 76  is an additional 
element that would justify questioning the judicial deference doctrine.  
                                                                                                                                 
given the radical novelty of the rule, companies and their legal advisors could not be relied upon to assess themselves the 
compatibility of their agreements with the provisions of Article 81 EC. Similarly, leaving the application of Article 81(3) EC to 
the courts and authorities of the Member States…would have entailed a major risk of the prohibition laid down in Article 81 
EC not being applied in practice, or at least not in a sufficiently uniform manner. The centralized notification and authorization 
system guaranteed that the new provision would be interpreted and applied by the Commission, which was specifically dedicated to 
the new religion. The notification system also had an educational function, as companies and their lawyers were educated by the 
Commission through the authorization process’; see WILS W. P. J., Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, 
Hart Publishing, 2005, pp. 5-6. 
76 On the issue of the substantial increase of the amount of fines inflicted by the Commission see CONNOR J. 
M., Cartel Fine Severity and the European Commission: 2007-2011, in ECLR, 2013, Issue 2, pp. 58-77; VENIT J. S., 
Human All Too Human: The Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and Judicial 
Review in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 2. 
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2. THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMICS IN COMPETITION LAW AND THE EU 
COURTS’  COMPETITION LAW EXPERTISE 
 
2.1. The increased relevance of economics in competition law 
Another important consideration is that economic analysis has progressively gained 
more and more space in the context of the Commission’s antitrust and merger cases. This 
economics-oriented revolution has been ongoing for more than 10 years, 77  with the 
Commission at the forefront promoting initiatives and new legislation in order to legitimize 
its new economic approach to the application of competition rules.78 However, it has been 
pointed out that the proliferation of legislation which gives economic evidence and analysis 
a major role and influence in competition cases, runs ‘a risk of misunderstanding the place of 
economics within the judge’s control and leave it in the hands of a non-judicial authority’.79 In light of 
these changes, it has been claimed that the judicial deference doctrine risks giving too much 
discretion to the Commission as there is ‘a discrepancy between, on the one hand, the transformation 
of the EU antitrust enforcement paradigm over the past decade and the corollary expansion of the 
Commission discretion and, on the other hand, the shrinking of the intensity of judicial review’.80   
The current President of the General Court has highlighted this risk and advocated for a 
clarification of the notion of ‘complexity’ and thus of the triggering event of marginal 
                                                     
77 See LOWE P., Taking Sound Decisions on the Basis of Available Evidence, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 12: 
‘During the past ten years, the Commission has gradually moved from a form-based approach to an effects-based approach to 
competition law enforcement. This change is maybe the most obvious as regards Article 81, where the introduction of the 
horizontal and vertical guidelines (and the accompanying Block Exemption Regulations) showed not only the increasing 
importance of economics in the assessment of restrictions on competition, but also the increasing importance of analyzing the actual 
potential negative effect of the agreement. Another field where the importance of an effects-based economic approach increased 
during recent years is merger control. A further step in this policy was taken in December 2008 when the Commission published 
its Guidance paper on the enforcement priorities under Article 82’. 
78 For an overview of the history of the place of economic analysis in the application of the competition rules 
see JAEGER M, The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
pp. 305 onwards; FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic Approach – Implications for the role of the EU 
Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel 
Marquis, eds., European Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases, forthcoming, Hart Publishing; and ORTIZ BLANCO L., LAMADRID DE PABLO A., 
Expert Economic Evidence and Effects-Based Assessments in Competition Law Cases, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, pp. 305-312. 
79 See JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
p. 309. 
80 GERARD D., EU Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: Why Wait? Full Appellate Jurisdiction, Now, CPI Antitrust 
Journal, Vol. 1, December 2010, pp. 2-3. 
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review. As pointed out by one author, ‘the mere fact that an assessment is made which requires 
consideration of (possibly esoteric) economic arguments and the examination of economic evidence…does not 
necessarily make an assessment subject to judicial review a “complex” one, subject only to limited control, 
even though it may make the task of the judge extremely difficult or burdensome’.81 It is often argued 
that the only way to ensure that the Commission’s economic analysis is not left to the 
authority’s discretion and is still subject to the EU Courts control, is by abandoning the 
judicial deference doctrine all together. As the argument goes, in a landscape where the 
Commission has lost, as mentioned supra, its advocacy monopoly in the competition field, 
and where it increasingly resorts to economic analysis, there is no reason to insulate the 
Commission from an effective and thorough system of judicial review. These are also the 
reasons why it is argued that limiting the definition of ‘complex economic assessments’ to 
‘situations where the Commission has to make an economics-based choice of policy’, as proposed by the 
President of the General Court Mr. Jaeger,82 would not seem satisfactory, as not only such 
policy monopoly in the hands of the Commission could be considered no longer justified 
today, but ‘policy choices’ is also an indeterminate concept and thus does not solve the 
problem of defining the concrete situations in relation to which the Commission retains 
discretion, with the subsequent risk and fear that judicial control would continue to be too 
light when this is not appropriate. 
 
2.2. The EU Courts’ competition law expertise 
In relation to the expansion of the importance of economic analysis, a number of 
authors claim that the EU Courts do not have the necessary know-how and knowledge in 
the competition field to adopt decisions or to substitute the Commission's appraisals of so-
                                                     
81  FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic Approach, Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the 
Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 264-265. 
Similarly SIRAGUSA: ‘the question has been seriously overlooked of how correctly to identify those assessments that are to be 
regarded as “complex” and subject only to light review. The mere fact that the assessment required of the Commission in a given 
case includes the consideration of economic arguments and the examination of economic evidence…may make the task of the 
Commission extremely difficult or burdensome. However, it does not necessarily entail “complex” assessments. Judges of all levels 
are used to dealing with complex, fact-intensive cases and reaching reasoned and reliable conclusions, and there is no reason why 
competition cases should be different’; see SIRAGUSA M., Annulment Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, in The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 133. 
82 See JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 4, 
p. 313. 
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called complex economic assessments to their own. Scholarly studies have been made to 
demonstrate that competition cases when particularly complex might be too complicated 
for generalist judges to adjudicate on.83 This lack of expertise would justify the current 
limits on the ability of the EU Courts to comprehensively review and, if appropriate, 
substitute their own assessments of so-called complex economic facts/issues for those of 
the expert competition authority.84 This argument can be summarized as follows:  
‘[o]ne of the potential reasons behind this limited standard of review is the lack of resources at the 
EU Courts’ disposal. Although the GC was created, amongst others, with the purpose to hear 
competition cases at first instance, EU Courts are not specialised antitrust or administrative 
tribunals. There is no substantive court specialisation in competition matters as, for example, in 
Germany. The EU Courts also lack the significant numbers of competition economists, as well as 
the manpower and competition expertise, of the Commission’.85 
A number of authors contend that this criticism is unfounded as EU judges are in 
principle fully equipped with the instruments necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of 
the legal and factual situations they are presented with, therefore being perfectly capable of 
making assessments and drawing conclusions in complex competition cases.86 According to 
                                                     
83  BAYE M. R., WRIGHT J. D., Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalists Judges? The Impact of Economic 
Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, January 27, 2009, Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 1-37. See also 
POWER JG V., The Relative Merits of Courts and Agencies in Competition Law – Institutional Design: Administrative 
Models; Judicial Models; and Mixed Models, in European Competition Journal, April 2010, p. 96: ‘it is very likely that 
almost everyone would accept that competition agencies are more expert and more experienced in competition law matters than 
courts general […] On expertise and experience in competition law matters, agencies will usually trump generalist courts’; 
CAFFARRA C., WALKER M., An Exploration Into the Use of Economics Before Courts in Europe, in Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice, vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 161: ‘[a]t this stage, the courts still remain 
considerably less economically sophisticated than many competition authorities. Particularly non-specialist courts tend to be 
unfamiliar with the analytical framework of much competition policy analysis’; and PETIT N., How much discretion do, and 
should, competition authorities enjoy in the course of their enforcement activities? A multi-jurisdictional assessment, in 
Concurrences No. 1-2010, No. 30047, p. 45: ‘[t]he devolution of discretionary powers to CAs traditionally hinges on three 
different justifications. First, from a public administration standpoint, a primary reason for delegating discretion to CAs is due to 
their specialized knowledge or expertise, as compared to elected politicians or other governmental organs. Put simply, CAs are 
deemed best-placed to make decisions in what is often described as an inscrutable discipline’. The author also indicates 
independence and the possibility of making optimally efficient decisions as other two justifications. 
84  A number of authors are persuaded that competition authorities and regulatory bodies that employ 
economists in their staff are (or should be) better suited than courts to evaluate sophisticated economic 
arguments and evidence; see, inter alia, CARLTON D. W., How Should Economic Evidence be Presented and 
Evaluated?, in European Competition Law Annual: 2009. The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review 
in Competition Cases (editors EHLERMANN Claus- Dieter and MARQUIS Mel), European University 
Institute, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Portland Oregon, 2011, p. 560. 
85 MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., Due Process in EU Competition Cases, Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5, footnote 72. 
86 See, inter alia, BISHOP S., Expert Economic Evidence in European Competition Law: Some Personal Views, in The 
Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences 
Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, 293, at 303: ‘[O]bserved “market” evidence 
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this argument, EU judges have a wide range of instruments available to them that can assist 
them in resolving disputes.87 Judges are used to and are trained to dealing with complex, 
fact-intensive cases and reaching reasoned decisions, as they are provided with all the 
instruments and tools available to this end.88 In particular, they can prescribe measures of 
inquiry intended to prove the veracity of the facts alleged by one of the parties in support 
of its pleas in law. The Courts can order the personal appearance of the parties, request 
information and the production of documents, order oral testimony, commission expert 
reports and, finally, inspect places or things.89 The range of measures available to them is 
diversified, although in relation to competition cases giving rise to complex economic 
issues, expert witnesses and expert reports made by economists are considered the best 
instruments that can assist judges. 90 The EU Courts however rarely make use of these 
                                                                                                                                 
indicates that judges are perfectly able and capable of reviewing and assessing “complex economic evidence”’; FORRESTER I. 
S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 14: 
‘the Courts…enjoy significant powers to gather facts and conduct enquiries, powers which seem perfectly consistent with the 
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction by the Courts’. 
87 See FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 18: ‘It is not easy to understand why the Courts should defer to the Commission’s 
expertise in a particular technical or economic controversy when the Courts have themselves the power to appoint experts, economic 
and otherwise’. 
88 The accumulation of experience of the EU Courts in competition cases is considered all the more and 
increasingly out of kilter with a standard of limited review under which only manifest errors are corrected; see 
BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. 
and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 117. 
89 See Article 45 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and Article 65 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the General Court. On the importance of expert reports for technical assessments see CASTILLO DE LA 
TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics 
Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 567: ‘procedural rules allow for the appointment of court experts. They could arguably 
help the court to make the technical assessments without having to rely too heavily on the views of the Commission’. 
90 Court experts are considered ‘highly valuable to detect manifest errors or errors of fact’; see BARBIER DE LA 
SERRE E., SIBONY A., Expert Evidence Before the EC Courts, in CMLR Vol. 45, 2008, p. 969. It is also 
considered that ‘[g]reater use of expert evidence could combine with greater understanding of the technical background to favour 
comprehensive review in all cases (a more radical option) or perhaps a more intense form of review and a greater willingness to 
identify manifest errors (a more likely development)”; see BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC 
Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 118. The 
importance of economic studies for the solution of competition cases has also been emphasized by Advocate 
Generals: ‘[e]conomic analyses often make up an important part of the evidence in competition cases and can be of great value to 
the Court in understanding the relevant economic context’; see Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf in Case T-
1/89 Rhȏne-Poulenc SA v Commission [1991] II-867, at II-957. 
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instruments and the cases in which they did commission expert reports represent the 
exception.91 
 
2.3. The judicial review paradox created by the direct applicability of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU 
Since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, competition authorities and courts of 
the Member States are also competent to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU where they 
apply national competition law to agreements and practices which may affect trade between 
Member States. This raises a number of issues. In the first place, in numerous Member 
States, such as Belgium, France, Germany, UK, and with nuances also in Denmark, 
Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, the decisions adopted by national 
competition authorities are subject to full appellate judicial review. 92  This entails that 
national judges are required to undertake in-depth analysis and to review issues which are 
considered economically complex. In the second place, even where Member States do not 
subject to full judicial review the determinations of national competition authorities, and 
exercise only a review of legality, it may still be the case that the practice of national courts 
is to subject to comprehensive review also complex economic assessments. This may occur 
when national judges review claims for damages caused by antitrust violations. Since these 
actions pertain to the civil law domain, national judges may be empowered (differentiations 
will of course exist between Member States) to exercise intense judicial review, without any 
space left for the discretion of the national competition authority, and without the limits 
often imposed by Member States in the administrative field for reviewing decisions 
adopted by independent national authorities.  
In the context of actions for damages, the following paradox can thus occur. In follow-
on litigation, national judges may be called upon to enforce decisions adopted in the 
                                                     
91 The ECJ appointed its own experts in the ICI case (Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619) and in 
the Wood Pulp II case (Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85 
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307). These cases exemplify the use of expert reports 
by the Courts in a competition case in order to verify the validity of the conclusions drawn by the 
Commission as to the existence of a concerted practice. Also, in GlaxoSmithKline the GC reached the 
conclusion that the Commission had failed to examine satisfactorily the first condition of Article 101(3) 
TFEU on the basis of economic studies produced by the applicant. This case would also prove the Courts’ 
ability to review economic evidence where necessary. See Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para 256; upheld on appeal by the Court of Justice. 
92 GERARD D., EU Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: “Why Wait? Full Appellate Jurisdiction, Now, in CPI Antitrust 
Journal, December 2010, p. 8.   
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antitrust field by the Commission.93 In these instances, the Commission’s determination of 
the existence of an infringement cannot be rebutted, all the more if the decision has passed 
the scrutiny of the EU Courts (even if only a ‘limited’ review of legality). As indicated by 
one author, ‘defendants face a procedural vicious-circle, pursuant to which their right to a fair trial is 
denied (or, at least, not wholly safeguarded) both at the administrative level as well as in the subsequent civil 
litigation stage that typically ensues thereafter. Said in other terms, if competition decisions are to a smaller 
or larger extent immune from judicial review on the merits, damages awarded by a civil judge could be 
perceived as being the poisonous fruit of the poisonous administrative proceeding they relate to’.94 
On the other hand, when national courts are adjudicating on follow-on damage claims 
based on a decision by the national competition authority (where EU antitrust law may 
have been applied in parallel to national antitrust law), the national court may be 
empowered in the civil domain to scrutinize intensely all of the authorities’ determinations 
(not engaging only in a “limited” or “marginal” review of legality). Accordingly, depending 
on whether particular behavior has been the object of a Commission or a national 
authority’s decision, in the framework of actions for damages, antitrust determinations may 
be or not subject to intense scrutiny covering also complex economic assessments.  
Similarly, in the framework of stand-alone actions for damages, the following paradox 
may occur: had the interested party based its action on a Commission decision finding an 
                                                     
93 Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 establishes that Commission decisions have binding effect on national 
courts and national competition authorities when they apply EU antitrust law. This rule also applies when 
national courts are hearing an action for damages for loss sustained as a result of an agreement or practice 
which has been found by a decision of the Commission to infringe Article 101 or 102 TFEU. 
94 GRASSANI S., Jurisdictional vs. “Juris…Fictional” Review in the Land of Menarini, (June 7, 2012), 19th St.Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum ICF - June 7th and 8th 2012; available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2190929, p. 2. This matter was recently raised by defendants in the preliminary 
reference ruling in the OTIS case (Case C-199/11 European Union (represented by the European Commission) v Otis 
NV and others, not yet reported). In 2008, the Commission had filed a case with the Brussels Commercial 
Court to seek damages from four groups of companies, including Otis, that it had found to have breached 
Article 101 TFEU. The Brussels Commercial Court referred a number of questions to the ECJ. In the 
preliminary reference proceedings in front of the ECJ, the defendants argued that their right to effective 
judicial protection under Article 47 of the EU Charter is infringed as EU rulings in the competition field stem 
their binding effect over possible follow-on private actions, even though the judicial review carried out by EU 
Courts is insufficient. In particular, for the defendants the review of legality carried out by the EU Courts 
under Article 263 TFEU in the sphere of competition law is insufficient because of, inter alia, the margin of 
discretion which those Courts allow the Commission in economic matters. The ECJ rejected this argument. 
After having described the current characteristics of the EU review of legality and unlimited jurisdiction in 
relation to fines, it concluded that ‘[t]he review provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the EU Courts of both 
the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the 
amount of a fine. The review of legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect 
of the amount of the fine, provided for in Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, therefore meets the requirements of the principle 
of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter’ (para 63). 
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infringement (giving rise to follow-on proceedings), the antitrust assessments could have 
been subject only to limited judicial review by the EU Courts; having opted instead, 
intentionally or for necessity, for a stand-alone action, the national judge, operating in the 
civil domain, may be empowered to scrutinize all situations in fact and law, including 
complex economic or technical assessments.  
Situations of this kind raise the question of whether it is still justified today to have and 
keep a state of affairs where national judges have the possibility to scrutinize an antitrust 
situation more intensely than EU judges. These situations also prove that various national 
systems are confident that their judges have the instruments and know-how considered 
necessary to carry out such task and leads to view as surprising the consideration that EU 
judges are incapable of conducting such activity in an equally adequate manner. 
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3. DUE PROCESS AND THE FLAWS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF LIMITED 
REVIEW 
 
3.1. The concentration of functions in the hands of the Commission 
The current system of limited judicial review in the EU has raised criticisms concerning 
the extent to which the parties’ procedural rights and rights of defense are safeguarded in 
the competition domain. One of the main arguments raised in this context is that the 
concentration of investigative, prosecutorial and decision-making powers in the hands of a 
single authority, namely the Commission, raises the question as to whether such extensive 
and far-reaching powers are subject to effective controls.95 The concentration of functions 
in the hands of a single administrative body is not an unusual feature of many 
administrative systems. 96  However, this is usually considered acceptable only if the 
decisions adopted are subject to checks and balances, in particular, effective external 
control in the form of judicial review by a court.97   
                                                     
95 Certain commentators consider the risk of bias greater in the context of Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
proceedings, which are inquisitorial nature, than in merger proceedings which examine the possible ex-post 
effects of an operation before any harm to competition has occurred; see WILS P. J. W., The combination of the 
investigative and prosecutorial function and the adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis, 
in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, p. 12.  
96 According to the GCLC’s 2009 Working Group on competition enforcement, most countries in the world 
have opted for a system where prosecution is separated from adjudication of a case and cite Korea, Japan, 
Canada, Australia and Norway as extra-EU examples. Within the EU, the Working Group cites the 
Commission staff working paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council – Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (COM(2009)206(final), para 192), 
according to which 20 Member States had a system of one administrative authority investigating and deciding 
the case. See Working Group, Enforcement by the Commission. The Decisional and Enforcement Structure in Antitrust 
Cases and The Commission's Fining System, Report prepared from the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC)’s 
Annual Conference “Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe -- Time for a 
Review of Regulation 1/2003” (11 and 12 June 2009, Brussels), available at 
http://www.learlab.com/conference2009/documents/The%20decisional%20and%20enforcement%20struct
ure%20and%20the%20Commission_s%20fining%20system%20GERADIN.pdf., p. 6. 
97 For an overview on the risks of prosecutorial bias inherent in systems where the investigative, prosecutorial 
and decision-making powers are concentrated in the hands of a single antitrust authority see, inter alia, WILS P. 
J. W., The combination of the investigative and prosecutorial function and the adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: 
A legal and economic analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, pp. 6-10; and SLATER D., THOMAS S., 
WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for 
reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, No. 5/2008, College of Europe, pp. 26-29. According to 
VENIT, ‘the Commission’s dual role as prosecutor and judge, coupled with the inquisitorial and asymmetrical nature of its fact-
finding and adjudicative proceedings, its insulation from judicial review during those proceedings and the risk of enforcement and 
other biases, negatively impact the quality of evidence relied on by the Commission. These limitations make necessary the 
application of a standard of judicial review strict enough to ensure that the Courts examine facts and assumptions about facts 
with the necessary rigour to guarantee a sound result on the basis of the evidentiary record’; see VENIT J. S., Human All Too 
Human: The Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in 
Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82, European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 1-2. 
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The Commission’s numerous duties, more specifically to shape competition law and to 
adopt final, binding decisions, some of which imposing fines, are not questioned here.98 
This multiplicity of roles and duties, as prosecutor, judge and policy maker may make 
however the existence of an effective system of judicial control of the Commission’s 
actions all the more necessary.99 Over the years, in order to ensure that the Commission’s 
multiple roles were exercised efficiently and effectively, a number of internal mechanisms 
have been developed to subject the exercise of the Commission’s powers to adequate 
checks and balances. Not surprisingly, most of these mechanisms were developed in order 
to strengthen the Commission’s internal decision-making process following a number of 
judgments, mostly in the merger field, where the GC had quashed down the Commission’s 
decisions.100 Among these mechanisms, one can recall the creation of the Chief Economist, 
introduced to reinforce the quality of the Commission’s economic reasoning, and the 
creation of the so-called peer/devil advocate panels, introduced to review the strength of 
the Commission’s case. 101 However, several authors claim that the existence of internal 
checks, in the form of due process features of the Commission’s administrative system, is 
not enough to ensure the fairness of the system. 102 These features remain of a purely 
                                                     
98 For an overview of the current flaws and weaknesses of the Commission’s antitrust procedures, including 
the concentration of investigative, prosecuting and decision-making functions, and the issues of fairness they 
raise, see, inter alia, FORRESTER I. S., Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed 
Procedures, European Law Review, December 2009.  
99 REEVES T, DODOO N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, (2005) Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Barry E. Hawk, 
ed.), Juris Publishing Inc., 2006, p. 117. As stated in a OECD Report: ‘combining the function of investigation and 
decision in a single institution’ may have the effect to ‘dampen internal critique’ and raise ‘concerns about the absence of 
checks and balances’ (OECD country studies – European Commission – Peer Review of Competition Law and 
Policy – 2005, p. 62; cited by SLATER D., THOMAS S., WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before 
the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, 
No. 5/2008, College of Europe, p. 2). 
100 See infra subsection 2.2 in Chapter 3. 
101 For a detailed overview of the internal mechanisms introduced as checks and balances to the exercise of 
the Commission’s powers in the competition field, see inter alia GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in 
European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition 
Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, 
pp. 42-44. Recently, on 17 October 2011, the Commission adopted various measures aimed at enhancing 
transparency and procedural guarantees, including issuing the final version of its best practices in antitrust 
proceedings, best practices on submission of economic evidence and a revised mandate of the Hearing 
Officer (Best Practices Package).  
102 GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 44. See also MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., Due Process in 
EU Competition Cases, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 437: ‘Although 
there are some internal checks and balances, apart from the very limited role of the Hearing Officer, they do not constitute formal 
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‘internal’ nature, thus a system of exhaustive review and control by an external and 
independent body remains all the more necessary.103 According to certain commentators, 
only the introduction of a system of more intense or full judicial review would address all 
the concerns raised by this prosecutorial bias as the Commission would be obliged to 
‘conduct proceedings in the shadow of full review’104 and thus appear in front of the EU Courts on 
an equal footing with the other parties.  
 
3.2. The interests of parties to proceedings 
Another argument often raised to promote a change in the current system of judicial 
review is the need to take into account and to safeguard the interests and expectations of 
parties to proceedings. According to this argument, the circumstance that the EU Courts 
cannot exercise powers of review on the merits (except in relation to fines), or that, within 
the review of legality, they cannot exercise a comprehensive and exhaustive review of the 
Commission’s complex economical and/or technical assessments, is insufficient to 
effectively safeguard the interests of parties to proceedings.  
The circumstance that under the current system of limited review the Courts cannot re-
take a decision on the merits of a competition case and the matter is sent back to the 
Commission, is considered ineffective for the parties to the case from different 
standpoints. In particular, if, on the one hand, the Commission must draw the 
consequences of the EU Courts’ judgments, on the other, it is not always clear what 
measures the Commission must take to comply or whether it effectively complies with 
judgments. In any event, a fresh and possibly lengthy examination would still be required.105 
The circumstance that the EU Courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the 
                                                                                                                                 
proceedings followed by stringent procedural safeguards that would merit a decision that is fully compatible with due process 
requirements’. 
103 VESTERDORF B., Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the 
EC System of Competition Law Enforcement, in Competition Policy International, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/4218, pp. 6-7. 
104 GERARD D., EU Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: «Why Wait? Full Appellate Jurisdiction, Now, in CPI Antitrust 
Journal, December 2010 (1), p. 8.  
105 In the Solvay case (Joined Cases C-109/10 P and C-110/10 P Solvay SA v Commission [2011] ECR I-10329, 
it took the company more than 20 years to obtain a final closure of its case against the Commission for the 
violation of due process rights. The PVC cartel saga is another example of how the process of adoption, 
annulment and re-adoption of a decision may be lengthy and costly (Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, 
C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM) a.o. 
v Commission [2002] ECR I-8618; see WILS P. J. W., The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function 
and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, 
No. 3, p. 11 and footnote 36. 
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Commission and re-adopt the decision, ‘impacts the effectiveness of the antitrust enforcement system 
as a whole, since a successful appellant may well have to wait for a considerable time until its legal situation 
is finally resolved’.106 From the parties’ perspective, it could be considered more effective if 
closure to litigation could be achieved by allowing the EU Courts to take a final decision on 
the merits.  
This is all the more relevant in the merger field in light of the length of the 
administrative procedure, of the judicial review phase (notwithstanding the possibility of 
using, in certain instances, an expedited procedure) and of the new examination eventually 
carried out by the Commission. The parties’ interest in the transaction or the latter’s 
chances of surviving or resurrecting following all these phases, are in most cases destined in 
fact to disappear.107 
Even if the current separation between review of legality (for decisions) and review on 
the merits (for fines) were to remain unchanged, it is still argued that, in relation to the 
former, the circumstance that the EU Courts restrain themselves from conducting a 
comprehensive review of the Commission’s complex economic and/or technical 
assessments is insufficient to guarantee effective judicial protection.108 According to this 
argument, applicants to the EU Courts have the legitimate expectation that the EU 
judiciary verify the correctness of all the issues, whether matters of fact, law or complex 
                                                     
106 See MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., Due Process in EU Competition Cases, Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5pp. 431-432. According to the authors this situation may impact another 
due process principle, the right to obtain a decision within a reasonable time and may thus trigger in the 
future new human rights criticism. 
107 GLAZENER P., Strengthening External Checks and Balances in the EU Merger Control System, in EC Merger 
Control: A Major Reform in Progress, edited by Götz Drauz and Michael Reynolds, Richmond Law & Tax, 
2003; see also MARENCO G., Judicial Review of the First Ten Years of the Merger Regulation, EC Merger Control: Ten 
Years On, International Bar Association, 2000, p. 303. According to the author ‘[i]t is true that firms intending to 
merge generally cannot await the outcome of court proceedings in case of a decision of the Commission blocking their plan. Their 
interest in the operation generally would not survive the years necessary to reach a judgment of the [General Court] or, worse, of 
the Court of Justice on appeal)’. See also WAELBROECK D. and FOSSELARD D., Should the Decision-Making 
Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be left to an independent judge? - The Impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures, in Yearbook of European Law, 1994, Vol. 14, p. 
139: ‘Undertakings dissatisfied with a Commission’s decision can in theory appeal such a decision before the [General Court]. 
However, by the time the appeal procedure will be terminated, the [General Court] judgment is very likely to be deprived of any 
relevance, in violation to the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as required by Article 6 
of the ECHR’. Similarly LANG J. T., Do We Need a European Competition Court?, in Liber Amicorum in honour 
of Bo Vesterdorf , Brussels, 2007, p. 2: ‘Companies are rarely willing or able to keep deals alive for long periods of this 
kind, particularly in the case of hostile takeovers or merger prohibition decisions […] Indeed, delay in itself may have significant 
adverse effects on the target of the takeover’.  
108 See DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. 
and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 80. 
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economic assessments, that are brought to their attention. As the argument goes, the 
applicants’ demand for justice can only be satisfied by the EU Courts’ attention that the 
Commission’s decisions not be affected by any error at all, not just manifest errors. 
Sustainers of this thesis question in fact: 
‘why it is still acceptable and compatible with a satisfactory level of “justice” for the Court to decide 
that a contested act is “not manifestly incorrect”: should the applicant accept that the act it 
challenged, and which has had effect on it, was “not unreasonably wrongful”? There should be no 
such concept: the act is wrong or not, illegal or not. “Justice” should be done entirely, within the sole 
limit of the form of remedy that can be applied according to the rules governing the Court’s 
competence, i.e. the ability of the Court to annul the act or dismiss the application for 
annulment’.109 
 
3.3. Intense scrutiny and the quality of administrative decisions 
Another argument in favor of a more intense scrutiny of the Commission’s decisions is 
that more scrutiny helps the decision-maker, rather than weakening it, and encourages rigor 
within the decision-making authority thereby sharpening its own internal decision-making 
process. The EU Court’s case law supports this finding. For example the Tetra Laval110 and 
Airtours111 cases in the merger field, led to the introduction of peer review mechanisms 
inside the Commission, thus enhancing the quality of today's Commission decisions (see 
supra subsection 3.1 in Section II of this Chapter). This argument is all the more valid in a 
competition enforcement system where the Commission’s decisions are applied in 28 
different Member States and are of inspiration for national judges and national antitrust 
authorities. More intense scrutiny of the Commission’s decisions would thus benefit the 
system by avoiding that incorrect assessments have negative consequences on firms or that 
they reverberate on the assessments of other public authorities. This view rests on the 
belief that judicial review of administrative decisions is the ultimate guarantor of 
                                                     
109 DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 85. 
110 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. 
111 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-02585.  
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transparency and accountability and is likely to improve the effective quality of the 
decisions adopted at the administrative level.112  
                                                     
112 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, OECD 2002, p. 75; see 
also GERADIN D., PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative 
Assessment, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-008, Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 01/2011, 
February 2011, pp. 7-8, available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1698342, and authors cited therein; see also 
MONTI M., Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform, European Commission/IBA Conference 
on EU Merger Control, Brussels, November 7, 2002 (Commission Press Release SPEECH/02/545), 
concerning the role played by the EU Courts in ‘exerting constant pressure on the Commission to continuously improve 
its level of expertise’. 
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4. COMPATIBILITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
An issue often debated is whether the status quo of the current EU judicial review system 
meets the standards required for the protection of fundamental rights mandated by a 
number of international conventions to which the EU is or will soon be a party to. The 
following subsections will address the issue of the compatibility of the current system of 
judicial review (i) with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
“EU Charter”) and (ii) in light of the future accession of the EU to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 
the “ECHR”, “EU Convention” or “Convention”). 
The current EU system of judicial review of competition decisions is inherently limited 
given the characteristics of the control EU judges exercise in actions for annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU (which does not extend to a full appellate review on the merits), and for 
the deferential treatment EU judges reserve within the exercise of their review of legality to 
the Commission’s complex political, economic and/or technical appraisals (see supra 
subsection 2 in Section I of this Chapter). In light of these limitations, several authors claim 
that a system of full or more intense judicial review is necessary in order to comply with the 
provisions of the EU Charter and the ECHR.113 According to these theories, if the current 
system were kept unchanged, this could be interpreted as contradicting these international 
conventions as procedural fairness would not be guaranteed.114 This argument has been 
developed on the basis of the possible ‘criminal’ nature of antitrust fines and in relation to 
the application of Article 47 of the EU Charter and Article 6(1) ECHR.115 As recently 
                                                     
113  This issue has been raised, inter alia, by organisations and law firms commenting on the European 
Commission’s draft Best Practices in Antitrust Proceedings and the Hearing Officer’s Guidance Paper; see 
Comments submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce, Due process in EU antitrust proceedings, 8 
March 2010. More generally, commentators also criticize possible violation of fundamental rights during the 
administrative proceedings before the Commission. These criticisms are beyond the scope of this research. 
For an overview see, inter alia, SCORDAMAGLIA A., Cartel proof, imputation and sanctioning in European 
competition law: Reconciling effective enforcement and adequate protection of procedural guarantees, in The Competition Law 
Review, Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 5-52. 
114  See Comments submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce, "Due process in EU antitrust 
proceedings", March 8, 2010, pp. 1-2. 
115 The analysis of the ECHR system will focus on Article 6 ECHR and its implications for the intensity of 
EU judicial control in competition cases. It must me mentioned, however, that another provision of the 
ECHR is often invoked by commentators to criticize the current state of affairs in relation to judicial control. 
This is Article 7 ECHR which establishes the presumption of innocence (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). 
According to this argument the circumstance that a criminal sanction is enforced without having been subject 
to full review could be considered incompatible with the presumption of innocence to the extent that it 
cannot be required that interested parties be able to anticipate and predict the effects of their conduct when 
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stated by the General Court in the Areva case, ‘[t]he requirement of judicial review constitutes one of 
the general principles of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
and has also been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR…The right to an effective remedy is, 
moreover, reaffirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’.116 The 
debate on judicial review is however considered to have a more general outcome, as 
preserving the current system without any changes in all of the competition field, including 
also merger proceedings (not considered criminal in nature), may reduce the prestige of the 
EU system of competition enforcement.117 This latter outcome, analyzed infra in subsection 
4.2.4.3 in Section II of this Chapter, derives from the circumstance that Article 47 of the 
Charter does not distinguish between criminal and civil charges, thus the right to a fair trial 
in the EU constitutional framework is not limited to disputes relating to criminal or civil 
charges.118 
The discussion on this matter has picked up momentum over the last years, not only in 
light of the negative effects that a finding of a violation of fundamental rights by the EU 
may have, but also in consideration of the improvements that could, in any event, be 
introduced in the system. As emphasized by one commentator ‘I see this debate as mainly an 
implicit invitation to the judges to carry out a more thorough review, condition sine qua non, for the 
                                                                                                                                 
‘certain key aspects of a fining decision become too complex for judicial review’. See, inter alia, BRONCKERS M, 
VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities and Which Role for the 
Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, pp. 11-12. Against this argument see, inter alia, Castillo de la Torre, 
according to whom the Commission’s margin of assessment is not incompatible with the principle of the 
presumption of innocence as the Commission will not simply make the assessment it wishes, but the one that 
it deems to be the correct one and also most appropriate for the respect of the presumption of innocence; see 
CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 576. This issue was raised before the ECtHR years ago 
but not resolved as in the meantime the Commission’s fine had been annulled by the GC (see ECtHR decision 
of 10 March 2004, Senator Lines v Austria and others, Application No. 56672/00 and Joined Cases T-191/98, T-
212/98 and T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line [2003] ECR II-3275).  
116 Joined Cases T-117 and 121/07 Areva SA and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II-633, para 224. 
117  See, inter alia, International Chamber of Commerce Commission, Due process in EU antitrust proceedings, 
Comments submitted on the European Commission’s draft Best Practices in Antitrust Proceedings and the 
Hearing Officers’ Guidance Paper, 8 March 2010, p. 1; and ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement 
and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 29-39. 
118 This is spelled out in the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanies the Charter where in relation to 
Article 47 it is stated that this provision ‘corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR […] In Community law, the right to a fair 
hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations. That is one of the consequences of the fact that the 
Community is a community based on the rule of law […]. Nevertheless, in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees 
afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way in the Union’. See Explanations relating to the complete text of the 
Charter, December 2000, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Explanation%20relating%20to%20the%20complete%
20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf. 
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advocates of that view, to render the system compatible with fundamental rights’ 119  […However, 
c]riticisms of the institutional system based on its alleged incompatibility with fundamental rights do not 
appear to find a robust basis in the existing case law of the ECtHR. This of course does not mean that the 
system is perfect and cannot be improved’.120  
At present, firms wishing to raise pleas on the unfairness of EU competition 
proceedings and, in particular, on violations of their right to a fair trial, are able to do so in 
appeals before the EU Courts on the basis of the EU Charter and the ECHR, both 
incorporated in the EU legal framework through different Treaty provisions (see infra 
subsections 4.1 and 4.2 of Section II in this Chapter). Furthermore, once the EU accession 
to the ECHR is formalized, the EU will be directly bound by the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the ECHR. Given that the accession process will inevitably come to a 
successful end (the EU has undertaken to sign up to the Convention’s system), soon 
enough EU acts, including EU Court judgments, will be subject to the external control 
exercised by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”). Formal 
accession of the EU to the ECHR will in fact give the possibility to any physical or legal 
person to claim that his or her rights under the ECHR have been violated and to bring an 
application to this end in front of the ECtHR once all internal remedies have been 
exhausted. The above considerations have raised the issue, examined below in relation 
respectively to the EU Charter and the ECHR, of whether the current characteristics of the 
EU system of judicial review passes the scrutiny of fundamental rights. 
 
4.1. Compatibility of the EU system of judicial review with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights  
Article 6(1) TEU establishes that the Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the EU Charter, which has the same legal value as the Treaties. The 
EU Charter recognizes a range of personal, civil, political, economic and social rights of 
EU citizens and residents, enshrining them into EU law. The EU Charter was formally 
proclaimed in Nice in December 2000 by the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission. In December 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
                                                     
119 TORRE C., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics 
Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 571. 
120 TORRE C., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics 
Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 577. 
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Charter was given binding legal effect equal to the Treaties.121 In the competition field, 
Regulation 1/2003 expressly recognizes the importance of the EU Charter by stating at 
Recital 37 that: ‘[t]his Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized in 
particular by the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union. Accordingly, this Regulation 
should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles’.  
Among the various rights it proclaims, Article 47 of the EU Charter enshrines the right 
to an effective remedy before a Tribunal. This first two paragraphs of this provision 
establish that: ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has 
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law.’ In light of Article 52(3) of the EU Charter, this right must 
be interpreted as providing as much protection as that provided by the ECHR. Article 52(3) 
establishes that: ‘[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection’. Accordingly, if any of the rights enshrined in the 
EU Charter correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of 
those rights is to be the same as defined by the Convention, though EU law may provide 
for more extensive protection. According to the Explanatory Memorandum which 
accompanies the Charter, Article 47 ‘corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR […] and the guarantees 
afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way in the Union’.122 The analysis of the ECHR case law 
on the right to a fair trial is thus of particular importance, even withstanding the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR, because of its partial incorporation in EU law through the above 
provisions.123 This incorporation occurs also through Article 6(3) TEU which establishes 
                                                     
121 See, inter alia, SANCHEZ S. I., The Court and the Charter: The Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights, in CMLR, 2012, 49, pp. 1565-1612. 
122  See Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter, December 2000, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Explanation%20relating%20to%20the%20complete%
20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf. 
123 The incorporation of the ECHR in EU law under Article 52(3) EU Charter is only partial as limited to 
those specific rights which have a corresponding twin provision in the EU Charter, as is the case with the 
right to a fair trial enshrined respectively in Article 47 EU Charter and Article 6(1) ECHR. For an in-depth 
analysis of the challenges that the partial incorporation of the ECHR into EU law has for the role of the 
Convention in the application of human rights by EU institutions see, inter alia, WEIß W., Human rights in the 
EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights after Lisbon, in European Constitutional Law 
Review, 2011, 7, pp. 64–95; WEIß W., Human rights and EU antitrust enforcement: news from Lisbon, in ECLR, 
2011, Issue 4, pp. 186-195; and ANDREANGELI A., Competition enforcement and human rights after the 
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that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles 
of the Union’s law.124 Through the indirect references to the ECHR contained in the TEU, 
interested parties are entitled to the exercise of judicial review powers by the EU Courts in 
a manner compliant with Article 6(1) ECHR.125 In practice, this entails that undertakings 
which have been the addressees of Commission fining decisions have the right to obtain in 
first instance before the General Court a ‘full review’ of the Commission’s assessments, 
and then on appeal before the Court of Justice a review based on points of law apt to 
verifying that the General Court did ensure an effective judicial review as mandated by the 
EU Charter and the ECHR.126 In light of the importance that the provisions of the TEU 
give to the interpretation and application of fundamental rights under the system of the 
ECHR, any discussion on the content of the right to a fair trial under the EU Charter must 
be made in light also of its content under the ECHR system, examined in the following 
subsection.127 
                                                                                                                                 
Treaty of Lisbon: the state of play and the (near) future prospects, in Eugene Buttigieg (eds) Rights and 
remedies in a liberalised and competitive internal market, Gutenberg Press, 2012, pp. 63-94. 
124 It follows from a consistent line of cases (see the judgments in Case C-177/94 Perfili [1996] ECR I-161, 
para 20, and Case C-309/96 Annibaldi v Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio [1997] ECR I-
7493, para 12), that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the observance 
of which the Community judicature ensures. For that purpose, the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance draw inspiration from the constitutional tradition principles common to the Member States and also 
from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. In that context, the Court of Justice has 
stated that the ECHR has special significance (Case 222/84 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, para 18, and Case C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I-
2629, para 14). As the Court has also stated, it follows that the Community ‘cannot accept measures which are 
incompatible with observance of the human rights thus recognised and guaranteed’ by the Community (see, in particular, 
Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 41). 
125 As will be examined infra, only with the EU’s formal accession to the ECHR the compliance of EU 
measures with the Convention, including judgments, will be submitted to the external control of the ECtHR. 
126 The importance of the EU Charter has recently been confirmed by the EU Courts in the KME and Chalkor 
judgments of 8 December 2011, where the ECJ focused its analysis on the respect of the parties’ fundamental 
rights on the EU Charter rather than on the ECHR (see infra subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2). 
127 However, as will be seen infra in subsection 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, in the KME and Chalkor cases the ECJ 
based its reasoning entirely on Article 47 of the EU Charter and made no reference to Article 6 ECHR. 
According to commentators this may be explained by the ECJ’s willingness to develop its own case law on 
the right to a fair trial, still at its infancy, rather than borrowing the mature case law developed under the 
ECHR on the principle of effective judicial protection; see, inter alia, MUGUET-POULLENNEC G., Sanctions 
prévues par le règlement no 1/2003 et droit à une protection juridictionnelle effective: les leçons des arrêts KME et Chalkorde la 
CJUE, in Revue Lamy de la Concurrence: droit, économie, regulation, 2012, No. 32, p. 57-78. For an in-
depth analysis of the origins and scope of the general principle of effective judicial protection in EU law, even 
before the adoption of the EU Charter and the current discussions on the ECHR, see, inter alia, ARNULL A., 
The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?, in European Law Review, 2011, Vol. 
36(1), pp. 51-70, and RAVO L. M., The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and Its Impact on 
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4.2. Compatibility of the current system with the European Convention of 
Human Rights 
 
4.2.1.  The Convention and the European Court of Human Rights  
The ECtHR is an international court based in Strasbourg whose functioning is regulated 
by the European Convention, an international Treaty containing a list of fundamental civil 
and political rights and guarantees which a number of States have undertaken to respect.128 
The ECtHR’s task is to ensure that the Member States respect the rights and guarantees set 
out in the Convention and does so by examining complaints, known as applications, lodged 
by individuals, legal entities or States. The ECtHR’s function is not that of a court of 
appeal vis-à-vis national courts, thus it is not empowered to rehear cases, nor quash, vary or 
revise national decisions or annul national laws.   
Where the ECtHR finds that one or more Member States have violated the Convention, 
it delivers a binding judgment which the countries concerned are under an obligation to 
comply with. If the ECtHR finds there has been a violation, it may also award ‘just 
satisfaction’, a sum of money in compensation for certain forms of damage.129 In case of a 
violation, the ECtHR may also require the State or States concerned to refund the expenses 
incurred by the applicants in presenting the case. On the other hand, if the ECtHR finds 
that there has been no violation, the applicant will not have to pay any additional costs, 
such as those incurred by the respondent State/s. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
National Jurisdictions, in Sources of Law and Legal Protection (Triestine Lecture 1), EUT Edizioni Università di 
Trieste, 2012, pp. 101-125. 
128 Currently the parties to the Convention are 47. The rights and freedoms secured by the Convention 
include, among others, the right to life, the right to a fair hearing, the right to respect for private and family 
life, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the protection of property. The 
Convention prohibits, in particular, torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, forced 
labour, arbitrary and unlawful detention, and discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
secured by the Convention. For an overview of the ECHR system see, inter alia, REID K., A Practitioner’s Guide 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed., 2012. 
129 The award of just satisfaction is not an automatic consequence of a finding by the ECtHR that there has 
been a violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols. The ECtHR shall award just 
satisfaction only if the domestic law does not allow complete reparation to be made, and even then only ‘if 
necessary’ and if this award is considered ‘just’. Article 41 of the Convention states: ‘[i]f the Court finds that there 
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned 
allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party’. 
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4.2.2. The EU Accession to the Convention 
Currently the EU is not a formal member to the Convention as the accession process is 
still on-going. The accession of the EU to the Convention has been made possible by the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.130 In its new formulation, Article 6(2) TEU now 
requires the EU to accede to the Convention’s system.131 On the side of the Council of 
Europe,132 the legal basis for the EU’s accession is provided for by Article 59 paragraph 2 
of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR which entered into force 
on 1 June 2010. 133  
Official negotiations between the Council of Europe and the EU to elaborate the 
necessary legal instrument for the EU’s accession to the ECHR started on 7 July 2010. In 
order to finalize the accession process, an agreement needed to be found between the EU 
and the 47 current members of the Convention. The draft accession agreement of the EU 
to the European Convention on Human rights was finalized by negotiators of the 47 
Council of Europe member states and the EU on 5 April 2013.134 A number of draft 
                                                     
130 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ [2007] C306/1.  
131 Article 6(2) TEU states: ‘[t]he Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties’. 
132 The Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg (France), was founded on 5 May 1949 by 10 countries. Today, 
with its 47 member countries, it seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles 
based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of 
individuals and legal persons. 
133 Article 59 of the Convention, as amended by Article 17 of Protocol 14, contains a new paragraph 2 which 
states that ‘[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention’. 
134 For an overview of the various steps of the negotiations between the Council of Europe member States 
and the EU, see the Council of Europe dedicated website: http://hub.coe.int/en/web/coe-portal/what-we-
do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-
convention?dynLink=true&layoutId=22&dlgroupId=10226&fromArticleId=. For an in-depth analysis of the 
complex issues raised by a supranational organization such as the EU signing up to an international system of 
human rights protection, in particular concerning the autonomy of the EU legal order see, inter alia, LOCK T., 
Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, in CMLR, 
2011, 48, pp. 1025-1054; POTTEAU A., Quelle adhésion de l’Union européenne à la CEDH pour quel niveau de 
protection des droits et de l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique de l’UE?, in Revue générale de droit international public, 
2011, No. 1, pp. 77-112; JACQUÉ J. P., The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in CMLR, 2011, Vol. 48, pp. 995-1023; LOCK T., EU Accession to the ECHR: 
Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg, in European Law Review, 2010, Vol. 35; CALLEWAERT J., The 
European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law: a long way to harmony, in EHRLR, 2009, 6, pp. 768-
783; and MORGAN DE RIVERY E., EU accession to the ECHR: Bringing about an aggiornamento for EU case law? 
Overview of ECHR and EU case law, e-competitions No. 61327. On the importance of Article 6 ECHR see, inter 
alia, KUIJER M., The Blindfold of Lady Justice: Judicial Independence and Impartiality in Light of the Requirements of 
Article 6 ECHR, Nijmegen Wolf Legal Productions, 2004; PERROUD T., The impact of Art. 6.1 ECHR on 
competition law enforcement in France and the United Kingdom, in e-Competitions, No. 21954; and BAILLEUX A., 
Le salut dans l’adhésion?: Entre Luxembourg et Strasbourg, actualités du respect des droits fondamentaux dans la 
mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence, in RTD Eur., January-March 2010, 46(1), pp. 31-54. 
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revised agreements have since been discussed and negotiated. An opinion of the EU Court 
of Justice will be sought on the compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU 
Treaties. 135  Depending on the outcome of such an opinion, renegotiations might be 
necessary. 
The final agreement, which will result in an accession Treaty, will have to be ratified by 
all 47 parties to the Convention as well as by the EU according to the procedure set out in 
Article 218 TFEU. According to this provision, the Council will have to decide 
unanimously, having obtained the consent of the European Parliament. In addition, each 
Member State will have to ratify the Treaty in accordance with its national constitutional 
provisions, a process which may prove time-consuming.  
Although the EU is still not a formal party to the Convention, the EU is still required to 
take into account the interpretation of fundamental rights given by the ECtHR. In the past, 
it was sometimes stated by the EU Courts that they did not ‘have to systematically take into 
account, as regards fundamental rights under Community law, the interpretation of the Convention given by 
the Strasbourg authorities’.136 However, this can no longer be considered the case. In light of 
Article 6(3) TEU, which establishes that ECHR fundamental rights constitute general 
principles of EU law; of Article 52(3) of the EU Charter, which establishes that the 
fundamental rights it recognizes must be interpreted equivalently to the identical rights 
enshrined in the ECHR; and of Article 6(2) TEU, with which the EU has committed to 
abide to the fundamental rights of the Convention, it is evident that the EU Courts 
increasingly have to take into account the interpretation of fundamental rights given by the 
ECtHR. In addition, with the EU’s formal accession to the ECHR, the compliance of EU 
measures with the Convention, including court judgments, will be submitted to the external 
control of an external judicial entity, the ECtHR.  
 
4.2.3. Article 6(1) ECHR and criminal charges 
In the debate on the compatibility of the current system of judicial review with 
fundamental rights, the main provision of the ECHR which is called into question is Article 
                                                     
135  In accordance with Artile 218(11) TFEU, ‘[a] Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. 
Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties 
are revised’. 
136 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, para 140. 
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6(1) which provides that: ‘[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. The consequence of the classification of a 
proceeding as criminal in nature is that the individual or legal person concerned should be 
afforded all the guarantees and protection offered by Article 6 ECHR. In light of the 
nature and level of fines imposed today by the Commission, competition law proceedings 
in the fields of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are increasingly considered ‘criminal’ in nature. 
The following subsection will examine the notion of criminal charge under the ECHR case 
law, its application to EU competition proceedings and the EU Courts’ position on the 
matter. 
 
4.2.3.1. The notion of criminal charge 
Article 6(1) ECHR applies to proceedings involving the determination of civil rights or 
criminal charges. In order to assess the applicability of Article 6(1) ECHR to proceedings in 
the antitrust field, it must be first ascertained whether decisions adopted by the 
Commission under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can be considered a criminal charge.  
The concept of criminal charge has an autonomous meaning under the ECHR and is 
independent of the categorizations employed by national legal systems. This has been 
confirmed by the early case law of the ECtHR in order to avoid that the application of 
Article 6(1) ECHR could be circumvented by the domestic classification of penalties 
adopted by parties to the Convention. 137  Accordingly, although competition fining 
                                                     
137 See ECtHR judgment of 27 February 1980, Deweer v Belgium, Application No. 6903/75, para 44: ‘the 
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial … prompts the Court to prefer a "substantive", rather 
than a "formal", conception of the "charge" contemplated by Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). The Court is compelled to look behind 
the appearances and investigate the realities of the procedure in question’; see also ECtHR judgment of of 8 June 1976, 
Engel and Others v the Netherlands, Application No. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, para 81: 
‘[t]he Convention without any doubt allows the States, in the performance of their function as guardians of the public interest, to 
maintain or establish a distinction between criminal law and disciplinary law, and to draw the dividing line, but only subject to 
certain conditions. The Convention leaves the States free to designate as a criminal offence an act or omission not constituting the 
normal exercise of one of the rights that it protects. This is made especially clear by Article 7 (art. 7). Such a choice, which has 
the effect of rendering applicable Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7), in principle escapes supervision by the Court. The converse 
choice, for its part, is subject to stricter rules. If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an offence as 
disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author of a "mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal 
plane, the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7) would be subordinated to their sovereign will. 
A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention. The Court 
therefore has jurisdiction, under Article 6 (art. 6) and even without reference to Articles 17 and 18 (art. 17, art. 18), to satisfy 
itself that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach upon the criminal’. 
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decisions are not considered criminal within the autonomous meaning of EU law, 138 
proceedings in relation to antitrust infringements can be considered criminal within the 
autonomous meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR. 139  Prior to evidencing that competition 
sanctioning can be embodied in Article 6(1) ECHR, as has been confirmed by the ECtHR 
case-law, it is worth mentioning in which situations a sanction can be considered ‘criminal’ 
in nature under the Convention’s system.  
In accordance with the ECtHR’s case law, a fine can be considered ‘criminal’ according 
to the following alternative criteria: (i) the classification of the offence under domestic law; 
(ii) the nature of the offence; and (iii) the degree of severity of the penalty.140 These three 
conditions are often referred to as the ‘Engel criteria’,141 are alternative and not cumulative, 
and are used to establish whether the sanctions imposed have a punitive and deterrent 
effect and whether the level of sanction and the stigma attaching to the offence is 
important.142   
 
                                                     
138 Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that the Commission’s antitrust fining decisions ‘shall not be of 
a criminal law nature’. 
139 For an overview of the ECtHR case law from which it emerges that classifications under domestic law 
have only a relative value and that the ECtHR will prefer a substantive rather than formal conception of what 
is a ‘criminal charge’, see SLATER D., THOMAS S., WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before the 
European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, No. 
5/2008, College of Europe, pp. 5-7. The authors also argue that even if EU antitrust fines were not 
considered criminal, this does not exclude the possibility under the ECHR to consider criminal the 
proceedings in relation to which they are adopted. This would be possible (i) relying on the Engel criteria that 
gives importance to the stigma attaching to offenses; and (ii) considering that Regulation 1/2003 foresees the 
possibility of a criminalization of such proceedings under national law (pp. 8-9). See also  SCHWARZE J., 
Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 2004, Vol. 68, pp. 101-
103; MÖSCEL W., Fines in European Competition Law, in ECLR, 2011, Issue 7, pp. 369-375; and WILS P. J. W., 
Is criminalization of EU competition law the answer?, in Concurrences, 2006, No. 1. 
140 The ECtHR has also resorted to other criteria, such as considering whether: (i) the law is addressed to all 
citizens from a specific area; (ii) the fine is used as a punishment in order to deter re-offending; (iii) the 
general purpose of the fine is to be deterrent and punitive; and (iv) the amount of surcharge is substantial; see, 
inter alia, ECtHR judgment of 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v France, Application No. 12547/86. However, 
currently the ECtHR resorts consistently to the Engel criteria described above which take into account the 
criteria listed in the text. 
141 ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel and others v the Netherlands, Application Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 
5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72. In the recent Menarini case the ECtHR confirmed that a cumulative 
approach may be pursued when the separate analysis of each criterion does not lead to a conclusive outcome; 
see ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, Application No. 43509/08, 
para 38 (hereinafter, “Menarini”). 
142 Later ECtHR case law has confirmed the importance of the deterrent and punitive character of a sanction. 
In Jussila v Finland the ECtHR established that the deterrent and punitive character of the sanction determined 
the ‘criminal nature of the offence’ (see ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, Application No 
73053/01, para 38).  
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4.2.3.2. The criminal nature of antitrust sanctions 
The ECtHR case law supports the classification of EU competition proceedings as 
criminal in nature. In the Société Stenuit, 143  Fortum, 144  Jussila 145  and more recently in the 
Menarini case,146 among others, the ECtHR held that Article 6(1) ECHR can effectively 
apply in the competition field. It emerges from these cases that national antitrust 
proceedings, despite being classified as administrative in their respective domestic laws, can 
be considered criminal in nature. Given the similarities with the EU system, it is considered 
that the same conclusion can be extended to antitrust proceedings before the Commission. 
In the Societe Stenuit case,147 the French company Stenuit appealed to the ECtHR after 
being held responsible by the French Ministry for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
sharing public contracts during tenders and submitting ‘higher tenders than its competitors on the 
understanding that agreements would be concluded on future occasions to ensure that it was awarded other 
contracts’.148 The undertaking concerned was fined both by the Ministry and by the French 
Commission de la Concurrence. In dismissing Stenuit’s appeal, the French Conseil d’Etat 
contended that: (i) the fines imposed were not criminal in nature and (ii) administrative 
penalties were not contrary to the provisions of the ECHR.149 Even though the case was 
settled, 150  in its concluding Report, the European Commission for Human Rights 151 
considered that the Ministry’s decision to impose a penalty involved a criminal sanction 
and could imply a violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The Commission for Human 
Rights took the view that in consideration of the objectives of the national legislation under 
examination and the nature and severity of the offence, ‘le caractère pénal que l’affaire revêt au 
regard de la Convention ressort sans ambigüité’ (paragraph 65). The Commission for Human 
Rights concluded in the Report that the Conseil d’Etat had not exercised its full 
                                                     
143 European Commission of Human Rights Report of 30 May 1991, Société Stenuit v France, Application No. 
11598/85.  
144 ECtHR judgment of 15 July 2003, Fortum v Finland, Application No. 32559/96. 
145 ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, Application No. 73053/01. 
146 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, Application No. 43509/08.  
147 See ECtHR judgment of 27 February 1992 Société Stenuit case v France, Application No. 11598/85 and the 
Report of the European Commission for Human Rights of 12 July 1991 issued in the same case. 
148 Para 5 of the Société Stenuit judgment. 
149 Para 5 of the Société Stenuit judgment. 
150 After the Report of the Commission of Human Rights, the ECtHR stroke out the case following the 
applicant’s decision to withdraw its application.   
151 From 1954 until the entry into force of Protocol 11 of the Convention, individuals did not have direct 
access to the ECtHR; they had to first apply to the Commission of Human Rights, which if it found the case 
to be well-founded would launch a case in Court on the individual’s behalf. 
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jurisdictional powers and thus the undertaking concerned had not benefited from the 
judicial review of an independent and impartial tribunal, as required by Article 6(1) 
ECHR.152 
In the 2003 Fortum case, the parties to the proceedings had not contested the 
applicability of Article 6 ECHR to their case which concerned the application of Finish 
competition law. Here the ECtHR had concluded that the applicant’s right to a fair trial 
had been violated as it had not had the opportunity to be heard in front of the Finish 
Supreme Administrative Court on a document of the Finish Competition Office which had 
been presented to the Administrative Court and contained accusations against it.153 
In the more recent Jussila case the ECtHR confirmed that competition law can fall under 
the criminal head of Article 6(1) ECHR and stated that: ‘[t]he autonomous interpretation adopted 
by the Convention institutions of the notion of a criminal charge by applying the Engel criteria have 
underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional 
categories of the criminal law, for example […] competition law’.154 As will be examined infra, this 
judgment has also drawn an important distinction between hard-core criminal law and 
cases not strictly belonging to the traditional categories of criminal law, including 
administrative penalties, prison disciplinary proceedings, customs law and competition law. 
In the recent Menarini case, the ECtHR had to ascertain whether the fining decision 
adopted by the Italian competition authority in a cartel case involving various companies 
could be considered a criminal charge. In doing so, it referred to its previous case law, in 
particular the Engel criteria, 155  and concluded that the authority’s decision had to be 
considered criminal in nature and that Article 6(1) ECHR was applicable to the case under 
examination (see in detail infra subsection 4.2.5 in Section II of this Chapter). 
The EU Courts have also shown an increased awareness of the criminal nature of 
competition proceedings within the meaning given to the concept of ‘criminal charge’ by 
the Strasbourg Court.156 Over time, EU case law has recognised the direct link between 
                                                     
152 Para 72 of the Report 
153 ECtHR judgment of 15 July 2003, Fortum v Finland, Application No. 32559/96, paras. 44-45. 
154 ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, Application No. 73053/01, para 32.  
155 ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel and others v. Netherlands, Application Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 
5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72.  
156 See Advocate General Vesterdorf’s Opinion of 10 July 1991 in the polypropylene cartel, Case T-7/89 SA 
Hercules Chemicals v Commission [1991] ECR II-867, para I.3; and Advocate General Leger’s Opinion of 3 
February 1998 in Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, para 31. See also the 
General Court’s statements in JFE v Commission (Case T-67/00 [2004] ECR II-2501, para 178) where the 
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severe penalties and the rights of defence guaranteed by the ECHR (see more in detail infra 
subsection 2.2.1 in Chapter 2). As stated by Advocate General Vesterdorf: ‘the fines which 
may be imposed on undertakings […] have a criminal law character, it is vitally important that the Court 
should seek to bring about a state of legal affairs not susceptible of any justified criticism with reference to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights’ 157 . EU officials have also often 
highlighted the punitive and deterrent character of competition fines.158 
 
4.2.3.3. The application of criminal charges by administrative authorities 
According to certain authors, under the Convention system the imposition of a fine 
considered criminal in nature by an administrative authority, as the European Commission, 
is not considered per se incompatible with the ECHR in so far as the measure in question is 
open to challenge before a court who can offer all the protections and guarantees 
enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR, including independence, impartiality and the exercise of 
powers of full judicial review. This argument would derive from a distinction introduced by 
the ECtHR’s case law between hard-core criminal law and cases not strictly belonging to 
the traditional categories of criminal law.159 In light of the ECtHR’s pronouncement in 
Jussila, competition law would belong to the second category.160  
                                                                                                                                 
Court held that ‘given the nature of infringements [...] and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties, the 
principle of the presumption of innocence applies in particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules 
relating to undertakings that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments’. See also Case T-138/07 
Schindler Holding Ltd. and Others v Commission ECR [2011] II-04819, paras. 52-59, where the GC found that EU 
competition law belonged to the periphery of Article 6 ECHR and was compatible with its requirements. See 
contra LEGAL H., Le contentieux communautaire de la concurrence entre contrôle restreint et pleine juridiction, in 
Concurrences No. 2-2005, No. 95, pp. 1-2: ‘[l]’autorité régulatrice est la Commission; elle prend des décisions qui sont des 
actes administratifs, auxquels on prête un caractère quasi pénal tout-à-fait injustifié’. 
157 Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf in Case T-1/89, Rhone Poulenc SA v Commission [1991] ECR II-
867, p. 885.  
158 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_1_7.pdf; see also the Director General for 
Competition A. Italianer’s speech of April 2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2010_02_en.pdf; see also speeches by former Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes in October 2009, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/454&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en, and March 2007, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/128&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
159 WILS P. J. W., EU Antitrust Enforcement Powers and Procedural Rights and Guarantees: The Interplay between EU 
Law, National Law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights, Paper 
presented at the 2nd Annual International Concurrences Conference ‘New Frontiers of Antitrust’ (Paris, 11 
February 2011), pp. 22-23; WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, World Competition, Volume 33, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 15-17. 
160 ‘The autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention institutions of the notion of a criminal charge by applying the 
Engel criteria have underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional 
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According to this differentiation, when penalties belong to the ‘hard core’ category of 
criminal sanctions, an independent and impartial tribunal shall establish the criminal nature 
of charges. Therefore, ‘in the criminal context […] there must be at first instance a tribunal which 
fully meets the requirements of article 6’.161 When penalties do not belong to the category of ‘hard 
core’ criminal sanctions, as would be the case for antitrust fines, in order to comply with 
Article 6(1) ECHR, it is necessary that: or the administrative authority imposing the 
sanction in question is capable of offering all the guarantees enshrined therein, or, should 
the first solution not be applicable, the decision issued by the non-judicial body must be 
subject to the subsequent control of a judicial authority that does meet the requirements of 
Article 6(1) ECHR, including independence, impartiality and the possibility to exercise full 
judicial review powers.162  
For some time, given the lack of case law on the point, it was debated whether 
competition proceedings should fall under the category of hard-core criminal law or under 
the category of non-hard core criminal offenses (with the fundamental distinction that in 
the latter case the first determination of the right can be made by an administrative body, 
followed by the possibility of appeal to an impartial and independent court with full 
jurisdiction). The issue was addressed for the first time in the Jussila judgment in favour of 
the second solution (see supra subsection 4.2.3.2 in Section II of this Chapter). In the 
Menarini judgment the ECtHR, although it did not delve on the question whether 
competition law belonged to the hard-core of criminal law, it took into account the 
distinction between hard-core and non-hard-core by stating that: ‘[p]ar ailleurs, la Cour 
                                                                                                                                 
categories of the criminal law, for example […] competition law’, see ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2006, Jussila v 
Finland, Application No. 73053/01, paras. 32 and 43. 
161 ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2006, Jussila v Finland, Application No 73053/01, para 40. 
162 This distinction was elaborated for the first time by the ECtHR in the LeCompte case (ECtHR judgment of 
23 June 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, Application Nos. 6878/75; 7238/75, para 51). 
The ECtHR here considered acceptable a two-tier system when proceedings concerned disputes over civil 
rights and obligations. The two-tier system has been considered acceptable by the ECtHR also in the civil 
domain in the presence of disciplinary offences (see ECtHR judgment of 10 February 1983, Albert and Le 
Compte v Belgium, Application Nos. 7299/75; 7496/76, para 29). This case law has subsequently been extended 
to criminal proceedings concerning minor road traffic offenses in the Ozturk case (ECtHR judgment of 21 
February 1984. Application No. 8544/79, para 56) and to criminal proceedings concerning tax surcharges in 
the Bendenoun case (ECtHR judgment of 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v France, Application No. 12547/86, 
para 46). According to several authors, this principle applies also where sanctions are of large amounts and 
not only to ‘minor offenses’. For example, in the Bendenoun case the ECtHR applied this principle ‘even if the 
[penalties] are large ones’ or ‘very substantial’ (paras. 46 and 47); see, inter alia, WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of 
EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights, World Competition, Volume 33, 
No. 1, March 2010, p. 17; see also CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel 
Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 571.  
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rappelle que la nature d’une procédure administrative peut différer, sous plusieurs aspects, de la nature d’une 
procédures pénale au sens strict du terme. Si ces différences ne sauraient exonérer les Etats contractants de 
leur obligation de respecter toutes les garanties offertes par le volet pénal de l’article 6, elles peuvent 
néanmoins influencer les modalités de leur application’. 163  The ECtHR, after considering the 
national competition proceedings under examination criminal in nature, it did implicitly 
consider acceptable the Italian two-tier system where the competition ‘criminal’ charge was 
decided by an administrative authority and then subject to the subsequent review of 
national courts.164  
Applying by analogy the ECtHR cases concerning national competition laws to the EU 
scenario,165 the circumstance that the Commission combines its investigative and decision-
making powers and cannot be qualified as an independent and impartial tribunal,166 would 
not necessarily run counter to Article 6(1) ECHR. The establishment of criminal charges 
can be entrusted to administrative or non-judicial bodies as well, without the need of 
separating their internal functions, as long as their decisions can be challenged before a 
judicial body that respects all the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. Accordingly, Article 
6(1) ECHR would allow for the imposition of antitrust fines by the Commission, provided 
                                                     
163 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, Application No. 43509/08, 
para 62. 
164  This view is not shared by certain commentators who claim that ‘Menarini does not settle this point, as 
Menarini’s challenge […] focused on the way the Italian Courts had exercised their review […] not on the architecture of the 
Authority, or on the legality of criminal fines it inflicts. […] No mention was made in the judgment of the Jussila-distinction 
between a ‘hard core’ and a ‘periphery’ within criminal heading of Article 6 ECHR’. The circumstance that the ECtHR 
in Menarini did not address directly the distinction between hard-core and non-hard-core leads to speculation 
as this can be interpreted in the sense that or the ECtHR considers that competition law fines fall outside the 
‘hard-core’ or that according to the ECtHR criminal sanctions must not always necessarily be imposed by a 
judge. Moreover, according to these commentators, ‘[w]ithout the Menarini-court having explicitly dealt with these 
arguments […] it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions on where the law stands. […] if the Menarini court had wanted to 
tackle the questions […] on the characterization of competition law fines (‘hard-core’ or not, etc.) on its own motion, it probably 
could have done so. But the Court did not. Given the sensitivities of these issues, one should not draw implicit or a contrario 
conclusions from this judgment. They merit a full hearing, and proper, explicit consideration by the Court, and preferably (like 
Jussila) by the Grand Chamber’. See Bronckers and Vallery also citing Waelbroeck in BRONCKERS M, 
VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities and Which Role for the 
Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), in European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, pp. 4-5.  
165 As recognized undisputedly, the importance of the Menarini judgment for the debate on the EU system ‘lies 
in the fact that the Italian system of judicial review effectively mirrors the arrangements for the judicial review of the European 
Commission’s decisions on competition taken pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 of the […] TFEU’; see OLIVER P., 
“Diagnostics” – a Judgment Applying the Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Competition, in Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 163. 
166 Past case law of the EU Courts has consistently held that the Commission cannot be considered as a 
‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR; see, inter alia, Case T-348/94 Enso Espanola v Commission 
[1998] ECR II-1989, para 56, and Joined Cases 100/80, 101/80, 102/80 and 103/80 Musique Diffusion 
Française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, para 7. 
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that the EU Courts, before which the addressees of Commission fining decisions can bring 
appeal, offer all the protection and guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR.167 This 
view, however, is not unanimously shared, as a number of commentators believe that EU 
competition proceedings fall within the hard-core of criminal law in light of the nature of 
the offence (against free competition in the general interest of society), the stigma attached 
to competition sanctions, and their severity and deterrent nature.168 Sustainers of this view 
therefore criticize the current antitrust architecture and consider that respect of Article 6(1) 
ECHR requires that ‘criminal’ charges in EU competition cases be adopted only by the EU 
Courts. The following subsections are based on the premise that EU competition 
proceedings do not belong to ‘hard-core’ criminal law but to the periphery of Article 6(1) 
ECHR, and will examine the characteristics of the EU system of judicial review in light of 
the requirements of this provision. 
 
4.2.4. The characteristics of the EU system of judicial review in competition cases in light of the 
requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR 
It is necessary to examine whether the EU system of judicial review complies with the 
requirements set out in Article 6(1) ECHR, first in relation to the conditions of 
independence and impartiality established in Article 6(1) ECHR, then, in relation to the 
scope and standards governing the EU Courts’ powers of judicial review in competition 
cases. The EU and ECHR standards of review will be confronted with a view to 
establishing if the EU rules, and the manner in which they are concretely applied by the EU 
                                                     
167 At the EU level, cases are pending which might shed some light with reference to the issue of the 
combination of investigative and decision-making powers of the Commission. By way of example, this matter 
was recently discussed in the action brought by Saint Gobain against the Commission in which it relied, inter 
alia, on the ‘infringement of the right of an independent and impart tribunal […] in so far as the fine was imposed by an 
administrative authority which holds simultaneously powers of investigation and sanction and that Regulation 1/2003 is 
unlawful in so far as it does not provide for that right to an independent and impartial tribunal’; see Case T-56/09 Saint - 
Gobain Glass France and Others v Commission, currently pending in front of the General Court..  
168 BRONCKERS M, VALLERY A., No Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain 
Dogmas of EU Competition Law, in World Competition, 2011, No. 4, pp. 540-542. For an overview of the 
arguments raised in favour of considering competition proceedings part of the hard-core of criminal law see, 
inter alia, SLATER D., THOMAS S., WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before the European 
Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, No. 5/2008, 
College of Europe, pp. 17-21’ and INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMMISSION, 
Due process in EU antitrust proceedings, Comments submitted on the European Commission's draft Best Practices 
in Antitrust Proceedings and the Hearing Officers’ Guidance Paper, 8 March 2010, pp. 3-5. See contra TORRE 
C., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics Review, No. 4, 
December 2009, pp. 571-577. 
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Courts, are compliant with the requirement of full judicial review set out in Article 6(1) 
ECHR. 
As to the requirement of independence and impartiality, Article 6(1) ECHR establishes 
the right to a fair trial by an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’. It emerges from the 
ECHR case law that these two notions are often treated together, a lack of independence 
often coinciding with a lack of objective impartiality. 169  As to the requirement of 
independence, this necessitates that the tribunal or court be independent of the legislative 
and executive powers and of the parties. The criteria the ECtHR will consider to this end 
are the manner of appointment of the members, duration of office, guarantees against 
external pressures and appearance of independence. 170  As to the requirement of 
impartiality, a distinction is normally made between subjective and objective impartiality. 
The first relates to the actual existence of a prejudice on the part of a tribunal or court, or 
any of its members, the second refers to the existence of sufficient guarantees to exclude 
any legitimate doubt in this matter.171 In light of the characteristics of the General Court 
and the Court of Justice, there is no doubt that they satisfy the requirements of 
independence and impartiality set out in Article 6(1) ECHR.172 
As to the requirement of full judicial review, the approach advocated by the ECtHR 
demands that the court competent for reviewing administrative measures aimed at, in the 
case of competition infringements, the determination of a criminal charge, enjoy ‘full 
jurisdiction’. The ECtHR case law is not straightforward on what this requirement entails 
under Article 6(1) ECHR. From an overview of the case law, it is possible to make a first 
distinction between the standard of review applied in criminal cases and in civil cases. The 
judgments examined further justify the conclusion that, where criminal matters are 
concerned, the competent court should be able to access the validity of the measure both 
in fact and in law. On the other hand, it is considered still controversial whether the 
ECtHR mandates only the power to quash in all respects the decision under examination, 
                                                     
169 REID K., A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed., 2012, p. 
159. 
170 ECtHR judgment of 1 October 1982, Piersack v Belgium, Application No. 8692/79, para 27. 
171 REID K., A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed., 2012, p. 
162. 
172 See, inter alia, Case T-348/94 Enso Espanola v Commission [1998] ECR II-1989, para 62: ‘[f]irst, the Court of 
First Instance is an independent and impartial court, established by Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 
October 1988 […] As is apparent from the third recital in the preamble to that decision, the Court was established in order 
particularly to improve the judicial protection of individual interests in respect of actions requiring close examination of complex 
facts’ (emphasis added). 
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or whether it also requires the power to decide and reform under all aspects the decision in 
question.  
 
4.2.4.1. The ECtHR case law in criminal cases 
In Albert and LaCompte the ECtHR emphasized that the tribunal competent for 
reviewing administrative measures aimed at the determination of the individual’s civil rights 
must enjoy ‘full jurisdiction’, while in the specific case ‘[t]he Court of Cassation does not take 
cognisance of the merits of the case, which means that many aspects of "contestations" (disputes) concerning 
"civil rights and obligations", including review of the facts and assessment of the proportionality between the 
fault and the sanction, fall outside its jurisdiction’.173 In this case the ECtHR did not consider it 
necessary to decide whether, in the specific circumstances, there was a ‘criminal charge’, as 
it considered the two aspects, civil and criminal, not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
however it considered that paragraph 1 of Article 6, violation of which was alleged by the 
applicants, applied in civil matters as well as in the criminal sphere. 
In Belilos the ECtHR held that the proceedings before the French Criminal Cassation 
Division did not satisfy the standards laid down by Article 6(1) ECHR, as recourse to that 
court did not allow for a ‘ruling on the merits but solely for review of (…) [the] lawfulness’.174  
In Stenuit, the European Commission for Human Rights held that the French Conseil 
d’Etat, which according to national law had the power to exercise full judicial control, had 
not exercised such powers in practice, thus the undertaking concerned had not benefited 
from the intervention of a tribunal with full judicial review powers, as required by Article 
6(1) ECHR.175  Interestingly, and contrary to what is provided under EU law, under French 
legislation the Conseil d’Etat’s full judicial review powers entailed the possibility to 
‘substituer sa propre décision a celle qui lui est déférée, exerçant sur cette dernière un entier control. [...] Le 
Conseil d’Etat était ainsi appelé a contrôler la matérialité des faits retenus pour sanctionner la personne 
concernée, la qualification juridique des faits (et donc la base légale de la décision), la régularité de la 
                                                     
173 ECtHR judgment of 10 February 1983, Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, Application Nos. 7299/75; 7496/76, 
paras. 30, 36-37.  
174 ECtHR judgment of 29 April 1988, Belilos v Switzerland, Application No. 10328/83, para 70. Moreover, the 
French court did not have full competence to re-examine the facts. These various factors led to the 
conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Criminal Cassation Division was not in the instant case sufficient for 
the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Convention. 
175 Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, para 72. 
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procédure suivie, ainsi que la proportionnalité entre les manquements commis et le montant de l’amende 
infligée (en réduisant au besoin cette dernière)’ (emphasis added).176  
Similarly in Schmautzer, a case relating to an administrative decision concerning motoring 
offences (an Austrian citizen was imposed a fine with 24 hours imprisonment in default of 
payment), a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR was found in the lack on the part of the 
competent administrative court of the power to annul the final decision in all respects, on 
questions of fact and law. Here the ECtHR stated that ‘[t]he powers of the Administrative Court 
must be assessed in the light of the fact that the court in this case was sitting in proceedings that were of a 
criminal nature for the purposes of the Convention. It follows that when the compatibility of those powers 
with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is being gauged, regard must be had to the complaints raised in that court 
by the applicant as well as to the defining characteristics of a "judicial body that has full jurisdiction". These 
include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below. As 
the Administrative Court lacks that power, it cannot be regarded as a "tribunal" within the meaning of the 
Convention’.177  
In Janosevic, the ECtHR restated that full jurisdiction entails ‘the power to quash in all respects, 
on questions of fact and of law, the challenged decision’.178 Here the ECtHR concluded that there 
had been no violation of Article 6(1) ECHR because the Swedish courts reviewing the 
Swedish Tax Authority’s findings had ‘jurisdiction to examine all aspects of the matters before them. 
Their examination is not restricted to points of law but may also extend to factual issues, including the 
assessment of evidence. If they disagree with the findings of the Tax Authority, they have the power to quash 
the decisions appealed against’.179 
In Kyprianou, a Cypriot case concerning a contempt of Court falling under the criminal 
head of Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR stated: ‘[t]he Court notes that the decision of the Assize Court 
was subsequently reviewed by the Supreme Court. According to the Court’s case-law, it is possible for a 
higher tribunal, in certain circumstances, to make reparation for an initial violation of the Convention (see 
the De Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 19, § 33). However, in the 
present case, the Court observes that the Supreme Court agreed with the approach of the first instance court, 
i.e. that the latter could itself try a case of criminal contempt committed in its face, and rejected the 
applicant’s complaints which are now before this Court. There was no retrial of the case by the Supreme 
                                                     
176 Report of the European Commission of Human Rights, para 41. 
177 ECtHR judgment of 23 October 1995, Schmautzer v Austria, Application No. 15523/89, para 36. 
178 ECtHR judgment of 21 May 2003, Janosevic v Sweden, Application No. 34619/97, para 81.  
179 ECtHR judgment of 21 May 2003, Janosevic v Sweden, Application No. 34619/97, para 82. 
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Court. As a court of appeal, the Supreme Court did not have full competence to deal de novo with the case, 
but could only review the first instance judgment for possible legal or manifest factual errors. It did not carry 
out an ab initio, independent determination of the criminal charge against the applicant for contempt of the 
Assize Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that it could not interfere with the judgment of the 
Assize Court, accepting that that court had a margin of appreciation in imposing a sentence on the 
applicant. Indeed, although the Supreme Court had the power to quash the impugned decision on the ground 
that the composition of the Assize Court had not been such as to guarantee its impartiality, it declined to do 
so. The Court also notes that the appeal did not have a suspensive effect on the judgment of the Assize 
Court. In this connection, it observes that the applicant’s conviction and sentence became effective under 
domestic criminal procedure on the same day as the delivery of the judgment by the Assize Court, i.e. on 14 
February 2001. […] In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the Government’s argument that 
any defect in the proceedings of the Assize Court was cured on appeal by the Supreme Court’ (emphasis 
added). 
In the recent Menarini case, the ECtHR emphasized that among the most important 
features of a system of full judicial review, the ECtHR recalls the authority to examine all 
questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute and the power of modifying the contested 
decision: ‘[p]armi les caractéristiques d’un organe judiciaire de pleine juridiction figure le pouvoir de 
réformer en tous points, en fait comme en droit, la décision entreprise, rendue par l’organe inférieur. Il doit 
notamment avoir compétence pour se pencher sur toutes les questions de fait et de droit pertinentes pour le 
litige dont il se trouve saisi’ (emphasis added).180 Nowithstanding this definition, the ECtHR in 
the Menarini case considered acceptable a system whereby the national courts exercised an 
(exhaustive) review of legality coupled by unlimited review only in relation to the fine (for a 
detailed examination see infra subsection 4.2.5 of this Chapter).  
Finally in the 2012 Bouygues Telecom case, the ECtHR considered that the Paris Court of 
Appeal had unlimited jurisdiction over the decisions of the French Competition Council as 
it was able to assess the merits of the case and in particular to engage in a review of the 
proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty: ‘[l]a Cour souligne, à cet égard, que la 
cour d’appel de Paris statuant sur les recours formés à l’encontre des décisions du Conseil de la concurrence a 
la compétence de pleine juridiction (article L. 464-8, alinéa 1 du code de commerce, voir « droit interne 
                                                     
180 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, Application No. 43509/08, 
para 59.  
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pertinent »), qu’elle était donc en mesure d’apprécier le bien-fondé de la cause et notamment de se livrer à un 
contrôle de proportionnalité entre la faute et la sanction’.181 
In light of the ECtHR case law, a number of authors claim that the current EU judicial 
review system ‘does not pose any legal problems, as it appears fully compatible with Article 6 ECHR, 
as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights’,182 and that the ‘[c]riticisms of the institutional 
system based on its alleged incompatibility with fundamental rights do not appear to find a robust basis in 
the existing case law of the ECtHR’.183 On the other hand, a number of other commentators 
believe that the ECHR requirements are strict and require full appellate judicial review, i.e. a 
full de novo review of the case. This view can be summarized as follows:  
‘In light of the ECtHR case-law, it is clear that judicial review by the GC in antitrust cases 
should not be limited to questions of law and to the determination of the appropriate level of the 
fine, but should also extend to a full reassessment of the facts and to the expediency of the 
Commission’s decision. The GC cannot limit its analysis to “manifest errors of appraisals or 
misuses of power” but should in every case reassess fully the facts and the choice of the appropriate 
legal and economic tests applied to these facts. The “unlimited jurisdiction” that the Community 
Courts are entitled to exercise should not be limited to altering the amount of the fines imposed on 
companies but should also extend to the very determination of the infringement giving rise to these 
sanctions’.184 
This argument is supported, inter alia, by the circumstance that in the French versions of 
the ECtHR judgments, the expression ‘the power to quash’ the decision below uses the verb 
‘reformer’ (the power to substitute one assessment for another) rather than the word ‘quash’ 
                                                     
181 ECtHR judgment of 13 March 2012, Société Bouygues Telecom v France, Application No. 2324/08, para 71. In 
this case, Bouygues Telecom had claimed, inter alia, that its right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR had been 
violated as it had not benefited from a public hearing in proceedings in front of the French Competition 
Council. The ECtHR rejected this claim and stated that the absence of a public hearing at the administrative 
stage was counterbalanced by the double judicial review of its decision by the Court of Appeal and the Cour de 
Cassation. See THEOPHILE D. and SIMIC I., Can Human Rights Help? Bouygues’ Claim that its Procedural Rights 
were Infringed, in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2012, p. 345. 
182 WILS P. J. W., The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC 
Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, p. 11. 
183 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 577. See also the comments of the Director General for 
Competition Mr. Italianer in the aftermath of the Menarini judgment where he stated that given the 
resemblances between the EU and Italian system, the EU system of review would also comply with the 
ECHR standards of judicial review; see ITALIANER A., Best Practices for antitrust proceedings and the submission of 
economic evidence and the enhanced role of the Hearing Officer, Speech at the OECD Competition Committee Meeting, 
Paris, 18 October 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_12_en.pdf. 
184 SLATER D., THOMAS S., WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before the European Commission 
and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, No. 5/2008, College of 
Europe, p. 34. 
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(i.e. annul). If this were the scope of judicial review mandated by the ECtHR, in light of the 
characteristics of the EU system of judicial review in competition cases (see supra 
subsections 1 and 2 of Section I in this Chapter), the EU system could be considered 
inadequate and insufficient.  
This view is contested by those authors who claim that Article 6(1) ECHR does not 
require the judicial body to conduct de novo trials, being sufficient that it review the 
contested decision (examining all pleas, factual and legal, raised by the applicant) and that it 
quash the decision when it disagrees with its findings.185 This debate must now take into 
account the recent case law of the ECtHR, in particular the Menarini judgment, which has 
held not contrary to Article 6 ECHR, a system of judicial review of administrative charges 
considered criminal in nature which did not provide for full appellate judicial review but 
only for a review of legality for the finding of the infringement, combined with full 
appellate review for the determination of the fine. 186  Given the importance that the 
Menarini judgment has for the present debate, this case has been examined in detail in order 
to understand its effects (see infra subsection 4.2.5 of this Chapter). 
A more nuanced view is that of those authors who consider that the ECtHR case law 
does not mandate full appellate judicial review, but does require that within the framework 
of the review of legality, there should be no limitations concerning the assessments the 
judicial authority can review.187 This argument refers to the intensity of the judicial review 
exercised and considers that under the ECHR system it must be full, excluding standards 
which give space to discretion or that correct only manifest errors. As indicated by one 
author: 
                                                     
185 See WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in World Competition, Volume 33, No. 1, March 2010, pp. 20-21. The author bases this 
argument, inter alia, on the ECtHR Kyprianou judgment of December 15, 2005 (Kyprianou v Cyprus, Application 
No. 73797/01), which would not contradict this conclusion as the case concerned a hard-core criminal 
measure and not the requirements of judicial review outside the hard-core of criminal law.  
186 Interestingly, in the Menarini judgment the ECtHR used the verb ‘reformer’. For an analysis of the criticisms 
raised by the findings of the ECtHR in this judgment see infra subsections 4.2.7 and 2.2.3 respectively in 
Chapters 1 and 2.  
187 See, inter alia, ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 
232: ‘the “restrained” scrutiny of the “complex economic assessments” contained in decisions applying Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty appears to be at variance vis-à-vis the standards laid down by the European Court of Human Rights as regards appeals 
against administrative decisions determining a criminal charge, such as minor motoring offences’. See also WAELBROECK 
D., FOSSELARD D., Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be left to an independent judge? - 
The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures, in Yearbook of European Law, 
1994, Vol. 14 p. 133: ‘[i]t may therefore still be doubted whether the control carried out by the Court of First Instance, as long 
as it will be limited to manifest errors of fact, will be sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR’. 
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‘if two-tier systems with deferential judicial review are admissible, there may be issues that are never 
fully determined by an independent and impartial decision-maker whenever the first instance body 
is not independent and impartial and the reviewing court exercises deferential judicial review. This 
is prohibited by Article 6(1) ECHR, which does not allow any derogation from the right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal’.188 
Accepting that this is the correct interpretation of ‘full review’ under the Convention’s 
system, and considering the Commission does not satisfy the requirements of 
independence and impartiality, raises the issue of the incompatibility of the ‘limited’ or 
‘marginal’ standard of review exercised by EU judges vis à vis complex economic and/or 
technical assessments of the Commission in competition cases. This view is however not 
shared by certain authors who claim that a parallelism can be made between criminal and 
civil charges, both covered by Article 6(1) ECHR. According to this argument, examined 
more in detail in the following subsection, in civil cases judicial review can be limited to a 
control of manifest errors and the same conclusion could be transposed to criminal cases. 
 
4.2.4.2. The ECtHR case law in civil cases 
Over time the ECtHR case law has clarified the intensity of judicial review that is 
required for compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR in cases concerning the determination of 
civil rights and obligations. By way of example, in the Tsfayo case, the ECtHR stated that 
judicial review can be limited to a control of manifest errors ‘where the issues to be determined 
[require] a measure of professional knowledge or experience and the exercise of administrative discretion 
pursuant to wider policy aims’.189 Certain authors argue that the ECtHR case law relating to civil 
rights and obligations could be extended to ‘criminal’ charges.190 Accordingly, the ECtHR 
would have accepted both in the civil and criminal domain that judicial review can be 
limited to a control of manifest errors where the issues to be determined require a measure 
of professional knowledge or experience and the exercise of administrative discretion 
pursuant to wider policy aims. This view of a continuum between the two categories of 
proceedings is described by one particular commentator as follows: 
                                                     
188 NAZZINI R., Administrative enforcement, judicial review and fundamental rights in EU competition law: A comparative 
contextual-functionalist perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 990. 
189 ECtHR judgment of 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v United Kingdom, Application No. 60860/00, para 46, 
referring to ECtHR judgment of 22 November 1995, Bryan v United Kingdom, Application No. 19178/91. 
190 See WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, in World Competition, Volume 33, No. 1, March 2010, p. 24. 
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‘I am not sure that the ECtHR would necessarily consider that showing some deference towards 
the views of the public institution supposed to have superior knowledge and means to carry out 
technical assessments when it comes to assessing what are perceived to be technical matters, once the 
facts supporting that assessment are well-established (which Community Courts can obviously 
review), is something which would be contrary to Article 6(1), especially in view of the more 
nuanced approach expressed in Jussila as regards areas which are not the ‘core’ of criminal law. 
The case law of the ECtHR which refers to certain deference to technical assessments has developed 
in the area of civil rights, but the fundamental rights concerned is the same for civil and criminal 
law. Moreover, the difference between civil rights and criminal charges is sometimes puzzling 
(disciplinary proceedings implying that somebody cannot practice a profession is seen as a civil 
matter, whereas a tax surcharge is seen as criminal), and there is clearly a continuum between the 
two categories’.191 
The validity of such an interpretation of the ECHR is however questioned in light of the 
fundamental differences which exist between civil and criminal cases. The Bryan v United 
Kingdom case,192 often cited to sustain this thesis, occurred in the context of proceedings in 
the sphere of civil rights and obligations, more specifically a town planning dispute in 
which the applicant had challenged an order requiring him to demolish two buildings 
because in violation of planning law. Here the ECtHR considered various factors before 
concluding that deferential judicial review was sufficient, including (i) the safeguards that 
applied in proceedings before the administrative authority; (ii) the absence of disputes on 
the primary facts; and (iii) the subject matter of the measure which was a specialized area of 
the law.193 It can be argued that it is difficult to extend these findings to the domain of 
antitrust infringements, given that it can be contended that sufficient safeguards are not 
guaranteed during the administrative procedure where, although in the presence of a 
                                                     
191 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, p. 575. 
192 ECtHR judgment of 22 November 1995 in Case of Bryan v United Kingdom, Application No. 19178/91. 
193 For an overview of why the ECtHR Bryan and Tsfayo cases cannot be invoked in the criminal domain to 
justify limited review when the issues to be determined require a measure of professional knowledge or 
experience and the exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to wider policy aims; see NAZZINI R., 
Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A Comparative Contextual-
functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 998. According to this author, ‘the better interpretation of these 
cases is … that deferential review is admissible when two conditions are present: (1) the subject-matter is such that it is 
appropriate for the case to be decided at first instance by an administrative authority subject to deferential judicial review; and (2) 
the first instance decision-maker complies with the requirements of independence and impartiality albeit taking into account its 
administrative nature. To read these cases differently would be to accept that a central issue in a case may never be decided by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, which is against the text of Article 6(1) ECHR’. 
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specialised area of law, ‘criminal charges’ would still be involved and not mere local 
governmental issues such as town planning.194 Furthermore, to date, the ECtHR case law 
has continued to require a stricter approach in criminal cases, independently of whether 
hard-core or non-hard-core, as described in subsection 4.2.4.1 above. 
 
4.2.4.3. The peculiarities of merger control cases  
A separate discussion must be made for the field of merger control. To date the ECtHR 
has not rendered any judgment concerning the nature of these proceedings that could shed 
light on the applicability of Article 6 ECHR under its criminal or civil head. However, a 
number of commentators argue that these proceedings can be decisive for the freedom of 
undertakings to carry on their business and lead to the ‘determination of civil rights and 
obligations’ and are thus subject to the civil head of Article 6 ECHR.195  
Other commentators argue that the concept of ‘civil rights and obligations’ in the ECHR 
system should be interpreted broadly and that there are thus ‘no reasons why Article 6 should 
not equally apply to competition procedures resulting in the authorization of a joint venture, merger’,196 etc. 
                                                     
194 In the Bryan case the ECtHR found there had not been a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR as, although the 
review by the inspector did not meet the safeguards associated with ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’, 
the review by the High Court did satisfy the requirements enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. According to the 
Court, ‘while the High Court could not have substituted its own findings of fact for those of the inspector, it would have had the 
power to satisfy itself that the inspector’s findings of fact or the inferences based on them were neither perverse or irrational’. The 
Court added that ‘such an approach by an appeal tribunal on questions of fact “can be reasonably expected in specialised areas 
of law, particularly where the facts have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of 
the safeguards required by Article 6”’. The Court further explained that, ‘in assessing the sufficiency of the review…it is 
necessary to have regard to matters such as the subject matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision 
was arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal”. In the judgment, the 
Court states ‘indeed, the present case, the subject matter of the contested decision by the inspector was a typical example of the 
exercise of discretionary judgment in the regulation of citizen’s conduct in the sphere of town and country; ECtHR judgment of 
22 November 1995, Bryan v United Kingdom, Application No. 19178/91, paras. 45 and 47. Moreover, even if it 
were accepted that these findings could be applied in competition matters, it must be noted that in the Bryan 
case, other important factors contributed to limit the review of the High Court. In particular, the facts had 
already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many of the safeguards 
required by Article 6(1) ECHR. It is contended that it would be hard to conceive the Commission’s 
combination of investigative and decision-marking powers in antitrust proceedings as a full-fledged ‘quasi-
judicial procedure’. 
195 ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 29; see also 
WILS W. P. J., Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 159: ‘[a]s to proceedings under 
the EC Merger Regulation, they are in all likelihood to be regarded as relating to the determination of civil rights or obligations 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR, in that the result of these proceedings is decisive for the parties’ right to merge or 
make an acquisition’. 
196 WAELBROECK D., FOSSELARD D., Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be left to 
an independent judge? - The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures, in 
Yearbook of European Law, 1994, Vol. 14, p. 124. The authors refer to a number of ECtHR judgments 
which allegedly prove the broad scope of application of the civil head of Article 6 ECHR. 
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Accordingly, merger proceedings shall also benefit from all the safeguards and 
guarantees enshrined in Article 6 ECHR and it can be considered that all EU competition 
proceedings are covered by this provision of the ECHR. Within the EU framework this is 
all the more true given that Article 47 of the EU Charter (the twin provision of Article 6 
ECHR) enshrines the right to an effective remedy before a Tribunal without distinguishing 
between a criminal and a civil head.197 
 
4.2.5. The ECtHR’s judgment in case A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l.  
In September 2011 the ECtHR handed down an important ruling for the debate on 
judicial review and on the right to a fair trial in the Menarini case. This dispute concerned an 
Italian case but the similarities of the Italian situation with the EU system of judicial review 
triggered reactions and debates that went well beyond the national boundaries. In particular, 
the ECtHR clarified a number of issues concerning judicial review of competition decisions 
in light of the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR that are potentially equally applicable, 
and thus of valuable interest, to the debate concerning the EU system. The relevance of 
this ruling for the discussion on the compatibility of the EU system of judicial review with 
fundamental rights is such to necessitate an in-depth analysis of the ECtHR’s findings.  
On 27 September 2011, the ECtHR dismissed the action brought by the company A. 
Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. (“Menarini”), with which it challenged the compatibility of the 
Italian system of judicial review of decisions adopted by the national competition authority 
(the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, “AGCM”) with Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.198 The ECtHR’s ruling analyses the powers of judicial review exercised by Italian 
                                                     
197 The first two paragraphs of Article 47 of the EU Charter establish that: ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law.’ 
198 ECtHR judgment of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, Application No. 43509/08. 
See SIRAGUSA M., RIZZA C., Violazione delle norme antitrust, sindacato giurisdizionale sull’esercizio del potere 
sanzionatorio da parte dell’autorità di concorrenza e diritto fondamentale a un equo processo: Lo “Stato dell’arte” dopo le 
sentenza Menarini, KME e Posten Norge, in Giurisprudenza Commerciale, Anno XL, Fasc. 2-2013, pp. 408-456; 
BOMBOIS T., L’arrêt Menarini c. Italie de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit antitrust, champ pénal et 
contrôle de pleine juridiction, in Cahiers de Droit Européen, 2011, No. 2, p. 541; BRONCKERS M., VALLERY A., 
Business as usual after Menarini?, in M-Lex Magazine, January-March (2012), p .43; BOSCO D., Du Contrôle De 
Pleine Juridiction Exercé Sur Les Décisions Des Autorités De Concurrence, À Propos De Cour Edh, 27 Septembre 2011, 
Menarini, October 1, 2011, available at http://ssrn.com [Accessed October 3, 2012]; BELLAMY C., ECHR and 
competition law post Menarini: An overview of EU and national case law, (2012) No. 47946 e Competitions; 
BRONCKERS M., VALLERY A., Fair and effective competition policy in the EU: Which role for authorities and which 
role for the Courts after Menarini?, speech at the 19th International Competition Forum in St Gallen, 8 June 2012; 
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administrative courts over decisions adopted by the AGCM pursuant to national 
competition law.199 In particular, it establishes that the Italian judicial review system of 
antitrust decisions, as implemented by the Italian judges in Menarini’s case, was compliant 
with Article 6(1) ECHR and, thus, that there had been no breach of the applicants’ right to 
a fair trial. Such conclusion has important repercussions at the EU level, as the Italian 
judicial review system is modeled to a great extent against the European one.   
 
4.2.5.1. Background 
On 20 April 2003, the AGCM adopted a decision imposing a fine of six million euro on 
Menarini for having operated with other four pharmaceutical firms, between 1997 and 
2001, a complex price fixing and market-sharing arrangement in the market for diagnostic 
tests for diabetes. Subsequently, Menarini challenged the decision, without success, in front 
of the competent Italian courts (i.e. the Regional Administrative Tribunal of Latium, the 
Council of State and the Court of Cassation). Having exhausted all national remedies, the 
applicant brought its case before the ECtHR. Menarini’s main contention was that the 
Italian system of judicial review of the AGCM’s antitrust decisions infringed its right to a 
fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR, in so far as it did not allow the company to have access 
to a Court with powers of full judicial review nor to obtain a judicial re-examination of the 
authority’s decision. The ECtHR’s judgment first examines the issue of the applicability of 
Article 6(1) ECHR and of the admissibility of Menarini’s application, then turns to analyze 
the merits of the applicant’s arguments and, thus, whether the Italian courts had exercised 
their powers of judicial review of the AGCM’s antitrust decision in a manner compatible 
with Article 6(1) ECHR. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
ANDERSSON H., Judicial review after Menarini – any need for reform of the EU system?, Paper for the Conference: 
General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law - Stockholm, November 8-9, 2012; ABENHAIM 
M., Quel droit au juge en matière de cartels? Commentaire de l’arrêt Menarini Diagnostics c/Italie, in Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen, No. 1, janvier-mars (2012); CARDONNEL P., Art. 6, § 1 CEDH: The European Court of Human 
Rights rules on standard of judicial review on cartel decisions by national competition authorities (Menarini Diagnostics v. Italy), 
in Concurrences, 2011 No. 4, pp. 166-168; BASILICO A. E., Il controllo del giudice amministrativo sulle sanzioni 
antitrust e l’art. 6 CEDU, AIC, 2011 (available online at 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/sites/default/files/rivista/articoli/allegati/Basilico_0.pdf)<; 
and COUTRELIS N., Amendes, procedures antitrust et CEDH, l’harmonie plutot que la controntation, in Revue Lamy 
de la Concurrence, 2011, No. 29, p. 108. 
199 Law No 287 of October 10, 1990, ‘Norme per la Tutela della Concorrenza e del Mercato’, in Italian Official 
Journal No. 240 of October 13, 1990.    
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4.2.5.2. The applicability of Article 6(1) ECHR to antitrust decisions adopted by the AGCM 
Under Article 6(1) ECHR, ‘[i]n the determination […] of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law’. In order to assess the admissibility of Menarini’s action, the 
ECtHR had to ascertain whether the fining decision adopted by the AGCM could be 
considered a criminal charge. In doing so, it referred to its previous case law, in particular 
the Engel judgment,200 which provides for three alternative criteria: (i) the legal qualification 
of the measure under national law; (ii) the nature of the measure, independently of its 
domestic classification; and (iii) the nature and severity of the penalty imposed on the basis 
of such measure. Additionally, it clarified that a cumulative approach may be pursued when 
the separate analysis of each criterion does not lead to a conclusive outcome. In Menarini’s 
case, the ECtHR found that the anti-competitive practices recriminated to the applicant 
were not sanctioned under criminal law but on the basis of Italian competition law, which 
is administrative in nature, thus the first criterion was not met. As to the second criterion, 
concerning the nature of the infringement, the ECtHR held that the competition rules 
whose violation was recriminated were designed to preserve competition on the market. It 
also stated that the AGCM’s activity aimed to defend general interests of society normally 
protected by criminal law. In addition, the fine adopted was based on legal provisions 
which had contemporarily a punitive and preventive scope. The ECtHR then turned to the 
nature and severity of the sanction and found that it presented a punitive purpose, the 
punishment of an illegal conduct, and a preventive scope, deterring the interested company 
and third parties from reiterating the conduct in question. The ECtHR argued that in light 
of these considerations and the high amount of the sanction, the latter had to be 
considered criminal in nature. The ECtHR however did not clearly settle the question of 
whether competition law belonged to the hard-core or non-hard core criminal head of 
Article 6(1) ECHR.201 The ECtHR concluded that Article 6(1) ECHR was applicable to the 
case under examination and Menarini’s application admissible. 
                                                     
200  ECtHR judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel and other v Netherlands, Application Nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 
5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72. 
201 According to certain commentators, the ECtHR’s findings in this case ‘puts an end to the debate as to whether or 
not (European) competition law has a criminal law nature – insofar as that debate was not already previously concluded’; see 
WESSELING R., VAN DER WOUDE M., The Lafwulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European Cartel 
Law, in World Competition, 35, No. 4, 2012, p. 577. This view however is not shared by all commentators as 
the ECtHR did not expressly state if this was the case thus ‘[l]’observateur en est donc reduit aux conjectures’; see, inter 
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4.2.5.3. The compatibility of the judicial review exercised in Menarini’s case with Article 6(1) 
ECHR   
The ECtHR first clarified that the imposition of a fine, which is criminal in nature, by an 
administrative authority is not per se incompatible with the ECHR in so far as this decision 
is open to challenge before a court who can offer all the guarantees afforded by Article 6(1) 
ECHR and can exercise powers of full judicial review over the measure in question. 
Among the most important features of a system of full judicial review, the ECtHR recalls 
the authority to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute and the power 
of modifying the contested decision.202   
Next, the ECtHR acknowledged that, in the framework of the Italian system of judicial 
review, no administrative court can substitute its own legal qualification of the facts and 
technical evaluation to that of the AGCM. However, it observed that in the case under 
examination the Italian administrative courts did not carry out a simple review of the 
legality of the AGCM decision, but thoroughly reviewed Menarini’s claims in law and in 
fact, the evidence upon which the adoption of the decision was based and the soundness 
and proportionality of the AGCM’s choices, thus verifying its technical assessments. 
Additionally, it noted that the Italian courts reviewing the contested decision had full 
jurisdiction with regard to the level of the fine imposed on Menarini, thus could have 
modified the latter had they found it to be inadequate in relation to the infringement in 
question. In light of the above, the ECtHR concluded that the AGCM’s decision was 
subject to the scrutiny of judicial authorities enjoying powers of full judicial review and, 
consequently, no infringement of Article 6(1) ECHR could be detected. 
 
4.2.5.4. Dissenting and concurring opinions 
One of the most remarkable features of ECtHR judgments lies in the possibility for 
judges, in case of disagreement, to attach their own dissenting or concurring opinion to the 
final decision of the court. In the case at hand, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque provided a 
                                                                                                                                 
alia, BOMBOIS T., L’arrêt Menarini c. Italie de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Droit antitrust, champ pénal et 
contrôle de pleine juridiction, in Cahiers de Droit Européen, 2011, No. 2, p. 559.   
202 ECtHR judgment in Menarini, para 59: ‘[p]armi les caractéristiques d’un organe judiciaire de pleine juridiction figure le 
pouvoir de réformer en tous points, en fait comme en droit, la décision entreprise, rendue par l’organe inférieur. Il doit notamment 
avoir compétence pour se pencher sur toutes les questions de fait et de droit pertinentes pour le litige dont il se trouve saisi’. 
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dissenting opinion containing a detailed analysis of the Italian judicial system in which he 
concluded that the judicial review exercised by the Italian administrative courts, being 
limited to a review of legality, did not satisfy the requirements of a system of full judicial 
review. In particular, he underlines that the Italian administrative courts could only annul a 
decision when affected by an irregularity but could not substitute their own technical 
evaluations to that of the AGCM. Hence, they could not exercise a thorough review of the 
discretional choices of the AGCM which are at the very heart of the imposition of 
competition law sanctions. In that regard, the Judge stresses that the Italian administrative 
courts merely adhered to the technical evaluations of the AGCM and did not carry out a 
new assessment. Conversely, the classical concept of full jurisdiction entails the possibility 
of reassessing all factual and legal aspects that relate to the attribution of liability. 
According to the Judge, the applicant did not thus have the possibility to formulate its 
contentions in front of a judicial authority offering the guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) 
ECHR.   
A concurring opinion was also delivered by Judge Sajó. The opinion which shared the 
considerations exposed by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque but sided with the majority’s 
conclusions that the Italian judges had exercised a judicial review which satisfied the 
requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. According to Judge Sajó, the Italian legal framework 
only provided for a formal review (a review of legality or a ‘weak’ judicial control). 
However, in the case at hand, the Council of State had effectively conducted an in-depth 
analysis of the merits of the case which satisfied the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. In 
addition, national judges had the power to annul the administrative decision imposing the 
sanction. Judge Sajó went on by noting that if, on the one hand, in exercising this control 
on the merits the Council of State used a terminology which could have led to think it was 
exercising a weak review, on the other hand, it didn’t act accordingly and performed a 
meticulous review. What matters, according to Judge Sajó, is that the rights enshrined in 
the ECHR had been effectively protected by the judges, and not the terminology used or 
provided for in the national legislation. In other words, national judges should in any case 
perform a full review (in case even ignoring legal constraints to their powers). 
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4.2.6. The EFTA judgment in the Posten Norge case and the repealing of the ‘manifest error’ 
of assessment standard 
2011 and 2012 were two landmark years for the discussions on the standard of review as 
judgments relevant to this debate were rendered not only by the EU Courts and the 
ECtHR but also by the EFTA Court in Luxembourg. Although the EFTA Court has only 
jurisdiction with regard to the three EFTA States, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway, which are parties to the European Economic Area (“EEA”) Agreement,203 its case 
law is highly taken into consideration and often referred to by the EU Courts in order to 
preserve homogeneity and the uniform interpretation of EU and EEA law. As EEA law 
mirrors EU law and EFTA judgments are often of inspiration for the EU Courts, it is 
worth analysing the EFTA Court’s judgment in Posten Norge delivered on 18 April 2012, 
which extensively addresses the issue of the necessary and adequate standard of judicial 
control in competition cases.204 
The judgment concerned abuse of dominance allegations against the company Posten 
Norge in the market for business-to-consumer parcel services with over-the-counter 
delivery in Norway. In 2010 the EFTA Surveillance Authority had found that the company 
had abused its dominant position and imposed a fine of almost € 13 million. On appeal by 
Posten Norge, the decision was upheld by the EFTA Court, whose judgment is particularly 
relevant for the present debate in light of its findings on the application of Article 6 ECHR 
and on the right to a fair trial. In particular, Posten Norge argued that the EFTA Court was 
required to exercise full jurisdiction in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR. On the 
contrary, the EFTA Surveillance Authority argued that judicial review could be limited vis à 
vis complex economic and/or technical assessments as competition law fell outside the 
‘hard core’ criminal head of Article 6 ECHR. The issues the EFTA Court was called upon 
to decide concerning the scope and intensity of judicial review were similar to those 
                                                     
203 The EEA Agreement was concluded in 1992 with the aim of extending the EU single market to the EFTA 
States. It is built on two pillars, a EU pillar and an EFTA pillar. The EFTA Surveillance Authority exercises a 
surveillance role comparable to that of the EU Commission, while the EFTA Court exercises a jurisdiction 
comparable to that of the ECJ. 
204 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA. See, inter alia, BARBIER DE LA 
SERRE E., A Lesson of Judicial Review from the other European Court in Luxembourg, in Kluwer Competition Law 
Blog, 27 April 2012; LANG J. T., Judicial Review of Competition Decisions under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Importance of the EFTA Court: The Norway Post Judgment, in E.L. Rev., August 2012; 
BRONCKERS M., VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities and 
Which Role for the Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524; CROFTS L., Fundamental rights in focus as Posten Norge 
disputes dominance fine before EFTA court, M-lex, 5 October 2011. 
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addressed by the ECJ in KME and by the ECtHR in Menarini, the latter repeatedly referred 
to in the judgment.  
The EFTA Court first found that the scope of the guarantees enshrined in Article 6 
ECHR do not always apply in full stringency, this depending on the weight of the criminal 
charge at issue. In the circumstances of the case, the EFTA Court considered that the 
amount of the fine was ‘substantial’ and that ‘the stigma attached to being held accountable for an 
abuse of a dominant position is not negligible’. 205 However the EFTA Court did not expressly 
conclude that the charge fell under the ‘hard core’ criminal head of Article 6 ECHR. It did 
instead recognize that ‘the form of administrative review […] may influence […] the way in which the 
guarantees provided by the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR are applied’ however, ‘this cannot detract 
from the necessity to respect these guarantees in substance’. 206  According to the EFTA Court, 
criminal penalties such as those at issue can be imposed at first instance by an 
administrative authority that does not comply with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR, 
provided that the decision of that body is subject to subsequent control by a judicial body 
that complies with those requirements and has full jurisdiction.  
The most interesting statements made by the EFTA Court concerned however complex 
economic appreciations and the ‘limited’ review standard. After having essentially reiterated 
the EU Tetra Laval formula on the standard of review,207 the EFTA Court went on to state 
that, in its review of complex economic assessments, the EFTA Court must not limit itself 
to intervene only when an assessment is ‘manifestly wrong’.208 The EFTA Court must be 
able to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and of law, the challenged decision, and 
when the Surveillance Authority imposes fines for infringements of competition rules, it 
cannot be regarded as having ‘any margin of discretion in the assessment of complex economic matters 
which goes beyond the leeway that necessarily flows from the limitations inherent in the system of legality 
review’. 209 The EFTA Court went on to clarify that, although the EFTA Court may not 
                                                     
205 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, para 90. 
206 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, para 90. 
207 The EFTA Court first stated that ‘[n]ot only must the Court establish, among other things, whether the evidence relied 
on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, but also whether the evidence contains all the information which must be taken 
into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’ 
(para 99). 
208 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, para 102. 
209 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, para 100. 
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replace the authority’s assessment with its own, ‘the Court must nonetheless be convinced that the 
conclusions drawn by [the authority] are supported by the facts’.210 
What is most interesting of the EFTA Court’s statements is that it reaches a conclusion 
that the EU Courts never upheld, i.e. that in the exercise of their jurisdiction in the 
competition field, in the presence of complex economic and/or technical appreciations, 
judges must intervene not only when an error is ‘manifestly wrong’ but also when they 
consider it simply wrong, thus introducing a ‘correctness’ standard which does not leave 
any room to the competition authority’s discretion and represents a novelty in the field of 
judicial control of competition cases.  
 
4.2.7. Implications of the Menarini and Posten Norge judgments for the EU system of judicial 
control of competition cases 
As anticipated, the ECtHR and EFTA judgments have a number of interesting 
implications for the EU antitrust system of judicial review. At the EU level, Article 261 
TFEU enables the granting of unlimited jurisdiction to the European Courts with regards 
to the determination of penalties. In antitrust matters, this power is further specified by 
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 in relation to fines and periodic penalty payments. This 
entails that the EU Courts can cancel, reduce or increase fines imposed by the Commission 
and in doing so they can substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission. 
Conversely, Article 263 TFEU allows the European Courts to review only the legality of 
acts adopted by the Institutions, i.e., the Courts are only able to annul an act on the basis of 
specific grounds of appeal and to refer the case to the competent institution for 
reexamination, without, however, having the power to examine that measure on the merits. 
Additionally, the European Courts’ power of review is limited when it comes to policy 
choices, complex economic assessments and complex technical appraisals, as they confine 
themselves to verifying whether the Commission has committed a manifest error. In such 
instances, the intensity of their scrutiny is significantly softened and results, according to 
the most critical commentators, in a form of judicial self-restraint.  
As previously mentioned, over the years, in light of these features, a growing number of 
experts and scholars have expressed serious doubts as to the compatibility of the EU 
antitrust judicial review system with Article 6(1) ECHR. In particular, it has been 
                                                     
210 EFTA judgment of 18 April 2012 in Case E-15/10 Posten Norge v ESA, para 101. 
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questioned whether the review provided in the EU judicial system is broad and intense 
enough to ensure the degree of protection required by Article 6(1) ECHR. Accordingly, 
firms have become increasingly interested in challenging the EU system before the ECtHR. 
However, the EU is not yet a formal member of the ECHR, as the accession process is still 
ongoing, thus, to date, acts adopted by the EU Institutions cannot be challenged before the 
Strasbourg Court. Only once the EU formally accedes to the ECHR, firms will be able to 
resort directly to the ECtHR to challenge measures adopted by the EU Institutions, 
including the EU Courts’ judgments, once all internal remedies have been exhausted.  
In the antitrust field, the ECtHR’s recent judgment in Menarini has indicated that a 
sufficiently extensive review by an independent court of an administrative competition 
decision may satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. Should the ECtHR have to 
assess in the future the compatibility of the architecture of the EU judicial review system 
with Article 6(1) ECHR, it is argued that it could reach similar, if not identical, conclusions 
to those upheld in Menarini’s case, i.e. that a sufficiently extensive review by an 
independent court of an administrative competition decision may satisfy the requirements 
of Article 6(1) ECHR. In addition, it must be taken into account that in the future the 
ECtHR would most probably adopt a cautious stance in its pronouncements concerning 
the EU as it is aware that: (i) its rulings may require for compliance a modification of the 
EU framework and architecture, with all the negative criticism this may raise, all the more 
in a context where its decisions will be closely scrutinized to verify whether the best choice 
was made to ensure the delicate balance between two different judicial orders; and (ii) its 
decisions could expose it to an overwhelming amount of actions filed against the EU 
judicial review system. 
However, it can also be contended that in the antitrust field, the ECtHR’s judgment in 
Menarini does not necessarily provide a clean bill of health to judicial review systems that 
closely resemble that of the EU. On the one hand, what emerges from this case is that for 
compatibility with Article 6(1) ECHR, judicial review systems in the competition field 
should at least foresee unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines; on the other hand, ‘full 
judicial review’ under the Convention’s system does not require that judges deciding a 
controversy must necessarily have the power to substitute their own assessments for those 
of the administrative authority imposing a ‘criminal charge’.  
In the Menarini case the ECtHR considered sufficient and acceptable that national courts 
exercise an (exhaustive) review of legality coupled by unlimited jurisdiction in relation to 
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fines. In light of this, those theories which advocate for a change of the EU system in the 
direction of extending the EU Courts’ powers of review also to a review on the merits, on 
the basis of Article 6(1) ECHR, lose force and relevance.211  
On the other hand, the Menarini case still leaves space for discussion concerning the 
intensity of the review that courts appraising criminal charges must exercise within the 
framework of their review of legality. In its ruling, the ECtHR indicated that, in the specific 
circumstances of the case, the Italian judges had carried out a sufficiently extensive review 
of the administrative decision that satisfied the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. The 
ECtHR did not thus content itself of a ‘weak’ review, but verified whether the courts had 
exercised exhaustive and full control over all the elements pertinent to the qualification of 
the infringement. 
As indicated by certain commentators, ‘[t]he finding that the Italian system, as applied in the 
Menarini case, complied with Article 6 ECHR, does not mean that all administrative enforcement systems 
within which competition rules are being enforced do so as well. And even if such a system theoretically 
complies with these requirements, it cannot be automatically concluded that this also applies to the 
application thereof in a specific case’.212 Accordingly, actions raised in the future by companies in 
front of the ECtHR once the EU accession is completed, in order to safeguard their rights, 
will not remain necessarily without use, as the question may none the less arise whether, in 
any particular case, the EU Courts have adequately exercised their jurisdiction and thus 
have effectively complied with the ECHR. In light of the above, applications to the ECtHR 
would have to focus on demonstrating how the judicial review exercised by the EU Courts 
in a particular case, being limited to a review of legality, did not satisfy the requirements of 
a system of full judicial review. In particular, interested parties would have to demonstrate 
that the EU Courts could not, and effectively did not, substitute their own technical 
evaluations to those of the Commission, and could only annul the decision if they had 
found it to be affected by an irregularity. Hence, the EU Courts did not exercise a 
thorough review of the discretional choices of the Commission which were at the very 
heart of the imposition of the competition sanction. In that regard, it would have to be 
proven that the CFI merely adhered to the technical evaluations of the Commission and 
                                                     
211 For an overview of the main arguments advocating that the EU Courts should be given powers of ‘full 
appellate review’ see infra subsection 2.1 in Chapter 4. 
212 See WESSELING R., VAN DER WOUDE M., The Lafwulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European 
Cartel Law, in World Competition, 35, No. 4, 2012, pp. 577-578. 
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did not carry out a new assessment and that the ECJ failed to detect this deficiency in a 
manner not compliant with the ECHR.   
It is worth mentioning that the Menarini judgment has been subject to a number of 
criticisms, ranging from the complaint that the ECtHR’s reasoning is too short and poor to 
give an exhaustive and final answer to the questions raised by this case, to more substantial 
attacks against the merits of the Strasbourg judges’ reasoning, as demonstrated by the 
dissenting opinion. In Menarini’s case there was no further appeal to the ECtHR’s Grand 
Chamber although, given the importance of the matter, its intervention would have been 
welcomed. In light of the above, it is considered that nor the Menarini judgment, nor the 
other judgments cited supra, can be regarded as finally settling the debate. 
Finally, The EFTA Court’s judgment in Posten Norge and the novelty of its conclusions 
on the need for judicial control, within the boundaries of the review of legality, to be full 
and exhaustive, leaving no margin for space to the Commission’s discretion vis à vis 
complex economic and technical appreciations, has also contributed to the debate, and may 
lead the EU Courts to re-think their powers of review and their current exercise. Given the 
novelty of the EFTA Court’s statements, commentators have ‘hoped that this judgment will 
significantly influence the EU Courts thinking on their judicial review of the Commission’s decisions’213 or 
have stated that ‘the EFTA Court has stated a general principle that is likely to be accepted by the other 
three European courts’.214 The main expectation is that EU judges will be brought to follow 
the example of the EFTA Court and to engage more openly with the jurisprudence from 
Strasbourg. 
 
 
                                                     
213 BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., A Lesson of Judicial Review from the other European Court in Luxembourg, in 
Kluwer Competition Law Blog, April 27, 2012, p. 3. 
214 LANG J. T., Judicial Review of Competition Decisions under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Importance of the EFTA Court: The Norway Post Judgment, in E.L. Rev., August 2012, p. 467. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The effectiveness of judicial review in EU competition cases has been the object of 
intense scholarly debate. In the previous Chapter the characteristics of the EU judicial 
review system in antitrust matters have been described and the controversial factors that 
continue to be the object of criticism have been identified and analysed. The theories that 
have been developed in the literature that criticize the characteristics of the present system 
of judicial review have also been illustrated and confronted with the theories of those 
authors who believe no changes are needed nor warranted. Any analysis of the 
controversies raised by the current scope and intensity of the judicial review exercised by 
the EU Courts would be incomplete if not accompanied by a detailed case law analysis 
concerning the nature and standard of review applied by the EU judges, with particular 
attention to the intensity with which the EU Courts are willing to scrutinize and review 
‘complex economic and/or technical matters’. This analysis is altogether more useful if 
accompanied by an examination, not only of the scope and intensity of the review currently 
carried out, but also of how the standard of review was initially exercised at the origins of 
the EU construction of competition policy and of how its application has evolved over 
time. This Chapter is thus dedicated to a closer analysis of the EU Courts case law in the 
fields of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU215 and proceeds to do so in a chronological order in 
order to put into historical perspective the evolutions occurred in the EU jurisprudence on 
                                                     
215 The first provision prohibits as incompatible with the internal market ‘all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market’ (Article 101, 
paragraph 1, TFUE). These agreements and decisions are also considered ‘automatically void’ (Article 101, 
paragraph 2, TFUE). The second provision prohibits as incompatible with the internal market ‘[a]ny abuse by 
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it […] in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States’ (Article 102, paragraph 1, TFEU). On Articles 81 and 82 EC (now 101 
and 102 TFEU) see inter alia: BELLAMY&CHILD, European Union Law of Competition, edited by ROTH P., 
ROSE V., 7th edition, Oxford University Press, 2013; WHISH R., Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 
2012; KERSE C., KHAN N., EC antitrust procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012; FAULL J., NIKPAY A., The EC 
law of competition, Oxford University Press, New York 2007; HIRSCH G., SÄCKER F.-J., MONTAG F. 
(edited by), Competition law: European Community practice and procedure: article-by-article commentary, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008; JONES A., SUFRIN B., EC competition law: texts, cases, and materials, Oxford University Press, 
2008; PAPPALARDO A., Il diritto comunitario della concorrenza: profili sostanziali. La disciplina delle intese, gli accordi 
orizzontali, gli accordi verticali, l’abuso di posizione dominante, le concentrazioni di imprese, il trasferimento di tecnologia, regole 
di concorrenza e poteri pubblici, i settori speciali, UTET giuridica, 2007; TESAURO G., Diritto Comunitario, CEDAM 
2008. 
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the standard of review. From this analysis it will be possible to draw conclusions on the 
main factors, internal or external to the EU system, that have contributed to stimulate 
changes in the intensity of the judicial control exercised by EU judges in antitrust cases.  
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ARTICLE 101 TFEU 
CASES 
 
As examined in detail in Chapter 1, the EU system provides for a specific system of 
judicial review of decisions adopted by the Commission in the competition field which 
finds its original inspiration in the legal systems and traditions of the founding Member 
States. 216 While the provisions of the TFEU provide guidance on the contours of the 
review exercised by the EU Courts, distinguishing between review of legality under Article 
263 TFEU and unlimited jurisdiction with regard to penalties under Article 261, very little 
is said on the intensity with which EU judges review antitrust matters.  
On the basis of the case law of the EU Courts in Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases, it is 
possible to operate a distinction between the intensity with which EU judges review 
matters of fact and law, which is full and leaves no room for the Commission’s discretion, 
and the intensity with which so-called ‘complex economic’ and/or ‘technical’ assessments 
are reviewed. In the latter case, over the years, the EU Courts have developed the practice 
of recognizing a certain discretion to the Commission’s assessments and have exercised a 
certain deference by restraining their control to the so-called manifest error test (see supra 
subsection 2.1.3 in Section I of Chapter 1). As will emerge from the analysis of the case law 
in the following subsections, the Courts initially elaborated and applied the manifest error 
test in relation to cases decided under Article 85 EEC (now Article 101 TFEU). Over the 
years, the EU Courts have progressively increased their use of the manifest error test by 
applying it also to new domains. While initially the test was meant to leave a certain 
discretion to the Commission when it made complex economic assessments conducive to 
value judgments for the balancing test under Article 85(3) EEC (now Article 101(3) TFEU), 
after a number of years its application was extended also to similar assessments made under 
Article 85(1) EEC (now Article 101(1) TFEU). It is only after the contours of the manifest 
error test were well defined in the case law under Article 101 TFEU that the test makes its 
                                                     
216 GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 44. 
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appearance in abuse of dominance cases under Article 102 TFEU. The EU Courts 
however did not only expand the use of the test to new heads of Article 101 TFEU and to 
Article 102 TFEU, but also intervened to increase the categories of assessments that could 
be caught by this test and thus be subject to more limited review (for example the 
expansion from ‘complex economic’ to ‘complex technical’ assessments). Interestingly, this 
last intervention occurred in the field of abuse of dominance cases under Article 102 
TFEU which, as mentioned, for a long time were not at the forefront of the debate on the 
standard of review.  
According to certain authors, the EU case law ‘has been showing a worrying expansion’ of the 
judicial deference doctrine217 and ‘light judicial review in competition cases has expanded more than 
desirable’, the ‘deference language [appearing] too frequently in judgments of the Community Courts, in 
matters not calling for deference’. 218  For this reason, the EU Courts’ approach to complex 
economic and technical assessments of the Commission in competition cases has become 
the object of more or less intense criticism. Chapter 1 contains a detailed analysis of the 
various censures raised. Among the various considerations that will be made in the 
following analysis of the case law, particular attention will be dedicated to ascertaining if, 
how, and to what extent, the EU Courts have taken account of these criticisms and even 
attempted to modify the intensity of the review exercised in order to address particular 
ones among them. It can preliminarily be anticipated that a unique answer to these 
questions does not exist, as the EU Courts’ attitude has varied greatly depending on the 
issue and specific criticism at stake. By way of example, the EU Courts’ attitude has ranged 
from strongly defending the EU institutional balance and the Commission’s discretion 
                                                     
217 SIRAGUSA M., Annulment proceedings in Antitrust Cases (Articles 101 and 102 TFUE) – Standard of Judicial 
Review Over Substantive Issues, in  The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law 
Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 132. 
218  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 18 and 42. According to MACFREGOR and GECIC: ‘If one steps back and 
peruses the current state of EU judicial review, although it may be developing in the right direction, it still seems inconsistent, 
fragmented and limited. In addition, a number of human rights concerns are yet to be dealt with. It is submitted that, presently, 
the quality of EU judicial review is not robust enough to effectively countervail the broad effects that Commission decisions have 
on alleged infringers’; MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., Due Process in EU Competition Cases, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 432. See contra CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, 
Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law and Economics Review, No. 4, December 
2009, p. 577: ‘too much noise is made, in my view, about the alleged limited review of complex economic assessments. Situations 
where this issue is crucial may not be as common as some appear to believe. Not only does the Commission often work with a 
safety margin, using calculations which, if anything, tend to favour the applicant in order to have a “robust” case, but very often 
the real difference with the applicant in litigation is about the legal test, and not so much about complex economic assessments’. 
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deriving therefrom in relation to certain assessments (comprising over time both complex 
economic and technical appraisals), to adopting an increasingly attentive stance towards the 
criminalization of antitrust procedures and the effects this may have on the intensity of the 
judicial review required. 
In the following subsections of this Chapter a distinct analysis will be made for Article 
101 and 102 TFEU cases. The reason for this is that Article 101 cases were the first where 
the issue of limited review was addressed, followed much later by Article 102 cases.219 As 
will be seen infra, the contours of the limited standard of review were first defined in this 
area of law, elaborated in depth, and then transposed to Article 102 cases and merger cases 
(the latter dealt with infra in Chapter 3).  
 
2.1. The early case-law on the standard of review in Article 101 TFEU cases 
 
2.1.1. The limited standard of review under Article 101(3) TFEU: the first appearance of this 
standard in the Consten and Grundig judgment and subsequent case law 
The first formulation of a deferential standard of review for complex economic 
assessments in competition cases goes back to the ECJ’s judgment in Consten and Grundig.220 
This judgment established the principle that agreements which prohibit exports within the 
internal market restrict competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) EEC (now Article 
101(1) TFEU), irrespective of their actual effects. In this case the ECJ was called upon to 
examine an agreement of indefinite duration between the German company Grundig and 
the French company Consten which granted the latter the exclusive right to sell Grundig’s 
products in France, Saar and Corsica. Under the contract’s terms, Consten was prohibited 
from selling competing products and from exporting Grundig’s products to other 
territories. The grant of exclusive rights to Consten also meant that Grundig had to refrain 
from marketing its products directly or indirectly to other entities established in the 
territories covered by Consten’s exclusivity. Grundig also agreed to insert clauses in its 
agreements with other distributors in other Member States which forbid them from 
                                                     
219 The first Article 102 case where the ‘manifest error test’ was mentioned is the 2000 judgment in Case T-
65/96 Kish Glass&Co Ltd v Commission [2000] ECR II-1885 (see infra subsection 3.1 in this Chapter). 
220 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 429.  
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exporting to Consten’s territories. These arrangements were meant to compensate Consten 
for the high investments it undertook to market Grundig’s products in France. 
In its judgment, the ECJ first examined whether the agreement, by prohibiting parallel 
imports, restricted competition between Grundig’s distributors in a way contrary to Article 
85(1) EC (now Article 101(1) TFEU). In this regard, the ECJ condemned the contractual 
elements of the agreement that aimed at, or had as their effect, absolute territorial 
protection, and stated that there was no need for economic analysis as the agreement had 
as its object the restriction of competition, since it isolated the French market for Grundig 
products and artificially separated national markets. 221 According to the Court: ‘[f]or the 
purpose of applying Article 85(1) (now Article 81(1)), there is no need to take account of the concrete 
effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition. Therefore the absence in the contested decision of any analysis of the effects of the agreement on 
competition between similar products of different makes does not, of itself, constitute a defect in the 
decision’.222 
Whether the agreement could have favourable effects, such as improving the production 
or distribution of the goods in question or increase competition, could be considered only 
under Article 85(3) EEC (now Article 101(3) TFEU). It is in the examination of the 
application of this particular head of Article 85 EEC, which calls for a balancing exercise 
between the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of an agreement, that the ECJ 
stated for the first time that its judicial examination would be limited or restricted, in order 
to take into account the fact that the Commission’s decision implied complex evaluations 
of economic matters. As indicated by the ECJ: 
‘…the exercise of the Commission's powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic 
matters.  A judicial review of these evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself 
to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission 
deduces therefrom’.223    
That the balancing test under Article 101(3) TFEU calls for complex assessments by the 
Commission that justify a restriction on judicial review has been confirmed by a number of 
                                                     
221 HILDEBRAND D., The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, Kluwer Law International, 
2009, pp. 200-203. 
222 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 299, p. 342. 
223 Joined cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] 
ECR 299, p. 347. 
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subsequent opinions and judgments. Advocate General Reischl’s 1977 Opinion in Metro 
I,224 which refers to the Consten and Grundig judgment, illustrates clearly the EU’s originary 
attitude on this point:  
‘[f]irst, it should not be forgotten that the assessment of a [selective distribution] system 
such as this involves difficult economic judgments. In particular, the question whether the restriction 
on competition which is linked thereto is counterbalanced by certain advantages calls for complex 
assessments. This necessarily means that the Commission has a margin of discretion in this respect 
and this means at the same time that there is a corresponding restriction on judicial review. This 
notion was also said to be correct with regard to competition law under the EEC Treaty in the 
judgment in… Consten and Grundig… According to those judgments, the Court of Justice cannot 
examine all the details of an evaluation: basically, it has only to determine whether the decision of 
the Commission resulting therefrom was justifiable as a whole or whether serious objections may be 
raised against it’ (emphasis added).225  
Descriptions of the manifest error standard in relation to Article 101(3) TFEU in the 
early case law of the EU Courts can be found also in the 1994 Europay case,226 in the 1995 
SPO case,227 in the 1997 SCK case228 and in the 2002 Shaw case,229 where the CFI (now GC) 
stated in almost identical terms that: 
‘[r]eview by the Community judicature of the complex economic appraisals made by the 
Commission when it exercises the discretion conferred on it by Article 85(3) of the Treaty, with 
regard to each of the four conditions laid down in that provision, must be limited to verifying 
whether the rules on procedure and on the giving of reasons have been complied with, whether the 
facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a 
misuse of powers’.230 
                                                     
224 Case 26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875. The case concerned a 
Commission decision approving, subject to certain changes, the terms and conditions of SABA’s selective 
distribution system for consumer electronics. Metro, a distributor which had not been admitted to the system 
because it did not meet certain marketing criteria, had appealed the decision and invited the ECJ to decide 
whether the terms of the selective distribution system violated Article 101 TFEU. The ECJ upheld the 
decision, however, while the Advocate General’s Opinion contained a discussion on the scope of judicial 
review of the Court, the final judgment made no reference to such matters. 
225 Case 26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, p. 1924. 
226 Joined Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92 CB and Europay v Commission [1994] ECR II-49, para 109. 
227 Case T-29/92 SPO and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-28, para 288. 
228 Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission [1997] ECR II-1739, para 190. 
229 Case T-131/99 Michael Hamilton Shaw and Timothy John Falla v Commission [2002] ECR II-2023, para 38. 
230 Case T-131/99 Michael Hamilton Shaw and Timothy John Falla v Commission [2002] ECR II-2023, para 38; see 
almost identical wording in Europay, para 109; SPO, para 288; and SCK, para 190.  
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In this early case law, originally, the margin of appreciation test and the Court’s ‘limited’ 
review was thought to be relevant only for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, and not 
also for Article 101(1) TFEU, as its application was confined to the balancing test between 
pro and anti-competitive effects foreseen in the last head of that Article. The ECJ in fact 
recognised in Consten and Grundig that the application of the last paragraph of Article 101 
TFEU necessarily implied complex economic assessments of economic matters, which had 
a consequence on the intensity of judicial review of the Commission’s decision. However, 
progressively and over time, the EU case law has applied the same test referring to the need 
for a ‘manifest error of assessment’ also in relation to the first stage of the application of 
Article 101 TFEU.231 This is what occurred in the Remia judgment examined below.232 
 
2.1.2. The extension of the application of the limited standard of review to Article 101(1) 
TFEU: the Remia judgment and subsequent case law 
In the Remia case the ECJ was called upon to examine a decision of the Commission 
that declared that a 10-year non-compete clause in a business agreement was restrictive of 
competition under Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) after the end of the first four 
years. The ECJ had to assess the legality of the decision considering also that the 
Commission had refused to apply the exemption within Article 81(3) EC (now Article 
101(3) TFEU) to the final six years of the agreement.233  
In his Opinion, Advocate General Lenz clarified the scope of judicial review of the 
Commission’s assessments under Article 81(1) EC. First, it questioned ‘whether it is possible 
for the prohibition in Article [81](1) not to be applied to agreements in restraint of competition which in 
theory fall within its scope without adopting the exemption procedure under Article [81](3)’. 234  It 
concluded that the non-application of Article 85(1) EC outside the terms of Article 85(3) 
EC was admissible and was ‘governed by criteria similar to those contained in Article 85(3)’. This 
had direct consequences on the intensity of judicial review. If the Commission is carrying 
out a balancing test and evaluations under Article 81(1) EC, similar to those normally 
                                                     
231 ROSE V., Margins of Appreciation: Changing Contours in Community and Domestic Case Law, April 30, 2009,  
available at globalcompetitionpolicy.com (https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margins-of-
appreciation-changing-contours-in-community-and-domestic-case-law), p. 6. 
232 Case 42/84 Remia BVand Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545. 
233 BAILEY D, Scope of Judicial Review Under Article 81 EC, in CMLR, 41 (2004), pp. 1341-1345. 
234 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz of 14 May 1985, in Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] 
ECR 2545, p. 2558. 
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carried out under Article 81(3) EC, then the discretion the Commission enjoys in carrying 
out these assessments has to be the same, and the same has to be the intensity of judicial 
review carried out by the Courts at a later stage. In the Advocate General’s words: 
‘[i]f this is right and the principles regarding exemption from the prohibition of restrictive 
agreements may be applied to this case by analogy, a further consequence will follow regarding the 
scope for judicial review of the Commission's decision. Since the conditions for an exemption are 
outlined only in a general manner, the Commission enjoys a wide discretion even in the case of a 
straightforward application of Article 85 (3). The Court of Justice has recognized that Article 85 
(3) necessarily implies complex assessments of economic matters. Similarly, where such assessments 
are made in the case of prohibitions of competition agreed in connection with transfers of 
undertakings, the judicial review must take that fact into account and therefore confine itself to 
determining the correctness of the facts on which the assessments are based and the applicability to 
those facts of the relevant legal principles. As the Court of Justice has stated, judicial review must 
in the first place be carried out in respect of the reasons given for the Commission's decision, which 
must set out the facts and considerations on which the said assessments are based and the 
applicability to those facts of the relevant legal principles’ (emphasis added). 
The ECJ followed the Advocate General’s reasoning and concluded that where the 
Commission has to carry out complex economic assessments under Article 81(1) EC, 
similarly to Article 81(3) EC, it will enjoy the same discretion, thus affecting the intensity of 
the judges’ later review that will be limited by the ‘manifest error’ standard. According to 
the Court: 
‘[a]lthough as a general rule the Court undertakes a comprehensive review of the question 
whether or not the conditions for the application of article 85(1) are met, it is clear that in 
determining the permissible duration of a non-competition clause incorporated in an agreement for 
the transfer of an undertaking the commission has to appraise complex economic matters. The 
court must therefore limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the relevant 
procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons for the decision is 
adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest 
error of appraisal or a misuse of powers’ (emphasis added).235 
Certain commentators consider that there is a contradiction between the full review of 
the act, the ‘comprehensive review’ the ECJ mentions in the first part of this statement, 
                                                     
235 Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 34. 
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and the ‘limited review’ mentioned in the final part, in the sense that the Court would have 
‘the power to undertake a comprehensive review but limits itself to mere verifications’.236 The Court in 
any event upheld the Commission’s position and stated that there was nothing that 
suggested that ‘the Commission based its decision on incorrect findings of fact or committed a manifest 
error in its appraisal of the facts of the case as a whole’.237 
With the Remia case the ECJ circumscribed the boundaries of judicial review under 
Article 101(1) TFEU in identical terms to the ones it used in the context of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. The judicial deference doctrine was this way extended from policy and opportunity 
choices made under Article 101(3) TFEU to cover more general situations where the 
Commission conducted complex economic analysis.238 The expansion of the application of 
the limited review test to Article 101(1) TFEU has been criticized by certain authors who 
believe that while the limited review standard may be justified under Article 101(3) TFEU, 
which calls also for value judgments, the same does not apply to assessments under Article 
101(1) TFEU, which, not requiring such evaluations, should not be left to the 
Commission’s discretion.239 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the ‘manifest error’ formula 
laid down in this judgment will find its way in a number of subsequent 101(1) TFEU cases. 
By way of example, in the British-American Tobacco judgment (‘BAT and Reynolds’)240 the ECJ 
literally cited Remia stating that:  
‘it should be recalled that in its judgment of 11 july 1985 in case 42/84 Remia v 
Commission … the Court held that although as a general rule it undertakes a comprehensive 
review of the question whether or not the conditions for the application of article 85(1) are met, its 
review of such appraisals made by the commission is necessarily limited to verifying whether the 
relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the 
                                                     
236 See, inter alia, DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 76. 
237 Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 36. 
238 DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 83. 
239  FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic Approach, Implications for the Role of the EU Courts, the 
Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 6-8. 
240  Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 British-American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v 
Commission [1987] ECR 4487. 
88 
 
facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a 
misuse of powers’ (emphasis added).241  
Although Remia extended the application of the manifest error standard to complex 
assessments under Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court’s findings in this case have subsequently 
continued to be cited also with reference to complex Commission assessments made under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, further proving that the boundaries of the manifest error test are 
equivalent under both heads of Article 101 TFEU. A demonstration of this can be seen in 
the Matra-Hachette judgment: 
‘[i]t must first be borne in mind that the Commission may only grant an individual exemption 
decision if, in particular, the four conditions laid down by Article 85(3) of the Treaty are all met 
by the agreement, with the result that an exemption must be refused if any of the four conditions is 
not met; secondly, it is incumbent upon notifying undertakings to provide the Commission with 
evidence that the conditions laid down by Article 85(3) are met…; thirdly, where complex 
economic facts are involved, judicial review of the legal characterization of the facts is limited to the 
possibility of the Commission having committed a manifest error of assessment (judgment of the 
Court of Justice in Case 42/84 Remia BV and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545)’. 242 
Over time, the EU Courts have extended the application of the manifest error standard 
also to Commission decisions rejecting complaints. This can be seen in the Asia Motor 
France case,243 where the CFI was called upon to decide on the legality of the grounds on 
which the Commission rejected the complaints of the applicants alleging they had been 
victims of an unlawful cartel between importers of Japanese cars into France. The CFI, 
having to decide whether the Commission’s reasoning in the decision was well founded, 
referred to the above mentioned BAT and Reynolds and Matra-Hachette cases, and restated 
the formula according to which ‘judicial review of Commission measures involving an appraisal of 
complex economic matters must be limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the 
                                                     
241  Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 British-American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v 
Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para 62. For an identical citation from the Remia and Bat and Reynolds cases see 
Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, para 34. 
242 Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595, para 104.  
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statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether 
there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers’.244  
The EU Courts have also extended the application of the manifest error test to refusals 
by the Commission to adopt interim measures in competition cases. In the La Cinq case, by 
way of example, when verifying the condition regarding the probability of serious and 
irreparable damage, the Court of Justice stated that this condition could involve appraisals 
of complex economic situations and, recalling Remia and BAT and Reynolds, that ‘judicial 
review must be limited to verifying whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
appraisal or a misuse of powers’.245 
 
2.1.3. The application of the limited standard of review to both Articles 101(1) and 101(3) 
TFEU: the relevant case law 
The manifest error of assessment test and the formula referring to the Commission’s 
discretion in relation to complex evaluations has been used by the EU Courts also when 
considering the application, in the same case, of both Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU.246 
This evolution confirms the original approach of the ECJ in Remia, which was meant to set 
the same limits and boundaries to judicial review when complex economic assessments are 
involved, irrespective of which head of Article 101 TFEU was under examination. 
In the Van den Bergh Foods case,247 the GC had to examine whether there had been an 
infringement of Article 85(1) EC (now Article 101(1) TFEU), thus whether the 
Commission had adequately proved that an exclusivity clause relating to freezer cabinets in 
reality imposed exclusivity on some sales outlets, and whether the Commission had 
quantified correctly the degree of foreclosure. In deciding whether the degree of 
foreclosure was sufficient to constitute an infringement of Article 85(1) EC, the GC 
referred to the manifest error formula indicating that ‘[j]udicial review of Commission measures 
involving an appraisal of complex economic matters must be limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on 
                                                     
244 Case T-7/9 Asia Motor France SA, Jean-Michel Cesbron, Monin Automobiles SA, Europe Auto Service SA and 
SOMACO SA v Commission [1993] ECR II-669, para 33. 
245 Case T-44/90 La Cinq SA v Commission [1991] ECR 1, para 85. 
246 ROSE V., Margins of Appreciation: Changing Contours in Community and Domestic Case Law, 30 April 2009, 
available at globalcompetitionpolicy.com (https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margins-of-
appreciation-changing-contours-in-community-and-domestic-case-law), p. 7. 
247 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] II-4653.  
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procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately 
stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers’.248  
In the same judgment, the GC referred to the same manifest error test when having to 
consider the applicant’s challenge to the Commission’s refusal to grant an exemption under 
Article 85(3) EC (now Article 101(3) TFEU). The GC, in relation to the Commission’s 
discretion over complex economic assessments made under Article 85(3) EC, restated the 
formula according to which ‘the review carried out by the Court…must be limited to ascertaining 
whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether proper reasons have been provided, whether 
the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of 
powers’.249 It concluded that it is not for the GC to substitute its own assessment for that of 
the Commission. 
Similarly, in the GlaxoSmithKline case,250 the GC, in relation to the application of both 
Article 81(1) EC and Article 81(3) EC considered that when dealing with an application for 
annulment of a decision, it carries out only a restricted review of the merits of the case.251 
The GC also considered that it was not for it to substitute its economic assessment for that 
of the Commission. According to certain commentators, interestingly, in the 
GlaxoSmithKline case, the GC, notwithstanding the restatement of the ‘manifest error 
standard’, scrutinized very closely the Commission’s decision. The GC in fact overturned 
the Commission’s finding that the contested agreement was contrary to Article 81(1) EC by 
reason of its object alone, and annulled the Commission’s refusal to grant an exemption 
under Article 81(3) EC.252 
Interestingly, in the GlaxoSmithKline judgment the GC also formulated for the first time 
in a 101 case a more extended definition of the ‘limited judicial review standard’. This new 
application of the manifest error standard occurred for the first time in 2005 in a merger 
                                                     
248 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] II-04653, para 80. 
249 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] II-04653, para 135. 
250  Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969. In May 2001, the 
Commission adopted a decision finding that GlaxoSmithKline’s Spanish subsidiary had infringed Article 81 
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251 See respectively paras. 57 and 241 of the GC’s judgment. 
252 ROSE V., Margins of Appreciation: Changing Contours in Community and Domestic Case Law, April 30, 2009,  
available at globalcompetitionpolicy.com (https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/margins-of-
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case, Tetra Laval, 253  and was then ‘transposed’ to the Article 101 domain with the 
GlaxoSmithKline judgment. As to its content, the GC clarified the extent of its duties of 
judicial review by stating that it has to verify ‘whether the facts have been accurately stated, whether 
there has been any manifest error of appraisal and whether the legal consequences deduced from those facts 
were accurate…[and that it is for it] to establish not only whether the evidence relied on is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent, but also whether it contains all the information which must be taken into 
account for the purpose of assessing a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it’.254  
On appeal, the ECJ in 2009, in dismissing the Commission’s claim that the GC had 
applied the wrong standard of review, confirmed the legality of the manifest error test and 
reiterated that the EU Courts exercise only a limited power of review over complex 
economic assessments made by the Commission.255 The ECJ thus confirmed its position 
concerning the existence of a limited standard of review, which it had already stated in 
identical terms in the earlier 2004 Aalborg case.256 
 
2.2. The recent case-law of the EU Courts on the standard of review in Article 101 
TFEU cases 
Over the years, in light of the characteristics of the EU antitrust judicial review system, a 
growing number of experts and scholars have expressed serious doubts as to the 
                                                     
253 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
254 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, paras. 241-242. This 
‘expanded’ application of the test has been used and re-formulated consistently in Article 101 cases 
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Others v. Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, paras. 85, 146 and 163. The ECJ dismissed the appeals against the 
CFI’s judgment although it considered that the CFI had erred in its assessment of the agreement as an 
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not need to be set aside. The ECJ also confirmed the CFI’s findings in relation to the assessment of the 
Article 81(3) EC criteria. 
256 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg 
Portland A/S and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, para 279: ‘[e[xamination by the Community judicature of the 
complex economic assessments made by the Commission must necessarily be confined to verifying whether the rules on procedure 
and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been 
any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers’.  
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compatibility of the system with fundamental rights, in particular with the EU Charter and 
with the ECHR. As analyzed in Chapter 1, the debate has mainly focused on the so-called 
‘manifest error’ or ‘limited’ judicial review standard that the EU Courts apply when 
reviewing the legality of Commission’s decisions in annulment proceedings brought on the 
basis of Article 263 TFEU. When the EU Courts are reviewing the Commissions’ so-called 
‘complex economic assessments’ or ‘complex technical appraisals’257 they exercise a form of 
judicial deference in relation to the Commission’s choices. The EU Courts limit themselves 
to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been 
any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers. According to the most critical 
commentators, this amounts to a form of judicial self-restraint that is unwarranted and in 
violation of fundamental rights, in particular the right to a fair hearing in front of an 
independent and impartial tribunal.258 
This debate has progressively found its way in the opinions of Advocate Generals and in 
the judgments of the EU Courts. Until very recently, it was very rare to find statements in 
opinions or judgments discussing the criminal or quasi-criminal nature of antitrust 
proceedings, and the effects on the issue of the compatibility of the limited standard of 
review with the right to a fair trial. This situation radically changes at the time of adoption 
and entry into force in 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty, which gives to the EU Charter binding 
legal effect equal to the Treaties and partially incorporates the ECHR in EU law (see supra 
subsection 4.1 in Section II of Chapter 1).  
In the following subsections, the EU’s more recent case law concerning Article 101 
TFEU will be examined in order to understand the EU judiciary’s position in relation to 
these topics. It will be shown how progressively the case law has been more attentive 
concerning the discussions on the ‘criminal’ nature of antitrust sanctions and, in particular, 
on the consequences this may have for the required intensity of judicial review. Particular 
attention will then be given to the analysis of the KME and Chalkor judgments of 
December 2011,259 considered the first rulings in which the ECJ openly adopts a position 
                                                     
257 As will be examined in subsection 3.1.3 of this Chapter, dedicated to abuse of dominance cases, the 
extension of the manifest error test occurred in the Microsoft judgment (para 88). 
258 See supra subsection 4 in Section II of Chapter 1. 
259 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported; Case C-389/10 P KME Germany 
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in relation to the compatibility of the current system of EU judicial review of antitrust 
decisions with the fundamental right to a fair trial. Finally, the case law following the KME 
and Chalkor judgments will be examined in order to analyze the current application of the 
principles enshrined in these rulings to Article 101 matters, in order to verify the current 
standard of judicial review applied by the EU Courts. 
 
2.2.1. The increased attention in EU case law to the criminal nature of antitrust proceedings 
and to the compatibility of the EU Courts’ powers of judicial review with fundamental rights  
While the ECtHR case law supports the finding that competition proceedings in which 
fines are imposed can be considered criminal in nature under Article 6(1) ECHR (see supra 
subsection 4.2.3.2 in Section II of Chapter 1), the EU case law has not always been 
straightforward in this regard. Initially the EU Courts have been reluctant to address the 
question of the nature of antitrust sanctions, rarely adopting a conclusive stance in this 
regard, sometimes denying the criminal nature, sometimes recognizing only the ‘quasi-
criminal’ nature of proceedings and sanctions. 260 This position, however, has progressively 
changed over time. 
One of the rare instances in the earlier case law where the EU Courts gave particular 
attention to the nature of antitrust violations and the degree of severity of the sanctions 
imposed is in the Hüls judgment where the ECJ observed, in relation to the application of 
the fundamental right to be presumed innocent, that ‘given the nature of the infringements in 
question and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties, the principle of the presumption of 
                                                     
260 See Opinion of Advocate General Mayras in Case 26/75 General Motors v Commission [1975] ECR 1367, p. 
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innocence applies to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to 
undertakings that may result in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments’.261  
Over the years, a number of Advocate Generals have proposed to treat antitrust 
sanctions as criminal in light of their characteristics, however without specifically discussing 
the consequences this may have on the intensity of judicial review carried out by the EU 
Courts. The Advocate General’s discussions mainly focused on the consequences of the 
criminal nature of antitrust sanctions on the Commission’s handling of competition 
cases.262  
By way of example, in the Polypropylene case the Advocate General, after having 
recognized the criminal law character of antitrust fines, made a general statement on the 
necessity to bring the EU framework in line with what is mandated by the ECHR:  
‘[i]n view of the fact - in my view confirmed to some extent by the judgment of the Court of Human 
Rights in the Ozturk case - that the fines which may be imposed on undertakings pursuant to 
Article 15 of Regulation No 17/62 do in fact, notwithstanding what is stated in Article 15(4), 
have a criminal law character, (11) it is vitally important that the Court should seek to bring 
about a state of legal affairs not susceptible of any justified criticism with reference to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. At all events, within the framework formed by 
the existing body of rules and the judgments handed down hitherto it must therefore be sought to 
ensure that legal protection within the Community meets the standard otherwise regarded as 
reasonable in Europe’.263  
In the Baustahlgewebe case, Advocate General Léger considered that the case involved a 
‘criminal charge’, the issue in the appeal being whether judicial proceedings before the CFI 
respected the right to legal process within a ‘reasonable time’, as requested under Article 6 
ECHR.264 Interestingly the Advocate General also pointed out that the Commission ‘does 
not dispute - that, in the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the opinions of 
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262 See Advocate General Mayras in Case 7/72 Boehringer v Commission [1972] ECR 1281, p. 1302; Advocate 
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263 Joined Cases T-1/89 to T-4/89, T-6/89 to T-15/89 Rhone Poulenc and Others v Commission [1991] ECR II-
867, ‘Polypropylene case’, p. 885. 
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the European Commission of Human Rights, the present case involves a “criminal charge”’. The ECJ 
followed him on this point, and stated that ‘[t]he general principle of Community law that everyone 
is entitled to fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights […] and in particular the right 
to legal process within a reasonable period, is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a 
Commission decision imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law’.265 Advocate 
General Kokott in the ETI case, in recognizing the application of the principle of personal 
responsibility to cartel offences also stated that ‘[t]he consequence of the sanctionative nature of 
measures imposed by competition authorities for punishing cartel offences – in particular fines – is that the 
area is at least akin to criminal law’.266  
To date, applications alleging the incompatibility in antitrust cases of the EU judicial 
review system with the right to a fair trial have so far been unsuccessful. In 1998, 1999 and 
2000, three interesting and exemplary cases were decided by the EU Courts in which they 
consistently rejected pleas arguing the infringement of Article 6 ECHR by the EU system 
of judicial review of antitrust decisions. In Enso Espanola, the applicants main contention in 
this regard was that ‘as Community law currently stands, bias by the Commission cannot be redressed by 
means of an action brought to contest the Commission's decision before a court that has full jurisdiction and 
that this is contrary to the obligations imposed by the ECHR’.267 The Court however rejected this 
argument stating that the ‘requirement for effective judicial review of any Commission decision that finds 
and punishes an infringement of those Community competition rules is a general principle of Community 
law which follows from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States [and in the present 
case] that general principle of Community law has not been infringed’.268 It based its conclusion on 
the consideration that (i) ‘the Court was established in order particularly to improve the judicial 
protection of individual interests in respect of actions requiring close examination of complex facts’269; (ii) 
‘the review of the legality of a Commission decision finding an infringement of the competition rules and 
imposing a fine in that respect on the natural or legal person concerned must be regarded as effective judicial 
review of the measure in question. The pleas on which the natural or legal person concerned may rely in 
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support of his application for annulment are of such a nature as to allow the Court to assess the correctness 
in law and in fact of any accusation made by the Commission in competition proceedings’ 270; and (iii) 
considering the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines, ‘[i]t follows that the Court has 
jurisdiction to assess whether the fine or penalty payment imposed is proportionate to the seriousness of the 
infringement found’.271 The GC therefore concluded that EU judicial review of competition 
decisions was compatible with Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Similarly, one year later in the Aristrain case, 272 the GC replied once more to pleas 
alleging that the EU system of judicial review was incompatible with the requirement to a 
fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. The GC concluded that the applicant’s complaint 
had to be rejected in so far as it called into question ‘the legality of the system of judicial review of 
acts of the administration’.273 The GC stated, without making a conclusive finding in this regard, 
that ‘even supposing that fines imposed under Article 65 of the Treaty have the nature of penal fines’, the 
complaint could be upheld only if ‘the Commission's decisions imposing those fines cannot form the 
subject-matter of an appeal to a judicial authority with unlimited jurisdiction, within the meaning of the 
ECHR’.274 In that regard, the GC continued stating that ‘[t]he requirement of effective judicial 
review of any decision of the Commission establishing and penalising an infringement of the Community 
competition rules mentioned above is a general principle of Community law which follows from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States [and that there] has been no breach of that 
general principle of Community law in the present case’.275 Recalling the Epso Espanola ruling, the 
GC considered that ‘review of the legality of a decision of the Commission establishing an infringement of 
the competition rules and imposing a fine in that respect on the natural or legal person concerned must be 
regarded as an effective judicial review of the measure in question [in particular since the] pleas on which 
the natural or legal person concerned may rely in support of the application for annulment or amendment of 
a pecuniary penalty are of such a kind as to enable the Court to assess the correctness both in law and in 
fact of any accusation made by the Commission in the field of competition’. 276  The applicant’s 
alternative argument, to the effect that the sole object of the control exercised in an action 
in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction was to amend the economic penalty imposed, 
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and did not extend to the other elements of the contested decision, such as the legal basis 
of the penalty, which remains subject only to the control of legality was also to be rejected. 
The GC here stated that ‘its unlimited jurisdiction to review the penalty […] in conjunction, where 
necessary, with a review of the legality of the other elements of the decision […] is consistent with the 
principle enshrined in Article 6 (1) of the ECHR’. 277  It went on to say that, in addition to 
unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines, the EC Treaty empowers the EU judicature, in 
reviewing errors of law and of fact, to carry out an exhaustive examination of the legality of 
the decisions referred to it. The GC considered that this was particularly true in the case of 
the control exercised in practice over the accuracy and relevance of the facts established by 
the Commission.278 
Finally, in 2000, in the Cimenteries case, the GC rejected also the arguments put forward 
by several applicants based on the alleged limits to the EU judicature’s review of legality. It 
substantiated its conclusion on the consideration that ‘[w]hen the [General Court] reviews the 
legality of a decision finding an infringement of Article 85(1) and/or Article 86 of the, the applicants may 
call upon it to undertake an exhaustive review of both the Commission's substantive findings of fact and its 
legal appraisal of those facts. Furthermore, so far as concerns the fines, it has unlimited jurisdiction under 
Article 172 of the EC Treaty (now Article 229 EC) and Article 17 of Regulation No 17’.279 
The year 2009 has also been particularly interesting for the debate on the compatibility 
of the EU system of antitrust judicial review with fundamental rights. This does not come 
as a surprise as in this period there’s an increased attention for fundamental rights in the 
EU framework (given the changes introduced or soon to be introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty). Against this background, a series of opinions and judgments were rendered on the 
issue of the criminal or quasi-criminal nature of antitrust proceedings and, in particular, on 
the consequences that from this must be derived on the intensity of the judicial review 
carried out by EU judges in antitrust matters. 2009 is effectively the first year in which the 
EU judiciary, also solicited by the increasing criticism against the limited judicial review 
standard, is called upon to reflect even more thoroughly on the characteristics of its review 
powers in light of the stringent requirements of fundamental rights, all the more pertinent 
with the recognition of the binding force of the EU Charter and the partial incorporation 
of the ECHR in the EU framework. 
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The legal reflection on these matters surfaces initially in the legal opinions of Advocate 
General’s in the exercise of their advisory role. Advocate General Bot, in his Opinion of 26 
March 2009 in the Erste case, reflects on the nature of antitrust fines considering them 
comparable to criminal penalties. 280  According to him, the criminal nature of antitrust 
investigations leads to the obligation for the Commission to respect the principles of 
criminal law when setting fines. In his own words: 
‘[i]t appears to me that the fines referred to in Article 15 of Regulation No 17 are, by their nature 
and their size, comparable to a criminal penalty, although they are, in the strict sense of the term, 
in the nature of an administrative penalty. The Commission’s intervention, which is primarily in 
the nature of a criminal investigation, must therefore comply, in both procedural and substantive 
terms, with the principles of criminal law and the Commission must therefore prove the factors on 
which it relies when calculating the amount of the penalty’.281  
One week later, on 2 April 2009, the same Advocate General, Mr. Bot, in his Opinion in 
the Bolloré judgment,282 pushed his reasoning further and applied the consequences of his 
finding of the criminal or quasi-criminal nature of antitrust proceedings to the EU’s 
judiciary powers of review. The Advocate General in fact stated that ‘judicial review must be all 
the stricter because the infringement of the rights of the defence is committed by the Commission in quasi-
criminal proceedings which may fall within the provisions of Article 6(1) of the ECHR’. 283  The 
Advocate General recognizes that the ‘[a]pplication of Article 6 of the ECHR to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 81 EC has raised a number of questions’284 and examines these at length in his 
Opinion. In the first place, he considers antitrust fines ‘by their nature and size, be likened to a 
criminal penalty (although strictly speaking they are an administrative penalty) and in view of the 
Commission’s investigation, inquiry and decision-making functions, a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 
EC is quasi-criminal in nature [and] must also comply with the requirements laid down in Article 6(1) of 
                                                     
280 Opinion of Advocate General Bot of 26 March 2009 in Joined Cases C-125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 
P and C-137/07 P Erste Group Bank AG (C-125/07 P), Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (C-133/07 P), Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt AG (C-135/07 P) and Österreichische Volksbanken AG (C-137/07 P) v Commission [2009] ECR 
I-8681. 
281 Ibid., para 306. This issue was not further dealt with by the ECJ in its judgment.  
282 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Bot of 2 April 2009 in Joined Cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-
338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] 
ECR I-7191. 
283 Joined Cases C-322/07 P C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and 
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] ECR I-7191, para 128. 
284 Joined Cases C-322/07 P C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and 
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] ECR I-7191, para 131. 
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the ECHR’. 285  Although Advocate General Bot’s intervention on this issue concerned 
specifically the observance by the Commission of the rights of defense of parties in what 
can be considered ‘quasi-criminal’ proceedings, the importance of the rights at stake did 
bear consequences also on the intensity of the judicial review subsequently carried out, 
which had to be ‘all the stricter’ and ‘very detailed’.286 The ECJ in its subsequent judgment did 
not make any express finding in this regard or statement concerning the characteristics of 
the EU antitrust judicial review system. However, it did expressly recognize, citing again 
the case law seen supra, that the right to a fair hearing is a ‘general principle of Community 
law…inspired by Article 6(1) of the ECHR…applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a 
Commission decision imposing fines on an undertaking for infringement of competition law’.287 
The year after, in 2010, the ECJ, in an appeal by the company Lafarge against a 
Commission decision, expressly faced the issue of the effects of the recognition of the 
criminal nature of antitrust proceedings on the CFI’s powers of judicial review.288 The ECJ 
however only briefly addressed the matter and did not make any conclusive statement in 
this regard. Lafarge had in fact claimed that the Commission’s sanctions had to be 
considered a ‘criminal offence’ for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, but did not explain 
how his rights under that provision had allegedly been violated. The ECJ thus avoided 
making a conclusive finding on the nature of antitrust penalties and stated that ‘[e]ven if a 
penalty imposed by the Commission under competition law were to be regarded as coming within the ambit 
of a ‘criminal offence’ for the purposes of Article 6 of that convention, Lafarge has not shown how the 
General Court infringed its right to a fair hearing as required by that article’.289 
Finally, as will be seen infra, in 2011 the ECJ renders the long awaited judgments in the 
KME and Chalkor cases. In these rulings the ECJ took a clear position on the characteristics 
of the EU antitrust judicial review system and its compatibility with the fundamental right 
to a fair trial. These judgments were particularly awaited as they were delivered following 
the decision of the Menarini case by the ECtHR which had resolved similar issues in 
relation to national competition rules (see supra subsection 4.2.5 in Section II of Chapter 1). 
                                                     
285 Joined Cases C-322/07 P C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and 
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] ECR I-7191, paras. 132-133. 
286 Joined Cases C-322/07 P C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and 
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] ECR I-7191, paras. 128 and 134. 
287 Joined Cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Bolloré SA and 
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles SL v Commission [2009] ECR I-7191, para 143. 
288 Case C-413/08 P Lafarge SA v Commission [2010] ECR I-5361.  
289 Case C-413/08 P Lafarge SA v Commission [2010] ECR I-5361, para 75. 
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For this reason, the following subsections are dedicated to the in-depth analysis of these 
cases and to the relevance they have for the present debate, followed by the analysis of the 
subsequent case law of the EU Courts, in order to ascertain how the EU Courts have 
implemented the formulas of judicial review elaborated in these cases and to understand 
whether the principles enshrined in these judgments have been crystallized in EU 
jurisprudence. 
 
2.2.2. The compatibility of the current limited standard of review over complex economic 
assessments with the fundamental right to a fair trial: the KME and Chalkor judgments 
The KME and Chalkor judgments are not, as seen above, the first rulings in which the 
EU Courts express their views on the characteristics, including the intensity, of EU judicial 
review in competition cases. However, the relevance that they have for the current debate 
on the compatibility with the right to a fair trial is without precedent, in particular due to 
their timing, having been adopted only three months after the ECtHR’s Menarini judgment. 
Moreover, while the ECJ’s findings in these cases have to some extent clarified the position 
of the EU Courts on the required intensity of judicial review of Commission antitrust 
decisions, on the other hand, they have also left open a certain number of unresolved 
issues which has led to consider that these cases have not ‘put an end to the discontent and 
criticism of the system in which European competition law is applied […and] mark the start rather than 
the end of a debate on the reassessment of the current enforcement system’. 290 Certain commentators 
have gone in so far as stating that the KME judgments are ‘a significant but somewhat 
disappointing contribution to the discussion regarding the compatibility of the EU regime for the public 
enforcement of competition law with the fundamental right to a fair trial’.291 The following subsections 
are dedicated to the analysis of these judgments, their findings and their implications, 
before reviewing the EU judges subsequent case law in order to verify the extent to which 
the principles enshrined in these rulings have been applied thereinafter. 
 
                                                     
290 See WESSELING R., VAN DER WOUDE M., The Lafwulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European 
Cartel Law, in World Competition, 35, No. 4, 2012, pp. 574-575. 
291 See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, p. 1977. 
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2.2.2.1. The KME cases: facts and General Court judgment 
The KME judgments of 8 December 2011 concerned respectively two different cartel 
decisions adopted by the Commission in 2003 and 2004, the Industrial Tubes292 and Plumbing 
Tubes decisions.293 In these decisions the Commission held that a number of companies, 
including the KME group, had participated in a complex of restrictive agreements and 
concerted practices consisting of price fixing and market sharing and had imposed on the 
KME group a fine totaling € 106.89 million.294 On the same date a third judgment was 
rendered always by the ECJ in the Chalkor case.295 The Chalkor judgment mirrors almost in 
identical terms the findings of the two KME judgments, which is why authors often refer 
only to the KME judgments in their commentaries. The same will be done in the following 
sections for simplification purposes. 
In the KME cases, disagreeing with the Commission’s findings, KME made separate 
applications to the GC for the partial annulment of the decisions insofar as they related to 
the Commission’s calculation of the fines imposed on them, and the reduction of the 
amount of these fines. The GC, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, rejected KME’s 
                                                     
292In the Industrial Tubes decision, the Commission found that KM Europa Metal AG (now KME AG), 
Tréfimétaux SA (now KME France SAS), Europa Metalli S.p.A. (now KME Italy S.p.A.), Outokumpu Oyi 
and Outokumpu Copper Products Oy (‘Outokumpu’) and Wieland Werke AG (‘Wieland’) violated Articles 
81 of the EC Treaty and 53(1) EEA by participating, for the periods respectively indicated for each company 
in the decision, in a complex of restrictive agreements and concerted practices, which affected the EEA 
market for industrial copper tubes supplied in level wound coils; see Commission Decision C(2003) 4820 final 
of 16 December 2003, relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the 
EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/38.240).  
293 In the Plumbing Tubes decision, the Commission found that KME – as well as Boliden AB, Outokumpu 
Copper Fabrication AB, Outokumpu Copper BCZ S.A., Austria Buntmetall AG, Buntmetall Amstetten 
Ges.m.b.H., Halcor S.A., HME Nederland BV, IMI plc, IMI Kynoch Ltd., Yorkshire Copper Tube Ltd., 
Mueller Industries, Inc., WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd., DENO Holding Company, Inc. 
DENO Acquisition EURL, Outokumpu Oyj, Outokumpu Copper Products Oy, and Wieland Werke AG – 
violated Articles 81 of the EC Treaty and 53(1) EEA by participating, for the periods respectively indicated 
for each company in Article 1 of the Decision, in a complex of restrictive agreements and concerted practices 
consisting of price fixing and market sharing, which affected the EEA market for copper plumbing tubes; see 
Commission Decision C(2004) 2826 final of 3 September 2004, relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 
81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/E-1/38.069). 
294 For purposes of simplification, we will refer generically to the company ‘KME’ even if the Commission’s 
decisions concerned different addressees and different companies part of the KME group that underwent 
various forms of restructuring during the litigation phase. 
295 Case C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, not yet reported. On the Chalkor judgment 
see MACGREGOR A., GECIC B., Due Process in EU Competition Cases, in Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 5, available at 
http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/due_process_in_eu_competition_cases_following_the_introduc
tion_of_the_new_best_practices_guidelines_on_antitrust_proceedings.pdf, pp. 431-432. 
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applications.296 KME appealed both judgments in front of the ECJ seeking to have the GC 
judgments set aside and the Commission’s decision partially annulled. On 8 December 
2011 the ECJ delivered its two final rulings on the matter, dismissing KME’s appeals.297  
 
2.2.2.2. The KME cases: The Advocate General’s conclusions on the limited scope for deference 
by the EU Courts over the Commission’s assessments 
In her Opinion of 10 February 2011 in one of the KME cases298, Advocate General 
Sharpston examined whether the judicial review exercised by the GC was adequate, not 
only in principle but also in the concrete circumstances of the case, in light of the right to a 
fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR. In her Opinion, the debate concerning the 
manifest error standard and its limits surfaced with great clarity. In the first place, she 
recognized and re-stated the uncertainties concerning the boundaries and definition of this 
                                                     
296 In the Industrial Tubes decision, by judgment delivered on 6 May 2009, in Case T-127/04, KME Germany 
AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission [2009] ECR II-01167, the Eighth Chamber of the CFI 
rejected KME’s application. In July 2009 KME Germany AG (formerly KM Europa Metal AG), KME 
France SAS (formerly Tréfimétaux SA) and KME Italy S.p.A. (formerly Europa Metalli S.p.A.) jointly 
appealed to the ECJ, seeking to have the CFI judgment in Case T-127/04 set aside and the decision partially 
annulled. In the Plumbing Tubes case, by judgment delivered on 19 May 2010, in Case T-25/05, KME Germany 
AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission [2010] II-91, the Eighth Chamber of the GC rejected 
KME’s application. In August 2010 KME Germany AG (formerly KM Europa Metal AG), KME France 
SAS (formerly Tréfimétaux SA) and KME Italy S.p.A. (formerly Europa Metalli S.p.A.) jointly appealed to the 
ECJ, seeking to have the GC judgment in Case T-25/05 set aside and the decision partially annulled. 
297 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported and Case C-389/10 P KME 
Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported. See NIKOLIC I., Full Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases after 
KME: A New Formula of Review?, in ECLR, 2012, Issue 12, pp. 583-588; SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME 
Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 
2012, pp. 1977-2002; MUGUET-POULLENNEC G., Sanctions prévues par le règlement no 1/2003 et droit à une 
protection juridictionnelle effective : les leçons des arrêts KME et Chalkor de la CJUE, in Revue Lamy de la Concurrence : 
droit, économie, regulation, 2012, No. 32, pp. 57-78; TUOMINEN N., La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du 
Tribunal de l'Union européenne. Chronique des arrêts. Arrêt « KME c. Commission », in Revue du droit de l'Union 
européenne, 2011, No. 4, pp.753-758; DE LONGIS C., Sull'effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nel diritto europeo 
della concorrenza, in Giustizia civile, 2012, I, pp. 279-284; SARRAZIN C., Amendes: La CJUE rejette les pourvois et 
examine de manière détaillée les éléments pris en considération pour fixer le montant de l’amende dans l’affaire des tubes 
industriels en cuivre et tubes sanitaires en cuivre (KME Germany c/ Commission), in Concurrences: revue des droits de 
la concurrence, 2012, No. 1, pp. 89-91; LACRESSE A., Recours juridictionnel effectif: La CJUE confirme l’exercice 
par le Tribunal d’un contrôle de pleine juridiction sur les sanctions infligées par la Commission en matière de concurrence (KME 
Germany c/ Commission, Chalkor c/ Commission), in Concurrences: revue des droits de la concurrence, 2012, No. 
1, pp. 181-182. 
298 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpstone of 8 December 2011 in Case C-272/09 P, not yet published. On 
Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion see GERARD D., AG Sharpston’s Opinion in KME: a new step toward full 
appellate jurisdiction in antitrust cases, in Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 12 February 2011; DEBROUX M., 
Amendes: L’Avocat général Sharpston passe en revue les critères pris en compte pour déterminer le montant d’une sanction 
pécuniaire et détaille l’étendue du contrôle que doit exercer le Tribunal de l’UE (Conclusions AG Sharpston, KME Germany), 
in Concurrences, 2011 No. 2, p. 103; GERARD D., The ECJ Advocate General Sharpston addresses the scope of the 
EU Courts' jurisdiction over antitrust cases and fines (KME Germany), in e-Competitions, 2011, No. 35160; and 
DAWES A., FORRESTER I., TROUCHE A., SAKELLARIOU S., The ECJ Advocate General Sharpston voices 
opinion on the standard of judicial review over fines in cartel cases (KME), in e-Competitions, 2011, No. 47909. 
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standard and emphasized that: ‘the case-law has never clarified the exact meaning, scope of rationale of 
the margin of discretion accorded to the Commission, having regard to the institutional balance between the 
[Commission and the EU judicature]’. 299  She also acknowledged the increased 
criminalization of competition proceedings and concluded that in light of the Engel criteria, 
she had ‘little difficulty’ in concluding that cartel fines were criminal in nature.300 She also 
stated her view on the necessity to ensure that there is only a very limited degree of 
deference by EU Courts when reviewing the Commission’s application of competition 
rules.301 In her own words:   
‘it is arbitrary, dangerous and unfair to apply the same “judicial deference” to the Commission’s 
discretion in the context of the current EU competition law enforcement regime, characterized by 
increasingly large fines having inevitable economic and financial impact on companies, shareholders 
and employees, and leading to de facto “criminalization” of competition law. EU competition rules 
are directly applicable provisions which leave no room for policy-based discretion in their 
interpretation and application, so that there is scope for only a very limited degree of deference by 
the Courts when reviewing their application by the Commission in a specific case’ (emphasis 
added).302   
As to the substance of the case, KME’s main contention was that the GC infringed its 
fundamental right to a fair trial by failing to examine its arguments closely and thoroughly 
and by deferring, to an excessive and unreasonable extent, to the Commission’s discretion. 
As a result, KME alleged to have failed to obtain full and effective judicial review, as 
required by Article 6(1) ECHR. Since the GC’s judicial review in the KME cases was 
restricted to the Commission’s exercise of its sanctioning powers, the Advocate General 
was able to narrow down the issue to the characteristics of the unlimited jurisdiction in 
relation to fines, leaving aside the issue of review of legality, and avoiding to have to take 
an open position on the compatibility in general of judicial review in competition 
proceedings with Article 6(1) ECHR. For the Advocate General it was hardly debatable 
that the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU is consistent ‘at 
                                                     
299 KME Opinion, para 44. 
300 KME Opinion, para 64. 
301 According to certain authors, Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in KME represents another step in 
the line of Advocate General Opinions advocating for a reduction in the use of the deference doctrine; see 
DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 85.  
302 KME Opinion, para 44. 
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least in theory’ with Article 6(1) of the ECHR insofar as it enables the Court ‘to cancel, reduce or 
increase the amount, with no restriction as to the type of grounds (of fact or law) on which it can be 
exercised’.303 However, KME’s claim before the ECJ was also based on the manner in which 
the GC actually reviewed the decisions being challenged. As opined by Advocate General 
Sharpston, it is a legitimate question ‘whether, in any particular case, the General Court has in fact 
adequately exercised’ its unlimited jurisdiction, proposing a case by case approach. She stated 
to this end that:  
‘I consider that what is of greatest importance is the way in which the General Court actually 
carried out its review, the way in which it described that review being less relevant. Thus, it cannot 
necessarily be concluded from references to the degree of discretion, choice or latitude available to the 
Commission that the General Court failed in its duty to assess, in response to KME’s arguments, 
the way in which the fine was set. Nor, conversely, can it be concluded from the use of the words ‘in 
the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction’ that that Court did indeed adequately exercise its powers 
of assessment. Each instance must be examined on the basis of its actual content’.304 
Advocate General Sharpston noted that ‘the General Court did request the Commission to 
produce a number of documents in its administrative file, and that the Commission produced well over 500 
pages in response’. This suggested that the thoroughness of the GC’s review was ‘sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the ECHR and the Charter. However, it remains to be verified, from the 
judgment itself, whether that review was of the requisite kind. In other words, was it confined to verifying 
that the Commission had not exceeded the bounds of its discretion, or was there also consideration (when 
called for by KME) of the assessment made within those bounds’.305  
Interestingly, the ECJ in its judgment adopted an entirely different approach and, as will 
be seen infra, departed from the Advocate General’s reasoning on why the review was 
compatible with fundamental rights and based its entire reasoning on Article 47 of the EU 
Charter rather than on Article 6(1) ECHR. 
 
2.2.2.3. The KME cases: The ECJ’s judgment 
As mentioned, in front of the ECJ KME submitted, inter alia, that the GC had infringed 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR and the EU Charter by failing to carry out an adequate review of 
the Industrial Tubes and the Plumbing Tubes decisions and by deferring, to an excessive and 
                                                     
303 KME Opinion, para 70. 
304 KME Opinion, paras. 71 and 73. 
305 KME Opinion, para 75. 
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unreasonable extent, to the Commission’s discretion. The ECJ rejected these arguments 
and made a number of statements that are of particular interest for the present discussion 
as the EU Court adopted a clear position on the compatibility of the current EU system of 
judicial review of competition decisions with the fundamental right to a fair trial.306 Rather 
than basing its reasoning on Article 6(1) ECHR, as done by the Advocate General, the ECJ 
based its analysis entirely on Article 47 of the EU Charter, which allowed it to avoid any 
discussion on the possible criminal nature of antitrust sanctions and on the implications of 
any such classification under Article 6(1) ECHR.307  
In the first place, the ECJ recalled that the principle of effective judicial protection is a 
general principle of EU law, to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter. 
Then, rather than concentrating its analysis on the unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines, 
as done by the Advocate General, it focused on the review of legality under Article 263 
TFEU and made a number of interesting statements. It indicated that in areas giving rise to 
complex economic assessments, the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to 
economic matters, which does not, however, mean that the EU Courts must refrain from 
reviewing the Commission's interpretation of economic information. The Courts must in 
any event establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent, and also whether the evidence contains all the information which must be taken 
into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of sustaining 
the conclusions drawn from it. 308  The ECJ thus emphasized that the Commission’s 
discretion, which is not in any event called into question, cannot dispense from conducting 
an in-depth review of the law and of the facts.  
                                                     
306As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the ECJ’s statements substantially mirrored the statements made by 
the Strasbourg judges in Menarini, creating an interesting dialectic between the two Courts.   
307 It has been claimed that this choice was made by the ECJ not only to avoid having to ‘engage in this complex 
and politically charged discussion’ but also to give a clear framework to the right to a fair trial under the EU 
Charter. According to this view, ‘[b]y making Article 47 of the Charter rather than Article 6 ECHR its point of 
reference, the Court may have reserved itself the possibility of not classifying competition law sanctions under any particular 
heading, as well as the liberty to consider that the annulment of a decision, even without a de novo review, qualifies as an effective 
remedy’. This may also be explained by the need to raise the ECHR standard of protection which after Menarini 
seemed disappointing as it watered down the requirements of effective judicial review in competition cases. 
See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second 
Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, pp. 1991-1993. 
308 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 94; and Case C-389/10 P 
KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 121. The standard is the same which has been 
formulated in the Tetra Laval case (see infra subsection 2.2.3 in Chapter 3) and was then transposed in Article 
101 TFEU case law (see supra subsection 2.1.3 in this Chapter). 
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As to the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction in relation to penalties, the ECJ stated that 
‘the review of legality is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction’,309 which empowers the Courts, in 
addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their 
own appraisal for the Commission’s and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the 
fine or penalty payment imposed. The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction in relation to 
penalties however does not amount to a review of the Court's own motion. The ECJ in 
fact recalled that judicial proceedings have an inter partes nature. With the exception of pleas 
involving matters of public policy, which the Courts are required to raise of their own 
motion (such as the failure to state reasons), it is for the applicant to raise pleas in law 
against that decision and to adduce evidence in support of those pleas.310 
The ECJ concluded that the EU system of review is in principle compatible with the right 
to a fair trial as the review provided by the Treaties involves a review by the Courts of both 
the law and the facts, that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the 
Commission’s decision and to alter the amount of a fine. Therefore, the judicial review 
provided under EU law is not contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective 
judicial protection. As to the compliance, in practice, with this right, the ECJ held that the 
GC conducted the full and unrestricted review, in law and fact, which was required of it. In 
the ECJ’s own words: ‘although the General Court repeatedly referred to the “discretion”, the 
“substantial margin of discretion” or the “wide discretion” of the Commission […] such references did not 
prevent the General Court from carrying out the full and unrestricted review, in law and in fact, required of 
it’.311 
 
2.2.3. Implications of the KME and Chalkor judgments 
It is considered that the KME and Chalkor judgments are to be welcomed as: (i) it is 
apparent that the ECJ acknowledges that the GC has in the past given excessive deference 
                                                     
309 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 103; and Case C-389/10 P 
KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 130. 
310 For an in-depth analysis of the importance of parties’ submissions as a fundamental pre-condition for 
comprehensive judicial review, see VAN CLEYNENBREUGEL P., Constitutionalizing Comprehensively Tailored 
Judicial Review in EU Competition Law, in The Columbia Journal of European Law, 2012, pp. 519-545. 
311 Case C-389/10 P, para 136; Case C-272/09 P, para 109 and Case C-386/10 P, para 82. According to 
certain commentators it is in any event ‘unfortunate that the appearance of a less than full review by the General Court 
was not criticized by the Court of Justice. Justice must not only be done, but also be seen to be done’; see BRONCKERS M, 
VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities and Which Role for the 
Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), in European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, pp. 8-9. 
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to the Commission’s discretion, which is not in any event called into question, and 
emphasizes that the Commission’s discretion cannot dispense from conducting an in-depth 
review of the law and of the facts;312and (ii) the ECJ states it will start looking at what the 
GC actually does in its review of the Commission’s competition decisions, beyond the 
GC’s choice of language which may repeatedly refer to the Commission’s discretion.313   
Certain commentators 314  also consider that KME signs a certain rupture with past 
statements of the Courts where it was often reiterated that ‘review of complex economic appraisals 
is necessarily limited’ 315 , as now the ECJ expressly states that ‘the Courts cannot use the 
Commission’s margin of discretion […] as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of 
the law and the facts’.316  
A number of critiques have anyway been raised against these judgments. On the one 
hand, it is still questioned whether these rulings are effectively compliant with what is 
mandated for the respect of fundamental rights, in particular the right to a fair trial, 
enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter. As examined supra in 
subsection 4.2.4 of Section II in Chapter 1, the case law of the ECtHR on the content of 
‘full judicial’ review is not straightforward, but in its prevalent applications mandates an 
extensive review that entails the power to quash and reformulate in all respects on points 
of fact and law the decision of the competition authority under examination. While the 
KME judgments seem to fall into the steps of the recent Menarini case, allowing to 
conclude that the EU judicial review system and architecture as such is not incompatible 
with Articles 47 of the EU Charter and 6(1) ECHR, it must not be forgotten that the 
ECtHR Menarini judgment has been the object of intense criticism, in particular for 
                                                     
312  As indicated by one author: ‘KME heralds more stringent review of the Commission’s antitrust decisions’; see 
NIKOLIC I., Full Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases after KME: A New Formula of Review?, in ECLR, 2012, Issue 
12, p. 587. 
313 This is a welcome change in particular for those authors who believe that ‘the crux is not whether the system has 
the “external characteristics” of a system that complies with the necessary guarantees but rather how the system operates in 
practice’; see WESSELING R., VAN DER WOUDE M., The Lafwulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of 
European Cartel Law, in World Competition, 35, No. 4, 2012, pp. 574-575. 
314 See, inter alia, DERENNE J., The Scope of Judicial Review in EU Economic Cases, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.), Bruylant, 2010, pp. 73-74. 
315 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 87.  
316 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 102; and Case C-389/10 P 
KME Germany and Others v Commission, not yet reported, para 129. 
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affording too light of a protection in competition cases, in particular for ‘water[ing] down the 
requirements of effective jurisdictional review in competition law cases’.317  
Another controversial matter is the extent to which the KME judgments effectively 
comply with the requirements set out in the earlier ECtHR Menarini judgment. One 
remarkable feature of the KME judgments is that, notwithstanding the lack of any 
reference to the ECtHR case law and Article 6 ECHR, the language used by the EU judges 
mirrors to a large extent that used by the ECtHR judges in Menarini. A more detailed 
analysis of the substantial findings of each Court shows however a significant difference in 
approaches.  
In Menarini, after having recalled that among the most important features of a system of 
full judicial review there is the authority to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to 
the dispute and the power of modifying the contested decision,318 and after acknowledging 
that in the Italian legal framework no administrative court can substitute its own legal 
qualification of the facts and technical evaluation to that of the AGCM, the ECtHR 
however concluded that, in practice, the Italian courts had not carried out a simple review of 
legality of the decision, but had thoroughly reviewed the applicant’s claims and thus the 
authority’s technical assessments (in addition to having the possibility to modify the fine).319 
The ECtHR judges in Menarini took care in fact to state clearly that the Italian judicial 
review system of antitrust decisions, as implemented by the Italian judges in Menarini’s case, was 
compliant with Article 6(1) ECHR and, thus, that there had been no breach of the 
applicants right to a fair trial. What is apparent from the Menarini judgment is that a 
distinction was made by the ECtHR between the judicial review powers as defined by the 
Italian legal framework, and the judicial review powers as exercised concretely by the Italian 
judges in the particular case. The circumstance that the legislation in itself did not foresee 
‘full judicial review powers’, as conceived in the ECtHR case law, did not preclude a 
                                                     
317 See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, p. 1998. 
318 ECtHR judgment in Menarini, para 59: ‘[p]armi les caractéristiques d’un organe judiciaire de pleine juridiction figure le 
pouvoir de réformer en tous points, en fait comme en droit, la décision entreprise, rendue par l’organe inférieur. Il doit notamment 
avoir compétence pour se pencher sur toutes les questions de fait et de droit pertinentes pour le litige dont il se trouve saisi’. 
319 ECtHR judgment in Menarini, para 64: ‘la Cour note que la compétence des juridictions administratives n’était pas 
limitée à un simple contrôle de légalité. Les juridictions administratives ont pu vérifier si, par rapport aux circonstances 
particulières de l’affaire, l’AGCM avait fait un usage approprié de ses pouvoirs. Elles ont pu examiner le bien-fondé et la 
proportionnalité des choix de l’AGCM et même vérifier ses évaluations d’ordre technique’. 
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finding of compatibility with the right to a fair trial, provided that full judicial review 
powers had been exercised in practice. 
In KME, on the other hand, the ECJ justifies its finding of compatibility of the GC’s 
review with the right to a fair trial, considering first the general characteristics of the judicial 
review system provided under EU law. Notwithstanding that the Commission continues to 
exercise discretion in relation to complex economic assessments, the circumstance that EU 
Courts can carry out a review of both the law and the facts, that they have the power to 
assess the evidence, to annul the Commission’s decision and to alter the amount of a fine, 
is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the judicial review provided under EU law is not 
contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection. The ECJ’s 
conclusion is thus that the system in itself is compatible with the requirements of the right 
to a fair trial and that deviations by the GC contrary to the system will be monitored on a 
case by case basis, as particular attention will be given to what the GC actually does in 
practice in its review of the Commission’s competition decisions.  
What is problematic of the ECJ’s approach in KME is that the Court considers that the 
EU system as it stands, i.e. a review of legality of the law and the facts that leaves discretion 
to the Commission for complex economic assessments, coupled with unlimited jurisdiction 
in relation to fines, is in itself compatible with the right to a fair trial. In Menarini, instead, 
the ECtHR reached the conclusion that the right to a fair trial had not been violated on the 
basis solely of what the national judges had done in practice. Notwithstanding the 
recognition that on the basis of national legislation the Italian judges could not substitute 
the technical assessments of the Italian Authority, the circumstance that in practice they 
had not exercised this deference and had rather reviewed thoroughly the authority’s 
assessments, had led to consider the requirement of ‘full’ review respected. The main 
difference between the two cases is that while the interpretation and application of the ‘full 
review’ requirement in Menarini does not leave space to the Commission’s discretion,320 that 
same requirement in KME is found instead to be respected even in the presence of 
                                                     
320 The ECtHR in Menarini considered that the Italian courts’ competence ‘n’était pas limitée à un simple contrôle de 
légalité’ as even if they did not have the ‘pouvoir de se substituer à l’autorité administrative indépendante’ they could 
‘toutefois vérifier si l’administration a fait un usage approprie de ses pouvoirs’. They could thus examine if ‘par rapport aux 
circonstances particulières de l’affaire, l’AGCM avait fait un usage approprie de ses pouvoirs [and] le bien-fondé et la 
proportionnalité des choix de l’AGCM’. They could also ‘vérifier ses évaluations d’ordre technique’ (Menarini judgment, 
paras. 63-64). 
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deference towards the Commission’s discretional evaluations over complex economic 
assessments. 
The KME cases have been also criticized for not providing ‘a coherent framework for 
appraising whether the EU system of review complies with the requirement of a fair trial’. 321  As 
mentioned, after these judgments, there is still place for the ‘limited’ standard of judicial 
review. As indicated by one commentator: ‘[t]he Court does not deny that discretion constitutes a 
limit to the effectiveness of control. In other words, Courts undertake to review parties’ submission carefully 
although they reserve their discretion to preserve the Commission’s discretion’.322 Accordingly, the EU 
Courts’ practice of not interfering and questioning certain Commission assessments is not 
considered an obstacle to ensuring ‘full review’, i.e. not per se in violation of the interested 
parties’ right to a ‘fair trial’. However, this position of the ECJ has also been criticized for 
being confusing as, on the one hand, the Court states that judges cannot use the 
Commission’s discretion for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review, and, on 
the other hand, that deference towards complex economic assessments is compatible with 
the principle of effective judicial protection.323 Thus, whether the circumstance that the EU 
Courts can dismiss certain arguments without having to reach an opinion on their 
substance is compatible with the right to a fair trial is still an open question, which is why a 
clarification by the EU Courts on this point would be welcome.324 
That a margin of discretion continues to be recognized to the Commission has been 
confirmed also by the position of individual EU judges on the matter, i.e. such as the 
president of the GC Judge Jaeger’s proposal to marginalize the marginal review of the EU 
Courts, in order to give the Commission deference only in relation to assessments 
                                                     
321 See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, p. 2000. 
322 See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, pp 1997. 
323 See NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), pp. 995-997. According to Nazzini: 
‘[t]hree arguments have been put forward to “save” the current system. The first is that, in certain cases, the Union courts do not 
in fact apply the “manifest error” test – although they say that they do – but carry out a comprehensive review of the evidence. 
This seems to be the approach adopted by the Court of Justice itself in KME, where the Court said that, although the General 
Court had set out a test of deferential review, it did in fact carry out a full review of the Commission decision. This approach is 
far from satisfactory. The principle of effective judicial protection is better safeguarded, in a democratic society, by a legal test which 
complies with it and is clear and certain in advance, rather than by courts departing from a test which is not compliant with such 
a principle on a case-by-case basis and, more worryingly, without providing reasons for the departure from the non-compliant test 
but, on the contrary, purporting to apply it’. 
324 See SIBONY A., Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Second Chamber) of 8 December 2011, in CMLR, 2012, p. 1997. 
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concerning economic policy choices. 325  This recommendation to reduce the sphere of 
discretion of the Commission (from complex economic and technical appraisals to only 
economic policy choices) is to be welcomed; however, it has also been contended that this 
is still not sufficient, as it leaves space for the Commission’s discretion for particular 
categories of assessments, continuing to raise the question of the legitimacy of forms of 
‘judicial immunity’. The most critical authors still contend that what is necessary for 
effective compliance with the requirements of the fundamental right to a fair trial is either a 
system where the EU Courts have full appellate judicial review powers, i.e. the power to 
quash and reformulate all of the Commission’s assessments, 326  either a system where, 
preserving the review of legality, within the latter no room is left to the discretionary 
choices of the Commission, the EU judges’ control having necessarily to cover all of the 
Commission’s assessments.  
 
2.3. The EU case law following the KME and Chalkor judgments  
The KME and Chalkor judgments have been welcomed for having brought more clarity 
in competition cases on the EU judiciary’s position concerning the compatibility of the EU 
judicial review system with the right to a fair trial; however, these cases have also been the 
object of criticism for having left a grey area of controversial issues still to be defined. In 
particular, a contentious matter is whether the EU case law following these two landmark 
cases will continue to be deferential towards the Commission’s complex economic and/or 
technical assessments, continuing to raise issues of compatibility with the right to a fair trial. 
The risk inherent in the ECJ’s approach in the KME and Chalkor cases is that given the 
novelty of the statements (one of the first times the ECJ made its view known on the issue 
of compatibility of deferential judicial review standards with the right to a fair trial), their 
timing (after the Menarini judgment and thus presumptively respecting its findings), and 
their origin (the EU’s highest court), successive judgments of the GC or the ECJ may be 
unlikely to adopt or state a different view, at least not until the EU Courts’ approach may 
be found to be in violation of the ECHR itself, after accession to the Convention. In the 
following subsections, the judgments rendered by the EU Courts in Article 101 TFEU 
                                                     
325 JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011. 
326 As seen supra in subsection 4.2.7 of Section II in Chapter 1, ‘full jurisdiction’ as interpreted in the Menarini 
case by the ECtHR does not however mandate full appellate judicial review as a minimum review standard. 
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cases after KME and Chalkor that are relevant in this regard have been examined, in order 
to assess how the principles enshrined in the 2011 cases have been given application 
thereinafter. As will be seen infra, it appears evident that the EU Courts continue to 
consider the existence of the limited judicial review standard legitimate and fully compatible 
with the right to a fair trial.  
 
2.3.1. The 2012 Shell judgment 
In the Shell judgment,327 rendered in September 2012, almost one year after the KME 
and Chalkor judgments, the GC stated that the EU judicial review system as foreseen by the 
Treaties was compatible with the right to a fair trial, as it empowers the Courts to carry out 
a review of legality and to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission’s in relation to 
the penalty, and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment 
imposed. The GC stated that: 
‘[t]he review provided for by the Treaties thus involves, in accordance with the requirements of the 
principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, review 
by the Courts of the European Union of both the law and the facts, and means that they have the 
power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine’.328 
In this case, the statement from the Court was made in the framework of its 
examination of the applicants’ arguments in the context of the Court’s unlimited 
jurisdiction in relation to fines. In reaching this conclusion the GC expressly cited the KME 
and Chalkor judgments. What is interesting is that the GC here made a general statement on 
the compatibility of the system with the right to a fair trial. The risk inherent in these 
statements of the GC is that this clean bill of health provided to the system may translate in 
the Commission’s discretional assessments being fully insulated by ‘full review’.  
As mentioned supra, compliance with the right to a fair trial must be ascertained not only 
on a theoretical basis but also in practice. Formalistic announcements that the system of 
review as described in the Treaties is adequate as such cannot but be viewed with suspect, 
                                                     
327  Case T-343/06 Shell Petroleum NV, The Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd and Shell Nederland 
Verkoopmaatschappij BV v Commission, not yet reported. The Shell judgment was one of 16 separate judgments 
handed down by the GC on 27 September 2012 in actions brought by bitumen producers and construction 
companies to challenge a decision of the Commission finding they had infringed Article 101(1) TFEU by 
participating in an illegal price-fixing cartel in the road bitumen sector in the Netherlands. 
328  Case T-343/06 Shell Petroleum NV, The Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd and Shell Nederland 
Verkoopmaatschappij BV v Commission, not yet reported, para 116. 
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as there is no guarantee of what review will effectively be exercised in practice. The greatest 
of these risks being that the GC may feel dispensed from carrying out an in-depth 
evaluation of the Commission’s findings, in particular in relation to complex economic 
and/or technical assessments. 
 
2.3.2. The 2012 Otis judgment 
A couple of months after the Shell judgment, on 6 November 2012, the ECJ handed 
down a ruling, of particular interest for the present debate, on a reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Brussels Commercial Court.329 Following a cartel decision fining a number 
of companies for infringement of Article 101 TFEU for operating illegal price-fixing, bid-
rigging and market-sharing cartels relating to the installation and maintenance of lifts and 
escalators, upheld both by the GC and the ECJ, in June 2008 the Commission filed a case 
with the Brussels Commercial Court seeking damages from these companies (Otis, Kone, 
Schindler and Thyssenkrupp). The Brussels Commercial Court referred a number of 
questions to the ECJ to ask, in particular, whether the right of access to a tribunal and the 
principle of equality of arms enshrined in the EU Charter prevented the Commission, 
where it has taken a cartel decision, from claiming compensation before national courts for 
loss sustained by the EU in its capacity as a consumer of the products that were the subject 
of that cartel. The ECJ ruled that the EU Charter does not preclude the Commission from 
bringing on behalf of the EU an action before a national court for damages in respect of 
loss sustained by the EU as a result of an agreement or practice contrary to Article 101 of 
the TFEU. 
This judgment is of interest because in the examination by the ECJ of the second 
question referred by the Brussels Commercial Court, particular reference was made to the 
content of the rights enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter. The main issue here 
concerned the circumstance that when national courts are hearing an action for damages 
on the basis of a Commission decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, they 
cannot take a decision that runs counter to the Commission’s decision (under Article 16(1) 
of Regulation 1/2003). The parties in the national case had argued that their right to a fair 
trial and to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the EU Charter had been 
                                                     
329 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, not yet reported. See Werner P., Lesur L., Aberg 
L., The European Court of Justice rules that the EU Commissin can bring follow-on actions for damages on behalf of the EU 
in cartel cases (Otis), in e-competitions No. 49461. 
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violated since, in their case, the review of legality carried out by the EU Courts under 
Article 263 TFEU had been insufficient because of the margin of discretion which the EU 
courts afford the Commission in economic matters. The ECJ, however, replied this was 
not the case as the ‘EU law provides for a system of judicial review of Commission decisions relating to 
proceedings under Article 101 TFEU which affords all the safeguards required by Article 47 of the 
Charter’. 330  In response to the specific claim that review of legality in the sphere of 
competition law is insufficient because of, inter alia, the margin of discretion allowed to the 
Commission in economic matters, the ECJ responded by re-formulating the exact wording 
used in the KME and Chalkor judgments. In particular, the ECJ answered that the EU 
courts must carry out a review of legality on the basis of the evidence submitted by the 
applicants in support of their pleas in law. In carrying out this review, the EU courts 
cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion as a basis for dispensing with the 
conduct of an in-depth review of the law and facts. The ECJ concluded that ‘[t]he review 
provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the EU Courts of both the law and the facts, and means 
that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a 
fine. The review of legality provided for in Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction 
in respect of the amount of the fine […] therefore meets the requirements of the principle of effective judicial 
protection in Article 47 of the Charter’.331 
This judgment is thus an apparent example of how in relation to the issue of whether 
the ‘limited’ judicial review standard is compatible with the right to a fair trial, the ECJ 
formulates once again general conclusions on the compatibility of the current system of 
review. The ECJ’s reasoning in the Otis case lacked any analysis of the intensity of review 
concretely exercised by the EU Courts in the framework of the previous action for 
annulment. While this specific review may be considered to go beyond what is required by 
the ECJ in the framework of a preliminary ruling, on the other hand, what is evident and 
relevant for any future debate on this topic is that, notwithstanding the effective nature and 
characteristics of the review carried out under Article 263 TFEU, and contested by the 
defendants in their action for damages, the ECJ continues to guarantee a clean bill of 
health to the existence of the Commission’s discretion in relation to complex economic 
assessments.  
                                                     
330 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, not yet reported, para 56. 
331 Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others, not yet reported, para 63. 
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3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
CASES 
 
For a long time there were no judgments concerning Article 102 TFEU in which the 
ECJ or GC described their powers of judicial review in terms comparable to the Article 101 
cases mentioned supra.332 Initially the EU Courts had elaborated the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard only in relation to Article 101 cases, however, over the years, the EU Courts 
extended its application also to new domains. Once developed and applied consistently by 
the EU Courts in relation to the Commission’s complex economic assessments in the 
framework of Article 101 TFEU cases, the ‘limited’ review standard was then transposed 
also to cases decided in the framework of Article 102 TFEU. The ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard will in fact make its appearance in abuse of dominance cases only after the 
contours and content of the manifest error standard were well demarcated in the case law 
under Article 101 TFEU.  
Interestingly, while Article 102 cases were for a long time not at the forefront of the 
debate on the ‘limited’ standard of judicial review, once this standard does make its 
appearance also in this field of competition law, Article 102 cases have since then 
contributed to further clarify and demarcate the ambit of application of this standard. By 
way of example, as will be seen infra, it is in the field of Article 102 cases that the EU 
Courts intervened to increase the categories of assessments (complex ‘economic’ 
assessments and complex ‘technical’ assessments) that could be caught by the ‘limited’ 
judicial review standard and thus be subject to more narrow review. 
 
3.1. The early case-law on the standard of review in Article 102 TFEU cases 
The first time the ‘limited’ review standard makes its appearance in an Article 102 case is 
in the 2000 judgment in Kish Glass. 333  Here the GC extended for the first time the 
application of the Remia formula, elaborated in the context of a 101 case, to an Article 102 
case:334  
                                                     
332 VON BOGDANDY A., MAVROIDIS P. C., MÉNY Y., European Integration and International Co-ordination: 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 194. 
333 Case T-65/96 Kish Glass&Co Ltd v Commission [2000] ECR II-1885, para 64. 
334 See SIBONY A., BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit communautaire de 
la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective, in Revue trimestrielle du droit européen 43 (2), April-June 2007, p. 
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‘[a]s a preliminary point, the Court of First Instance observes that, according to consistent case-
law, although as a general rule the Community judicature undertakes a comprehensive review of 
the question whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition rules are met, its 
review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to verifying 
whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, whether 
the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or 
a misuse of powers’ (para 64). 
Thereinafter a series of judgments were rendered in the framework of Article 102 cases 
considered particularly relevant for the discussion on the ‘limited’ standard of judicial 
review, a selection of which will be examined in the following subsections. 
 
3.1.1. The Wanadoo judgment: the impact of the limited judicial review standard on the 
outcome of cases 
The 2007 Wanadoo judgment335 can be considered a good example of how the existence 
or not of the limited standard of review in relation to complex economic assessments can 
lead to very different outcomes in cases, in particular to the finding or not of the existence 
of an infringement of competition rules. As previously described, the existence of this 
limited standard entails that EU judges limit themselves to verifying whether the 
Commission’s evaluations of complex economic matters contain a ‘manifest’ mistake (in 
addition to verifying the respect of procedural norms, statement of reason requirements 
and correct exercise of powers). As a consequence, if the party challenging the 
Commission’s assessments does so presenting an alternative plausible explanation of the 
facts, the EU judges will ignore such alternative proposal, unless the party in question is 
capable of demonstrating that the Commission’s theory is vitiated by a manifest error. This 
also entails that if two alternative and perfectly plausible interpretations of the facts are 
possible, none of which affected by errors, leading however to different outcomes (a 
finding or non-finding of abuse), the Commission’s interpretation will always prevail.336 
                                                                                                                                 
238; and ART J., COLOMBO P. I., Judicial Review in Article 102, in Competition Law and the Enforcement of 
Article 102 (Etro & Kokkoris eds.), Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. 
335 Case T-340/03 France Telecom [2007] ECR II-107 (“Wanadoo”). 
336 See AZIZI who considers that ‘in case of equal plausibility of both parties’ submission, the Commission’s wide margin of 
assessment shall prevail and its decision thus be upheld’; AZIZI J., The Limits of Judicial Review concerning Abuses of a 
Dominant Position: Principles and Specific Application to the Communications Technology Sector, in Today's Multi-layered 
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In the Wanadoo case, the Commission imposed a fine of € 10.35 million on the French 
internet services provider Wanadoo for abusing its dominant position by engaging in 
predatory pricing.337 Wanadoo appealed this decision in front of the CFI which, on 30 
January 2007, handed down its judgment confirming the decision. In this case, one of the 
main issues at stake was whether Wanadoo was abusing its dominant position by applying 
prices below costs. The answer to this issue depended ultimately on the depreciation 
method applied. While the Commission had applied a particular amortization method, 
Wanadoo had argued that in its case the discounted cash flow method was more 
appropriate for calculating the rates of recovery.  
The CFI, after first noting that the choice of method of calculation as to the rate of 
recovery of costs entails a complex economic assessment on the part of the Commission, 
thus ‘the Commission must be afforded a broad discretion’ and ‘the Court’s review must therefore be 
limited to verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
appraisal or a misuse of powers’, 338 it then concluded that, to the extent that Wanadoo was 
unable to prove that the Commission’s method was affected by a manifest error, the CFI 
would adhere to the Commission’s findings. In particular, the CFI mentioned that even if 
Wanadoo’s method could be considered more appropriate in some respects, this would not 
be enough to consider the Commission’s method unlawful, nor enough to solicit the CFI 
to substitute its assessment for that of the Commission. The CFI in fact stated that: 
‘[f]inally, as regards WIN’s argument that only the method of discounted cash flows is relevant to 
calculating the rates of recovery in the present case, it should be observed that, even though WIN 
were to prove that the method which it advocates is appropriate in some respects, this would be 
insufficient to prove that the method used by the Commission in the present case is unlawful. It is 
for the applicant to prove that unlawfulness. However, the foregoing assessment has shown that the 
Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in choosing that method. To conclude, 
WIN has not proved that, in using the data recorded in WIN’s accounts and correcting it in 
favour of WIN to take account of the particular context of the market in question, while 
                                                                                                                                 
Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, Liber amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H. MEIJ, Paris Legal 
Publishers, Paris 2011, p. 10. 
337  Commission’s decision of 16 July 2003 relating to a proceeding under Article [82 EC] (Case 
COMP/38.233 − Wanadoo Interactive). 
338 Case T-340/03 France Telecom [2007] ECR II-107, para 129. 
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complying with the requirements for an assessment under Article 82 EC, the Commission applied 
an unlawful test of recovery of costs in the present case. For the sake of completeness, it must be 
held, first, that it is not apparent from the case-law that use of the method of discounted cash flows 
was necessary in the present case, and, secondly, that WIN has not advanced any argument 
establishing that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment in this regard. 
Consequently, the arguments relating to the method of calculating the rate of recovery of costs must 
be rejected’ (emphasis added).339 
It is evident from the CFI’s reasoning that it did not consider the amortization method 
proposed by Wanadoo necessarily ‘inappropriate’ but that it focused its attention on 
verifying whether Wanadoo had proven to the requisite legal standard if the Commission’s 
method had been affected by manifest mistakes and thus could be considered unlawful. 
Given that complex economic assessments were at stake, the CFI refused to substitute its 
own assessment for that of the Commission and was unwilling to challenge the method 
defended by the Commission.340 According to certain authors, the Wanadoo example helps 
to show how different approaches can reasonably be taken which can profoundly change 
the outcome of a case (leading to the imposition of fines), without having the possibility 
that an independent Court overturn the relevant decision.341  
 
3.1.2. The Alrosa judgment: the application of the limited judicial review standard to 
commitments cases 
The 2007 CFI judgment in Alrosa, followed by the ECJ’s 2010 judgment on appeal,  are 
considered landmark rulings for the debate on the scope and standard of judicial review 
that must be applied in competition cases.342 As a preliminary matter, it is important to note 
                                                     
339 Case T-340/03 France Telecom [2007] ECR II-107, paras. 153-156. 
340 France Telecom challenged the CFI’s findings in relation to the assessment of the abuse which, however, 
were confirmed on appeal (Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission [2009] ECR I-02369). As to 
France Telecom’s plea alleging that the Court of First Instance erred in its assessment of the lawfulness of the 
method used by the Commission to calculate the rate of recovery of costs, the ECJ held that ‘by this ground of 
appeal the appellant fails, in fact, to identify any error of law committed by the CFI […] and merely repeats the arguments 
against the methodology adopted by the Commission in the contested decision already put forward at first instance’ (para 72).  
341 See SLATER D. and WAELBROECK D., Marginal Review by the European Court of Justice in Competition Cases, 
in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual 
Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 280. 
342 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601 and on appeal Case C-441/07 P 
Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd [2010] ECR I-5949. See, inter alia, CENGIZ F., Judicial Review and the Rule of 
Law in the EU Competition Law Regime after Alrosa, in European Competition Journal, April 2011, p. 127; and 
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that the discussion on the intensity and scope of judicial review in this case did not concern 
a substantial finding under Article 102 TFEU, but rather a commitment decision under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, in relation to which the Commission does not make a final 
finding of an infringement.343  
As to the facts of the case, in 2006 the Commission adopted a decision under Article 9 
of Regulation 1/2003 accepting the commitments offered by De Beers to resolve the 
Commission’s concerns that, given the company’s allegedly dominant position in the 
worldwide rough diamonds market, by entering into an agreement with its largest 
competitor Alrosa, it would gain control over an important source of rough diamond 
supplies. The commitments offered by De Beers, and made binding by the Commission’s 
decision, required De Beers to stop purchasing altogether diamonds from Alrosa from 
2009 and to phase-out its purchasing orders between 2006-2008.344 Alrosa appealed the 
commitment decision to the CFI claiming, inter alia, that the Commission had failed to 
explain why the commitments originally proposed jointly by De Beers and Alrosa were 
inadequate; that its right to be heard had been violated in the procedure leading to the 
adoption of the decision; that the commitments made binding had been offered only by De 
Beers rather than both Alrosa and De Beers, amounting to a violation of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003. Alrosa also claimed that the absolute prohibition for De Beers to 
purchase rough diamonds from Alrosa infringed Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU), 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 and the principle of proportionality, as a less onerous 
solution could have been found. 
In its judgment, the CFI annulled the decision concluding that the Commission had 
breached the principle of proportionality, which according to the Court applies also when 
commitments are offered voluntarily, and that there were ‘less onerous alternative solutions for 
the undertakings than the total prohibition of transactions and that the Commission could not refuse to 
take them into consideration on the basis of the alleged difficulty in determining them’. 345  The 
                                                                                                                                 
GERARD D., Alrosa, negotiated procedures and the procedural economy/due process conundrum – one step forward, three 
steps back?, in Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 6 July 2010. 
343 The case is also of interest as it is the first time that the Commission’s power to make commitments 
binding under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 has been reviewed by the EU Courts. 
344 See Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/B-2/38.381, De Beers). 
345 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para 154. The CFI also considered 
that the Commission had violated Alrosa’s right to be heard during the proceedings which led to De Beers’ 
commitments being made binding. 
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Commission appealed the ruling in front of the ECJ. The ECJ on 29 June 2010 handed 
down its judgment setting aside the CFI’s judgment.  
What is of particular interest for the debate on the intensity of judicial review is that the 
Commission in front of the ECJ claimed, inter alia, that in determining that the 
commitments were disproportionate, the CFI not only erroneously interpreted and applied 
Article 102 TFEU and Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, but also, in particular, ignored the 
proper scope of judicial review, encroaching on the Commission’s discretion. The ECJ 
agreed with the Commission and set aside the CFI’s judgment. As to the correct standard 
of judicial review, the ECJ held that the CFI had encroached on the Commission’s 
discretion by considering that since the joint commitments that had been proposed by De 
Beers and Alrosa were sufficient to address the competition concerns, the Commission 
should have accepted them. 
According to the ECJ, the Commission had effectively considered the joint 
commitments, but since the results of the market test had been negative, it had concluded 
that they were not sufficient to address the antitrust concerns. In order to ascertain 
whether the CFI really had, as the Commission submitted, infringed the discretion the 
Commission has in connection with accepting commitments, the ECJ first defined the 
extent of that discretion and stated that the Commission is not required to seek out less 
onerous or more moderate solutions than the commitments offered, its only obligation 
being to ascertain whether the joint commitments offered in the proceedings initiated 
under Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) were sufficient to address its concerns. 
Furthermore, according to the ECJ, the CFI ‘could have held that the Commission had committed a 
manifest error of assessment only if it had found that the Commission’s conclusion was obviously unfounded, 
having regard to the facts established by it’.346 However, the CFI had made no such finding and 
had instead ‘examined other less onerous solutions for the purpose of applying the principle of 
proportionality, including possible adjustments of the joint commitments’. 347 Moreover, the CFI had 
‘expressed its own differing assessment of the capability of the joint commitments to eliminate the competition 
problems identified by the Commission, before concluding […] that alternative solutions that were less 
onerous for the undertakings than a complete ban on dealings existed in the present case. By so doing, the 
General Court put forward its own assessment of complex economic circumstances and thus substituted its 
                                                     
346 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para 63 
347 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para 65. 
121 
 
own assessment for that of the Commission, thereby encroaching on the discretion enjoyed by the Commission 
instead of reviewing the lawfulness of its assessment’.348 The ECJ concluded that that error in itself 
justified setting aside the judgment under appeal. 349 
According to certain commentators, the ECJ’s judgment remains ‘a big cause for concern, as 
it leaves a very wide margin of appreciation to the Commission to take decisions applying the commitment 
procedure’.350 Thus, while the Commission is encouraged to use this procedure more often, 
third parties will rarely appeal such decisions in view of the Commission’s margin of 
appreciation. 
 
3.1.3. The Microsoft judgment: a qualitative and quantitative expansion of the application of 
the limited judicial review standard in Article 102 cases 
Another landmark dominance case where the EU Courts referred to the so-called 
manifest error standard in relation to complex economic assessments is the 2007 Microsoft 
case.351  Interestingly, as will be examined further, this judgment also gained visibility in the 
debate on EU standards of judicial review as in this case the EU Courts expanded the area 
of Commission’s assessments which can be subject to the manifest error standard and thus 
benefit from a deferential treatment by the EU judiciary. 
As to the facts of the case, on 24 March 2004 the Commission adopted a decision 
finding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in the market for client PC 
operating systems of which it held 95%. The Commission held that Microsoft had 
breached Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU) by refusing to grant interoperability 
information and by bundling Windows Media Player with the Windows PC operating 
system and had imposed a € 497 million fine. Microsoft appealed this decision to the CFI 
which, on 17 September 2007, essentially rejected Microsoft’s claims.352  
                                                     
348 Case T-170/06 Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, paras. 66-67. 
349 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949. On this point the ECJ followed Advocate 
General Kokott’s opinion (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 17 September 2009 in Case 441/07 P). 
Advocate General Kokott considered that the GC had substituted its own assessment for that of the 
Commission, wrongly violating the margin of assessment enjoyed by the Commission in evaluating the 
market situation in which the commitments offered are embedded. 
350 BARBIER DE LA SERRE E., Competition Law Cases Before the EU Courts, in The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 99. 
351 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
352  The CFI upheld the Commission’s findings of dominance and abuse, however, it held that the 
appointment of the monitoring trustee had been unlawful. See AHLBORN C, D. S. EVANS, The Microsoft 
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On the standard of judicial review, the CFI held that: 
‘[a]lthough as a general rule the Community Courts undertake a comprehensive review of the 
question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition rules are met, 
their review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to 
checking whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, 
whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
assessment or a misuse of powers.353 Likewise, in so far as the Commission’s decision is the result 
of complex technical appraisals, those appraisals are in principle subject to only limited review by 
the Court, which means that the Community Courts cannot substitute their own assessment of 
matters of fact for the Commission’s…However, while the Community Courts recognise that the 
Commission has a margin of appreciation in economic or technical matters, that does not mean 
that they must decline to review the Commission’s interpretation of economic or technical data. The 
Community Courts must not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data 
that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable 
of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.354 
The above statement of the CFI is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. In 
the first place, this judgment is considered, notwithstanding the general language on 
‘limited’ review and ‘manifest error’, a case in which the CFI (and its successor the GC) 
exercised a very exhaustive review.355 For example, as to the finding in the Commission's 
                                                                                                                                 
Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy Towards Dominant Firms in Europe, 2009 75(3) Antitrust Law 
Journal 887. 
353 For an identical formulation, see the previous Case T-65/96 Kish Glass v Commission [2000] ECR II-1885, 
para 64 (upheld on appeal by order of the Court of Justice in Case C-241/00 P Kish Glass v Commission [2001] 
ECR I-7759): ‘the Court of First Instance observes that, according to consistent case-law, although as a general rule the 
Community judicature undertakes a comprehensive review of the question whether or not the conditions for the application of the 
competition rules are met, its review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to verifying 
whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately 
stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers’. 
354 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, paras. 87-89. 
355 According to certain commentators, the EU judges in Microsoft reviewed ‘in excruciating detail the challenged 
Commission decision’; see GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The 
Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences 
Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 67. This view is shared by other 
authors who consider that the impression is that in this case the GC, ‘notwithstanding the general language on 
“limited” review and “manifest error”, in reality exercises a quite exhaustive review’; see WILS P. J. W., The Increased Level of 
EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights, in World Competition, Volume 
33, No. 1, March 2010, p. 31. This view is not shared by all authors as certain believe that the GC had an 
‘almost completely hands-off approach in Microsoft’; see BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 
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decision that Microsoft's refusal to supply interoperability information limited technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers, the Court opens its discussion in para 649 of 
the judgment, and closes it in para 665, by saying that it finds that the Commission's 
findings ‘are not manifestly incorrect’. However, in the fifteen paragraphs in between, the Court 
seems to go beyond a mere check if there was a ‘manifest’ error, and seems rather to 
conduct an exhaustive review to exclude the existence of any error whatsoever in the 
Commission’s assessments. The language used by the CFI in this case also seems to want 
to exclude any finding of an error, as the CFI reiterates in a number of instances that ‘the 
Commission was correct to observe’ (para 650), or that ‘the Commission was correct to consider’ (para 
653), rather than limiting itself to exclude the existence of a manifest mistake. 356  The 
exhaustive review the CFI carried out in this case, even in the presence of complex 
economic or technical assessments by the Commission, leads also to consider that EU 
judges are perfectly capable of carrying out a comprehensive review of all assessments 
made by the Commission.357 
In the second place, the judgment is of interest as it transposes to Article 102 TFEU 
cases the standard of review test developed by the EU Courts in merger cases. As will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 3, dedicated to the analysis of the intensity of judicial 
review of merger decisions, in the Tetra Laval case,358 the CFI developed a particular test 
that the EU Courts must apply in order to ensure that their review is sufficiently exhaustive 
even in the presence of economically complex matters. In the Tetra Laval case, the CFI 
stated that, although the Commission has a margin of appreciation in economic matters, 
this does not mean that the Courts must decline to review the Commission’s interpretation 
                                                                                                                                 
102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC 
Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 116. 
356 Shortly after, in 2008, the CFI rendered its judgment in the Deutsche Telekom case, considered an example 
of case where the CFI did not second-guess the Commission's complex economic assessment and findings 
(Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2008] ECR II-477). Here the CFI found that the 
Commission’s calculation method of the margin squeeze implemented by Deutsche Telekom, i.e., based on 
the charges and costs of a vertically integrated dominant undertaking and disregarding the particular situation 
of competitors on the market, was correct (on appeal, Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission 
[2010] I-9555). See contra AZIZI who considers that rather than not second-guessing the Commission’s 
assessment, the CFI’s approach was that of examining ‘accurately the legality of the methodology of the margin squeeze 
test used by the Commission’; AZIZI J., The Limits of Judicial Review concerning Abuses of a Dominant Position: Principles 
and Specific Application to the Communications Technology Sector, in Today's Multi-layered Legal Order: Current 
Issues and Perspectives, Liber amicorum in honour of Arjen W.H. MEIJ, Paris Legal Publishers, Paris 2011, 
p. 13. 
357 For a more in-depth discussion on this point see also subsection 2.2. in Section II of Chapter 1. 
358 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
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of economic data. The Courts must in fact establish whether the evidence relied on is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent, and whether the evidence contains all the 
relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. As can be seen from 
the paragraph of the Microsoft judgment cited above, the CFI in Microsoft restated the same 
test established in Tetra Laval. This can be viewed as an effort by the EU Courts to apply 
horizontally the same test for the standard of review across all matters falling within the 
umbrella of EU competition law.359 
Finally, the Microsoft case is also of interest as in this judgment the CFI extended the 
application by the Commission of the manifest error standard from ‘complex economic 
appraisals’ to ‘complex technical appraisals’. The introduction of the reference to complex 
‘technical’ appraisals as a limiting factor to the EU judges’ judicial review is novel in 
competition case law and has been the object of intense criticism by those authors who 
believe that this illegitimately expands the area of Commission assessments which benefit 
from a form of judicial immunity. 360 As explained more in detail in subsection 2.3 in 
Section I of Chapter 1, the definition of the notion of ‘complex economic assessment’ is 
crucial in order to understand which assessments fall within this concept, and are thus 
subject to less intense review.  
The same considerations apply to the notion of ‘complex technical appraisals’, with all 
the difficulties, controversies and criticism that may arise when deciding, particularly in the 
field of competition law, naturally characterized by complex and technical assessments, 
when an appraisal is sufficiently technical and complex to fall or not within this notion. 
The CFI’s intervention in Microsoft to capture also complex technical assessments under the 
manifest error standard has not been isolated in the antitrust case law. As examined further 
                                                     
359 See MEIJ A., In Search of a Manifest Error: Dutch Complexities Between Certainties of the Law and Uncertainties of 
Economics?, in European State Aid Law Quarterly, 2012, Vol. 2, pp. 547: ‘[it is] particularly clear that judicial review 
of legality in the whole range of EU competition law, including merger review and State aid, follows basically one single standard’. 
360 The CFI supported its statement concerning complex technical assessments by referring to case law on 
complex assessments in the medico-pharmacological field. See, inter alia, FORRESTER S., A Bush in Need of 
Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 24: ‘[t]he Court’s 
enunciation of a different standard of review in paragraph 88 [for complex technical appraisals] is striking. The Court’s 
reference to cases “in the medico-pharmacological sphere” to present this new standard applicable to “complex technical 
appraisals” seems unfortunate. In any competition case, the Commission is not assisted by a special agency entrusted with 
elucidating scientific controversies and making recommendations for action. I respectfully submit that the Court should have 
determined the standard of review applicable to the Commission as a competition authority, which makes independent 
determinations and reaching conclusions based thereon’. 
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below, in the AstraZeneca judgment the CFI applied the same test and formula. However, 
the further reduction of the area where EU Courts exercise comprehensive review and the 
consequential expansion of the Commission’s area of discretion have been criticised, in 
particular by the President of the GC Mr. Jaeger who in 2011 published an article 
advocating for clarification of which assessments are to be analysed by the Courts under 
the manifest error standard, and recommends the application of the manifest error test only 
to the Commission’s economic policy choices.361 
 
3.1.4. The AstraZeneca judgment: the consolidation of the limited judicial review standard 
developed in Microsoft 
The 2010 AstraZeneca judgment is equally interesting for the present discussion as the 
GC applied the same standard of review test formulated in the Microsoft judgment but, 
notwithstanding the recognition of a certain deference to the Commission’s complex 
economic and technical appraisals, is considered to have engaged in an in-depth review of 
the authority’s findings.362  
As to the facts of the case, in June 2005 the Commission adopted a decision finding that 
AstraZeneca had abused its dominant position in the market for proton pump inhibitors 
between 1993 and 2000 by blocking or delaying market access for generic versions of its 
medicinal product Losec and by preventing parallel imports of this product.363 In particular, 
AstraZeneca had abused its dominant position by making misrepresentations to national 
patent offices with a view to obtaining supplementary patent protection for Losec and by 
misusing rules and procedures applied to obtain market authorisations for medicinal 
products with the intent to block the entry of generic products or parallel imports. The 
Commission had thus fined AstraZeneca € 60 million for breach of Article 82 EC (now 
102 TFEU). AstraZeneca had appealed to the GC seeking the decision’s annulment.  
                                                     
361 JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011. 
For a further discussion on Mr. Jaeger’s position see supra subsection 2.3 in Section I of Chapter 1. 
362 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2010] II-2805. See BAILEY D., Standard of 
Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) 
Bruylant, 2010, pp. 114-115. The ECJ on 6 December 2012 dismissed the appeal by AstraZeneca against the 
GC’s judgment. In its judgment, the ECJ made no reference to the manifest error test; see Case C-457/10 P, 
AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission, not yet reported. 
363 Commission Decision C(2005) 1757 final of 15 June 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 [EC] 
and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3 – AstraZeneca). 
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The GC, in the sections of the judgment dedicated to the discussion of market 
definition and dominance, reiterated the ‘manifest error’ language. As the CFI had already 
done in Microsoft, it applied the manifest error test not only to ‘complex economic 
appraisals’ but also to ‘complex technical appraisals’, thus seeming to consolidate the 
Court’s trend in this sense. Furthermore, the GC specified, as previously done in Tetra 
Laval and Microsoft, that the recognition of a margin of discretion to the Commission does 
not mean that the Court will renounce to review the Commission’s interpretation of 
economic or technical data, as it will ‘not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the relevant data 
that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.364   
Furthermore, the judgment is considered by a number of authors an example of how 
the GC, notwithstanding the language it uses to describe its ‘limited’ review powers, may 
engage in an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s assessments, arriving to ‘examine, 
painstakingly at times, the soundness of the Commission’s conclusions’.365 By way of example, the GC 
upheld the Commission’s findings on market definition but only after an in-depth 
consideration of the Commission’s Notice on Market Definition,366 of an economic study 
and various statements of experts. It also expressed criticism to the Commission for not 
having investigated sufficiently the pricing mechanisms in certain Member States, although 
this omission was not sufficient to undermine the Commission’s conclusions.367 In addition, 
the GC considered that the Commission did not commit any manifest error of assessment 
in its findings on dominance and thus upheld the Commission’s conclusions in this regard. 
As to the abuse in itself, the GC upheld almost all of the Commission’s findings but 
established that the Commission had failed to demonstrate that the deregistration of the 
Losec marketing authorisations was capable of restricting parallel imports in Denmark and 
Norway. The GC therefore reduced the fine from € 60 million to € 52.5 million.  
                                                     
364 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2010] II-2805, para 33. 
365 BAILEY D., Standard of Judicial Review under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, in The Role of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA 
M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 115. According to Bailey, in the AstraZeneca judgment this could be 
explained by the novelty of the matters under examination in front of the GC and their future implications 
for the pharmaceutical sector. 
366 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C 372/5. 
367 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v Commission [2010] II-2805, paras. 196-199. 
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3.2. The recent case-law of the EU Courts on the standard of review in Article 
102 TFEU cases 
From an overview of the more recent case law in Article 102 TFEU cases, it is possible 
to argue that the existence of the limited review standard and the manner it continues to be 
exercised, notwithstanding the ECJ’s statements in the Article 101 cases KME and Chalkor, 
continues to be unsatisfactory for parties wishing to bring forward a different interpretation 
of the facts and evidence put forward by the Commission to substantiate its case. In the 
KME and Chalkor cases the ECJ expressly indicated that the EU Courts cannot dispense 
from an in-depth review, while contemporarily recognizing that the Commission can 
maintain discretion for certain types of assessments (economically and/or technically 
complex). The ECJ’s call for more thorough review by the Courts was certainly welcomed, 
although there was much expectation in the aftermath of these judgments as to how judges 
would have followed the ECJ’s indications, also in the Article 102 domain. The judgments 
rendered thereinafter confirm that the continued existence of the Commission’s discretion 
entails that EU Courts can only decide on the plausibility of the legal conclusions reached 
by the Commission on the basis of the underlying facts of each case.368 The circumstance 
that EU judges will not substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission also 
entails that they will not carry out a new balance of probabilities between the different 
interpretations of facts brought forward respectively by the Commission and the applicants. 
The consequence of this for interested parties is that, in the absence of a manifest error 
in the conclusions reached by the Commission, they are not able to constructively bring 
forward alternative proposals on the interpretation of the evidence. Any effort in this sense 
is frustrated by the judges’ impossibility to balance different theories capable of explaining 
the evidence, given that the Commission’s assessment continues to benefit from a 
presumption of correctness and thus to prevail. The 2012 Telefonica judgment, examined 
below, exemplifies the role that the Commission’s margin of discretion continues to have 
for the assessment of alleged abuses of dominance and the effects of this situation on the 
positive or negative outcome of cases.  
 
                                                     
368 GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts?, in ELR, Vol. 36(4), p. 
469. 
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3.2.1. The 2012 Telefonica judgment  
On 29 March 2012, the GC dismissed the appeal by Telefónica SA and Telefónica de 
España SAU (Telefonica) against the Commission’s 2007 decision finding that Telefonica 
had engaged in a margin squeeze in breach of Article 102 TFEU.369 The GC upheld the 
Commission’s analysis in its entirety, including its market definition, assessment of 
dominance, approach to demonstrating that there was a margin squeeze (the ‘as-efficient’ 
competitor test) and the penalty imposed on the applicant. 
One particular aspect of Telefonica’s pleas is worth mentioning for the present debate, 
as it concerns specifically the extent of the GC’s review of complex economic appraisals 
made by the Commission. 370  As to the impact of the alleged abusive conduct on the 
relevant markets, Telefonica argued, inter alia, that the Commission had committed major 
errors of calculation and omission in applying the ‘Discounted Cash Flow’ (“DCF”) test 
and the ‘period-by-period’ test. In particular, Telefonica argued before the GC that the 
DCF methodology used by the Commission suffered from two fundamental types of 
errors. On the one hand, the method of calculating the terminal value used by the 
Commission was wrong and, secondly, the Commission should have used a terminal value 
based on market data.371 Telefonica’s plea in this regard was meant to demonstrate that if 
that methodology had been applied correctly, the Commission could not have established 
any margin squeeze.  
The GC rejected Telefonica’s arguments on the Commission’s alleged error in the 
method of calculating the terminal value on the basis that: (i) the extension of the reference 
period increases the risk of errors by incorporating in the analysis rewards for 
                                                     
369 Case T-336/07 Telefónica, SA and Telefónica de España, SA v Commission, not yet reported, and Commission 
Decision C (2007)3196 final of 4 July 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 [EC] (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
370 The judgment contains also general statements on the content, scope and intensity of judicial review that 
reflect those used in the KME and Chalkor cases; see paras. 67-71. 
371 In a DCF analysis, a terminal value is calculated in order to reflect the fact that there are key assets that will 
continue to be used beyond the end of the reference period. Thus, it may be necessary to take account of a 
terminal value in the analysis since certain costs are not fully covered during the reference period. In the 
Commission’s view, both the appropriate terminal value to be included in the DCF calculation and the 
appropriate reference period are intended to determine a final date after which the recovery of losses is no 
longer taken into account in the analysis. Since the DCF method allows for initial short-term losses, but 
provides for their recovery over a reasonable period, the Commission was required to determine the 
appropriate period of recovery in the present case. In that regard, the Commission considered that the most 
reasonable approach was to limit the period of analysis to the economic lifetime of the assets employed by 
the undertaking concerned. At recital 359 to the contested decision, the Commission considered that in 
Telefonica’s case the appropriate period for the DCF analysis was the period between September 2001 and 
December 2006 (five years and four months); see Telefonica judgment, paras. 214-215. 
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anticompetitive behavior; (ii ) the duration of the analysis is not arbitrarily set, as explained 
in the decision; (iii) even assuming that the methodology used by the Commission was not 
the most favorable to Telefonica, this did not imply the unlawfulness of the decision, and 
(iv) using a terminal value which incorporates all future profits of the company would not 
be reasonable or appropriate. Furthermore, the GC considered that Telefonica did not 
sufficiently explain how the application of a correct valuation methodology could have 
shown that an equally efficient competitor would have been profitable. 
As to the GC’s position that the extension of the reference period in the DCF analysis 
would have led to unacceptable distortions, it is interesting to note how the Court often 
made reference to the ‘limited’ standard test and thus to the absence of any ‘manifest error’ 
on the side of the Commission, i.e. ‘[t]he Commission did not make a manifest error of assessment 
when it considered that the dominant undertaking’s downstream activity must be profitable over a period 
corresponding to the lifetime of its assets’ (para 220) and ‘did not make a manifest error of assessment in 
considering that the losses detected over the period […] could not be regarded as being attributable to the 
lack of maturity of the Spanish broadband market’ (para 223).  
What was interesting in Telefonica’s claims concerning the correct reference period for 
the DCF calculations is that it did not so much contest that the Commission had not 
sufficiently motivated its choice of the reference period, but rather that more reliable 
methodologies existed and could be used to properly treat the uncertainties in the 
evaluation exercise.  
By applying the ‘limited’ judicial review standard, the GC’s position was that of verifying 
whether the Commission’s conclusions had been explained and were reasonable (‘not 
manifestly incorrect’) rather than weighting the methodology used by the Commission 
against that proposed by Telefonica, in order to finally decide which was more reliable.372 
Here the GC was confronted with two different methodologies when assessing the 
existence of a violation. The impression is that the GC gave preference to the 
                                                     
372 See Telefonica judgment, para 225: ‘[i]t should be observed in that regard that the applicants do not specify in their written 
pleadings the reasons why their argument, even if it were well founded, would render the contested decision unlawful. First, even on 
the assumption that, as the applicants maintain, the methodology adopted by the Commission were not more favourable to 
Telefónica than the methodology which it used in its initial business plan or that the methodologies in question were not similar, it 
would not follow that the findings relating to terminal value, set out in particular at recitals 360 to 362 to the contested decision, 
and to the determination of the terminal value in the context of the calculation of the DCFs, would be incorrect. Second, it must 
be observed that Telefónica’s business plans were mentioned at recital 367 to the contested decision for the purpose of 
demonstrating that, contrary to Telefónica’s contention, the Commission’s calculation of the terminal value was not unprecedented. 
Even on the assumption that such a finding were incorrect, that would not render the calculation of the terminal value in the 
contested decision unlawful.’ 
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Commission’s choice without too much consideration for the mechanisms suggested by 
Telefonica to eliminate the hypothetical distortions that the use of the Commission’s 
mechanism could have raised.  
In addition, concerning the calculation of the terminal value, in a very concise statement 
in its judgment the GC dismissed Telefonica’s assertion that ‘the application of a correct 
evaluation method, based on market data, to calculate the terminal value would have shown that the activity 
of a possible competitor as efficient as Telefónica would have been profitable’, on the basis that ‘such an 
argument is neither explained nor developed in the written pleadings, where the applicants make a general 
reference to 10 pages of an economic study attached as an annex’.373 Here, Telefonica’s effort was to 
show that its mathematical calculations were able to prove that once the Commission’s 
errors in the DCF analysis were corrected, this would have resulted in a positive margin, 
thus the absence of a margin squeeze. However, the GC dismissed this argument stating 
that Telefonica had not explained or developed such claim in its pleadings, making instead 
a general reference to ten pages of an annexed economic study.  
Regardless of whether the GC gave correctly account of Telefonica’s claim, it is quite 
evident that the applicant’s intent was to demonstrate that its valuation method based on 
market figures to calculate the terminal value would have led to a higher terminal value 
than that calculated by the Commission, thus proving that a hypothetical equally efficient 
competitor would have been profitable with no evidence of margin squeeze. These 
estimates were developed in an Annex to which Telefonica made specific reference to and 
which the GC decided to not consider for its assessment. It is hard to foresee if the 
outcome of the case would have been different if the GC had taken Telefonica’s different 
methodology into account, it is however at the least remarkable that the GC decided to not 
address the issue tout court, leaving the Commission’s methodology standing, even if 
potentially far from being flawless.374 
                                                     
373 See Telefonica judgment, para 231. 
374 The GC judgment was appealed by Telefonica on 13 June 2012 and is currently pending in front of the 
ECJ; see Case C-295/12 P Telefónica S.A. and Telefónica de España, S.A.U. v Commission, not yet reported. On 26 
September 2013, Advocate General Wathelet delivered his Opinion in the above mentioned case. In sum, the 
Advocate General recommended that the ECJ reject the arguments presented by Telefonica against the 
criteria applied by the Commission to calculate the margin squeeze. According to the Advocate General these 
arguments reproduced the arguments set out in the application at first instance before the GC and were 
inadmissible since they essentially challenged findings of fact in the judgment of the GC (paras. 10-21 of the 
Opinion). Interestingly, in particular for the different debate on the exercise of the EU Courts’ unlimited 
jurisdiction in relation to fines, the Advocate General did delve at length on the applicants’ arguments relating 
to the calculation of the fine and concerning essentially the GC’s shortcomings in the exercise its unlimited 
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jurisdiction in relation to pecuniary penalties. In this regard, the Advocate General recommended that the 
ECJ annul the GC judgment on the ground that the GC did not exercise its powers of full judicial review in 
the framework of its examination of the fine imposed by the Commission (paras. 90-172 of the Opinion). 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PARTICULARITIES OF EU MERGER CONTROL 
 
As examined in the previous Chapters, the current system of judicial control of 
competition decisions continues to be the subject-matter of intense debate. Although the 
terms and scope of this debate are manifold, one of the most contentious aspects of the 
controversy relates to the application by the EU Courts of the so-called ‘limited’ judicial 
review standard in relation to complex economic and/or technical appraisals carried out by 
the Commission in a context where it increasingly relies on economic analysis to 
substantiate its decisions. In Chapter 2 the case law concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
relevant to this discussion has been analyzed. In this Chapter the intensity of the EU 
Courts’ review in the field of merger control will be addressed. The analysis will focus on 
the standard of judicial review regarding complex economic and/or technical assessments 
in EU merger control cases.375 
                                                     
375 See, inter alia, in the field of merger control: LEVY N., European Merger Control Law: A Guide to the Merger 
Regulation, 9th ed., Matthew Bender & Co, 2012; JACKSON D., A Return to Simplicity? A History of Developments 
in the Economic Analysis of Mergers, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 
170-175; VENIT J. S., The Scope of EU Judicial Review of Commission Merger Decisions, 15th Annual EU 
Competition Law and Policy Workshop – Merger Control in European and Global Perspective, Florence, 
Italy, 12-13 November 2010; VESTERDORF B., Chapter 13: The European Court’s Case Law in Merger Control, in 
Competition Law and Economics (edited by A. M. Mateus and T. Moreira), International Competition Law Series 
Volume 31, Kluwer Law International, 2007, pp. 243-254; CHELLINGSWORTH T., DRAUZ G., 
HYRKAS H., Recent Developments in EC Merger Control, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 
2010, No. 1, pp. 12-26; KINSELLA S., MEIER A., HARRISON P., Judicial review of merger decisions: An overview 
of EU and national case law, in e-Competitions, 2009, No. 29156; WERDEN G. J., Economic reasoning in merger 
cases and how courts should evaluate it, in European Competition Journal, 2009, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 701-720; PARR. 
N., Observations on Burden and Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in EC and UK Merger Control, Fordham Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 2008; VAN ROMPUY B., The Standard of Proof in EC 
Merger Control, Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), IES Working Paper 4/2008; 
TODOROV F., VALCKE A., Judicial review of merger control decisions in the European Union, in The Antitrust 
Bulletin: Vol. 51, No. 2/Summer 2006, p. 339; OLSSON K., The Standard of Proof in EC Merger Control – The 
Impact of Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval, Master Thesis, Faculty of Law of Lund, 2006; THEOPHILE D., 
PARMENTIER H., L’étendue du contrôle juridictionnel dans le contentieux du contrôle des concentrations en droits interne et 
communautaire, in Concurrences, No. 1, 2006, pp. 39-46; REEVES T., DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and 
Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, 14th Annual IBC Conference on “An Advanced analysis of Major 
Developments in the field of EC Competition Law and Policy”, Brussels, 17-18 November 2005; 
VESTERDORF B., Standards of Proof In Merger Cases: Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law of The Community 
Courts, in European Competition Journal, March 2005, pp. 3–33; NICHOLSON M., CARDELL S., 
MCKENNA B., The Scope of Review of Merger Decisions under Community Law, in European Competition Journal, 
March 2005; VESTERDORF B., Recent CFI Rulings on Merger Cases, Interim Measures and Accelerated Procedures 
and Some Reflections on Reform Measures Regarding Judicial Control, EC Merger Control, in EC Merger Control: A 
Major Reform in Progress, Papers from the EC Merger Control Conference held in Brussels in November 
2002 under the auspices of the European Commission Directorate General for Competition and the 
International Bar Association, pp. 79-84; BAILEY D., Standard of Proof in EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law 
Perspective, in in CMLR, Vol. 40, 2003.  
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The need to operate a distinct analysis for merger decisions derives from the 
characteristics of these proceedings which leads to differentiate them from antitrust cases. 
In the first place, antitrust and merger cases have a different legal basis, the former finding 
express provision in the Treaties in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the latter in the EU 
Merger Regulation.376 More importantly, in merger proceedings the Commission is called 
upon to decide whether to prohibit or clear a merger operation, not to declare if a 
company’s conduct is illegal for an infringement of the competition rules as in antitrust 
cases, and in general fines are not imposed.377 In this regard, the nature of the review 
carried out differs. In Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases the Commission is called upon to 
conduct an ex post review. The Commission’s investigation focuses on infringements of 
these provisions for conduct carried out in the past and which, in certain cases, may still be 
ongoing. This reflects on the nature of the process which involves a great amount of fact-
finding and, to the extent economic theories are relied upon, they are used to interpret 
conduct for which evidence already exists. Merger investigations, on the other hand, are 
forward-looking and carried out ex ante, before any anti-competitive conduct has yet 
occurred. 378 This entails that investigations involve future projections and estimates on 
market evolutions and company behavior.379 Here economic theory and modeling have a 
                                                     
376 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ [1989] L395/1) was substituted by the EU Merger Regulation. According to Article 21(2) of 
the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission has the exclusive power to take decisions on the control of 
concentrations. The Commission’s decisions, under the same provision, are subject to review by the EU 
Courts. The basic rules on merger control are contained in the EU Merger Regulation which establishes that 
concentrations with EU dimension must be notified to the Commission, as they cannot be put into effect 
either before their notification or until they have been cleared by the Commission. See also Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (the “Implementing 
Regulation”) and its annexes (Form CO, Short Form CO and Form RS), in OJ [2004] L 133/1; and the new 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 
802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, in OJ [2013] L 336/1. 
377 The Commission can ensure compliance with the EU Merger Regulation also by means of fines and 
periodic penalty payments which the EU Courts have unlimited jurisdiction to review pursuant to Article 229 
TFEU; see Articles 14 and 15 of the EU Merger Regulation. 
378 WAELBROECK D., Le contrôle du juge communautaire en matière de concentrations: «Censeur pédagogue» ou juge de la 
légalité?, in Concurrences, No. 4, 2005, p. 1. 
379 See PARR. N., Observations on Burden and Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in EC and UK Merger Control, 
Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 2008, p. 12: ‘merger control analysis […] 
is not simply an exercise of demonstrating the existence of a particular factual matrix to a particular standard of proof but is, in 
fact, primarily an exercise of judgment and evaluation based on an initial fact-finding or investigation exercise’. See also VENIT 
J. S., Human All Too Human: The Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate Standard of Proof and 
Judicial Review in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82, European University Institute, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 
2009, p. 6: ‘merger review presents very different issues from enforcement cases, particularly enforcement cases under Article 81. 
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predominant role, as they will aid in foreseeing what will be the likely outcome of a merger 
operation. The application of economic theories to perspective analysis can be particularly 
controversial, given the difficulties and uncertainties that accompany this exercise. As the 
outcome of these proceedings may in any event be particularly serious for the undertakings 
concerned, as the case for antitrust cases, the debate on the standard of review in the 
merger field is not less important. 
In the merger field, the standard of review used by the EU Courts has also evolved in a 
way which deserves autonomous analysis, ranging from the early cases in which the EU 
Courts had a more ‘hands-off’ approach and were particularly respectful of the 
Commission’s margin of appreciation in the case of complex economic and/or technical 
appraisals, to the ‘merger revolution’ that occurred in 2002, year in which the EU Courts 
annulled 3 distinct merger prohibition decisions and started to scrutinize intensely the 
Commission’s assessments, leading to the more recent cases in which the EU Courts have 
consolidated their more dynamic approach to the review of merger decisions. For these 
reasons, the analysis of the relevant case law in the following subsections will be broken 
down in these three phases. 
As will be seen, the first lesson that can be derived from the case law is that the lack of 
guidelines on the application of the limited standard of review has given the EU Courts the 
opportunity to clarify the degree of review that they should undertake. In this on-going 
work of interpretation, the EU Courts have progressively proven their willingness to 
scrutinize the Commission’s findings, thereby confirming the importance of a close review 
of the latter’s acts. The second lesson that can be derived is that, although ‘limited’ review 
with respect to complex economic appraisals and the definition of it seemed firmly fixed in 
case law, a change in definition occurred clearly with the Tetra Laval judgment 380  and 
subsequent case law, endorsing the view that the standard of review is a product of 
interpretation of the EU Courts which has evolved over time and could be modified by the 
EU Courts themselves. Another lesson that can be derived from various judgments, 
including, among other cases, Airtours, 381  Tetra Laval, 382  Schneider Electric, 383  Sony/BMG 
                                                                                                                                 
In merger cases, the primary concerns are: (i) establishing the economic significance of certain facts rather than merely establishing 
the facts themselves; and (ii) predicting the likely future impact of the structural change the merger would bring about’. 
380 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. 
381 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585. 
382 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. 
383 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071. 
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(Impala)384 and Ryanair,385 examined in the following subsections, is that complex merger 
decisions involving in-depth economic analysis could be assessed by the EU Courts, both 
when the Commission has blocked or cleared a merger,386 as the EU Courts have shown 
their ability to adequately engage in particularly intense judicial scrutiny of complex cases. 
In this regard, from a comparative perspective, it has also been argued that, in light of the 
case law, the EU Courts are more prepared to carry out a comprehensive review of the 
economic analysis carried out by the Commission in merger cases than in antitrust cases.387 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that under the ‘limited’ judicial review standard 
the EU Courts have been able to shield, also in the merger field, the Commission’s 
decisions from comprehensive review which, if it had effectively taken place, could have 
allegedly led to different conclusions and outcomes than those reached by the 
Commission.388 All of the above points will be addressed in the following examination of 
the case law. 
 
                                                     
384 Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and Labels 
Association [2008] ECR I-4951. 
385 Case T-342/07 Ryanair Holdings plc v Commission [2010] ECR II-3457. 
386  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 28. 
387  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 28.  
388 The Commission’s Summary of Replies received to the Commission’s Green Paper on the reform of the 
EU Merger Regulation expressed the concern of respondents who felt that ‘the availability of effective judicial 
review is illusory, on account of the lengthy delays before appeals can be heard and judgments rendered, as well as because of the 
existence of what is perceived by some to be inadequate standard of review’; see Green Paper on the Review of Council 
Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 – Summary of Replies Received, para 192, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2002_council_regulation/summary_publication_en.pdf. 
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2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN MERGER CASES  
 
2.1. The early case law and the EU Courts’ ‘light’ approach 
It is apparent from the first cases decided by the Court of Justice in the merger control 
field that in the early years of application of the EU Merger Regulation the tendency was to 
recognize that the Commission benefited from a discretionary margin of appreciation.389 In 
these early cases, the Courts’ role was mainly that of guiding the Commission in the 
interpretation of new legal concepts contained in the EU Merger Regulation, while leaving 
to the Commission the task of making substantial appraisals.390 The EU Courts’ practice 
was that of acknowledging the existence of a margin of discretion of the Commission over 
economic assessments conducted under the Merger Regulation391 and would state in this 
connection that ‘[it was] not for the Court…to substitute its own appraisal for that of the 
Commission’. 392  The extent to which EU judges gave leeway to the Commission’s 
assessments was such that EU judges would rarely proceed to an appreciation and 
evaluation of economically complex situations, leaving the Commission free to decide the 
substance of cases. This has led to consider that for a long time the intensity of judicial 
control remained very ‘light’. The nearly absolute deference granted by the EU Courts to 
the Commission’s analysis in the early case law is demonstrated by a number of judgments, 
including the rulings examined in the following subsections. 
 
                                                     
389  See TODOROV F., VALCKE A., Judicial review of merger control decisions in the European Union, in The 
Antitrust Bulletin: Vol. 51, No. 2/Summer 2006, p. 339: ‘[f]or a long time it has been commonly perceived that the 
decisions of the European Commission…appraising mergers have, for many reasons, not been fully subjected to substantive 
judicial review […] the CFI was also considered to have granted a significant level of discretion – some would say too much – to 
the Commission over its application of economic analysis in merger decisions’; see also VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la 
concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue des affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, 
p. 436; and BROWN A., Judicial Review of Commission Decisions under the Merger Regulation: the First Cases, in 
ECLR, 1994, No. 6, p. 296. 
390 CHAPPATTE P., BOYCE J., REEVE M., Annulment Proceedings in EU Merger Cases? Worth the Effort?, in 
The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual 
Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.), Bruylant, 2010, p. 194. 
391 See Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic and Société commerciale des potasses et de l’azote (SCPA) 
and Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission (“Kali und Salz”) [1998] ECR I-1375, paras. 223-224; and 
Case T-221/95 Endemol Entertainment Holding B.V. v Commission (“Endemol”) [1999] ECR II-1299, para 106. 
392 Case T-3/93 Air France v Commission (“Dan Air”) [1994] ECR II-121, para 8. 
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2.1.1. The Kali und Salz judgment: the recognition of the Commission’s discretionary margin of 
appreciation in the merger field 
In Kali und Salz, the ECJ annulled a Commission decision authorizing the merger 
between Kali und Salz (K&S) and Mitteldeutsche Kali AG (MdK) and Treuhand subject to 
certain conditions.393 In its decision the Commission had approved the merger between 
K&S and Mdk, two German potash producers, subject to the condition that K&S 
withdraw from the joint venture with the French potash producer SCPA. The ECJ held 
that the Commission had not shown to the requisite legal standard that the merger would 
create a collective dominant position between K&S and SCPA, which had been the basis of 
the Commission’s requirement that K&S withdraw from the joint venture with SCPA.394  
Notwithstanding the annulment of the Commission’s decision, as to the definition of 
the EU Courts’ powers of review, the ECJ recognized the existence of a discretionary 
margin implicit in economic evaluations conducted under the EU Merger Regulation by 
stating that: 
‘the basic provisions of the [Merger] Regulation, in particular Article 2 thereof, confer on the 
Commission a certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature. 
Consequently, review by the Community judicature of the exercise of that discretion, which is 
essential for defining the rules on concentrations, must take account of the discretionary margin 
implicit in the provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations’.395   
Advocate General Tesauro in his Opinion in this case had framed the Commissions’ 
discretionary powers in even stricter terms, observing that the Commission’s discretion is 
‘all the more valid with regard to concentrations, the control of which, being necessarily preventative in 
character, requires an inherently discretionary appraisal on the part of the authority whose task it is to 
interpret and apply the Regulation’;396 and that the Court’s review, from the point of view of 
substantive legality, ‘takes the form of scrutiny of the accuracy of the [Commission’s] economic and 
market analysis, of the anticompetitive effects and the correctness of the legal consequences (from the point of 
                                                     
393 Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Société commerciale des potasses et de l'azote (SCPA) and Entreprise 
minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375. 
394 Interestingly, the appeal was not brought by the merging parties but by the French Republic and SCPA, 
the latter considering its commercial position threatened by the Commission’s requirement. 
395 Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Société commerciale des potasses et de l'azote (SCPA) and Entreprise 
minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, paras. 223-224. 
396 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic and Société 
commerciale des potasses et de l’azote (SCPA) and Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission (“Kali und Salz”), 
[1998] ECR I-1375, para 21. 
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view of the characterization of the facts, for example) drawn from the analysis, without, of course, 
encroaching in the scope of the discretion which the Commission enjoys in the application of the rules on 
competition’.397   
It is contended however that from a careful reading of the EU Merger Regulation it 
would emerge that its provisions left only a very limited margin of discretion to the 
Commission,398 and that this extensive interpretation in favor of the Commission’s powers 
operated by the ECJ, would demonstrate the EU judges’ determination to limit the 
effectiveness of their control, by using the argument of the economic nature of the rules 
applied in the field of merger control.399 Essentially, the EU Courts would limit themselves 
to verifying whether the facts were exact and the absence of any manifest errors of 
appreciation, in order to allow the Commission to pursue its competition policy.400 This 
self-imposed limitation on the side of the EU Courts has led certain commentators to 
consider that ‘il est possible de remarquer une tendance du Tribunal à protéger la competence de la 
Commission’.401 The belief is that at the time EU judges were not ready to delve in detailed 
economic analysis and to effectively contest the substantive evaluations made by the 
Commission. 
 
2.1.2. The Gencor judgment: the continued ‘light’ approach to judicial review in merger cases 
The Gencor ruling is a further demonstration of how in early judgments, in cases 
demanding complex economic appreciations, the Courts’ control over the Commission’s 
                                                     
397 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 French Republic and Société 
commerciale des potasses et de l’azote (SCPA) and Entreprise minière et chimique (EMC) v Commission (“Kali und Salz”), 
[1998] ECR I-1375, footnote 33. 
398  According to Article 2(2) of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission has to declare a merger 
compatible with the internal market if it does not create or strengthen a dominant position, while in the 
opposite case, on the basis of Article 2(3), the Commission can prohibit the operation. This criteria do not 
leave the Commission a margin of appreciation. Traces of a discretionary margin of appreciation could only 
and eventually be found for the demonstration of the existence or not of a dominant position; see 
VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue des 
affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 436. 
399 VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue des 
affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 436. 
400 TILLI V., VANHAMME J., The “Power of Appraisal” (Pouvoir d’Appréciation) of the Commission of the European 
Communities vis-à-vis the powers of judicial review of the communities’ Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, in 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1999, p. 890. 
401 FAURÉ V., L’apport du Tribunal au droit communautaire de la concurrence des entreprises, Thèse Université de Nice 
Sophia Antipolis, 2003, p. 485. See also SZCZODROWSKI J., Standard of Judicial Review of Merger Decisions 
Concerning Oligopolistic Markets, Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2012, Vol. 5(6). 
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appraisals was of limited intensity. 402  This case concerned the companies Gencor Ltd 
(“Gencor”) and Lonrho plc (“Lonrho”) active in the mineral resources and metal industries. 
Gencor held 46.5% of the company Implats, active in the platinum group metals (“PGM”) 
sector, and 27% of East Plats and West Plats (LPD), also active in the same sector; while 
Lonrho held the remaining 73% of LPD. In the notified transaction, Gencor and Lonhro 
proposed to acquire joint control of Implats and then to grant Implats sole control of LPD, 
thereby eliminating competition between those two undertakings. Consequently, the EU 
market would have no longer been supplied by three African PGM suppliers but only by 
two. In its decision the Commission declared the operation incompatible with the internal 
market on the basis that it would have led to a collective dominant position on the part of 
the new entity and the remaining competitor on the market. 403  Gencor appealed the 
Commission’s decision which was upheld by the CFI. 
The Gencor judgment illustrates the deference granted by the CFI to the Commission 
despite the strong arguments put forward by the applicant in the context of the 
categorization of a collective dominant position. In this regard, certain of Gencor’s 
arguments are noteworthy. In the first place, Gencor contended, inter alia, that the 
Commission was wrong in considering that the merged entity and Amplats, the remaining 
competitor, would inevitably act together on the market because of their similar cost 
structures. According to the applicant the Commission’s analysis had ignored the wide 
variety in operating cost levels of different shafts both at the companies Implats and LPD 
and at Amplats. In particular, the Commission’s method of observing average costs was 
misleading since production decisions were made on a shaft-by-shaft basis and competition 
took place at the level of marginal cost. The CFI dismissed this argument and held that the 
Commission’s conclusion that the cost structures between Implats/LPD and Amplats 
following the concentration would have been similar was correct, despite the Commission’s 
adverse finding that there were significant differences between the parties as to the quality 
of the ore extracted, processing, refining operations and administrative costs.404 The CFI 
                                                     
402 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753. 
403 Commission Decision 97/26/EC of 24 April 1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the 
common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/M.619 - Gencor/Lonrho) in OJ 
[1997] L 11/30. 
404 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paras. 218-223. 
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thus did not question the Commission’s method of examining average costs rather than 
observing the marginal costs between shafts.  
In the second place, concerning the characteristics of the market, namely the growth 
prospects in the platinum market for the finding of the creation of a collective dominant 
position, Gencor argued that the analysis carried by the Commission was incorrect in 
finding that a market characterized by slow growth did not encourage new entrants or 
vigorous competition. In this regard, the applicant argued there was an overcapacity in the 
industry in question and producers had to compete by reducing their production costs in 
order to avoid the shutting down of their surplus production. In support of this argument 
Gencor presented an economic report and demonstrated that there had been past instances 
of reduction in platinum prices and rationalization measures. Notwithstanding Gencor’s 
arguments, the CFI argued, referring to the above-mentioned economic report, that more 
recently, demand was not forecast to increase substantially and that, in any event, the 
concentration would most probably have led to parallel anticompetitive conduct.405 The 
CFI therefore seemed to have favored the more recent figures of an economic report put 
forward by the Commission over Gencor’s past data and instances of vigorous competition. 
Finally, concerning the reaction of interested third parties, Gencor put forward that 
during the market test most customers and third parties contacted by the Commission 
reacted neutrally or positively to the concentration. However, the Commission, upheld on 
this point by the CFI, decided to endorse the minority view of the customers and other 
interested third parties who had reacted negatively to the proposed transaction.406 
In this case, the CFI’s ‘minimum’ or ‘limited’ control was summarized in the CFI’s own 
words: 
‘the basic provisions of the Regulation, in particular Article 2 thereof, confer on the Commission a 
certain discretion, especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature […] Consequently, 
review by the Community judicature of the exercise of that discretion, which is essential for defining 
the rules on concentrations, must take account of the discretionary margin implicit in the provisions 
of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations’.407 
                                                     
405 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paras. 233-238. 
406 Case T-102/96 Gencor v Commission [1999] ECR II-753, paras. 290-292. 
407 Paras. 164-165; for an identical formulation see also Case T-22/97 Kesko Oy v Commission [1999] ECR II-
3775, para 142. 
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2.2. The EU Courts’ stricter approach to the intensity of judicial review: the 
Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval cases 
In 2002 the EU Courts annulled three different Commission prohibition decisions in 
what became three landmark judgments on the intensity and scope of judicial review in the 
merger field.408 While in the first years of application of the EU Merger Regulation the EU 
Courts had a ‘light’ approach to review of Commission merger decisions (see supra 
subsection 2.1 in this Chapter), in these three cases the EU Courts demonstrated their 
willingness to change approach and to increase the intensity with which they reviewed 
decisions. The criticisms against the EU Courts’ submissive role and the increased 
importance of economic analysis led the Courts to surpass the classical arguments used to 
justify their passive role in judicial control of Commission decisions.409 
The Tetra Laval,410 Airtours,411 Schneider Electric412 cases arguably prove, on the one hand, 
that the EU Courts have power in shaping the content of the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard and, on the other hand, that the EU Courts have the instruments and capacity to 
assess complex merger decisions involving in-depth economic analysis.413 In these cases the 
CFI appeared to stretch the ‘limited’ judicial review standard by attempting to determine 
whether the Commission’s assessment had not been convincing or plausible. 414  While 
acknowledging the discretion entrusted to the Commission under the EU Merger 
                                                     
408 LEVY N., Evidentiary Issues In the EU Merger Control, Fordham Competition Law Institute’s 35th Annual 
Conference: ‘it is clear that the trilogy of judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance in 2001 in the Airtours, 
Schneider, and Tetra Laval cases represented a watershed in the Commission’s application of the Merger Regulation that 
accelerated the Commission’s reliance on sound economics and quantitative evidence’. See also ABRAHAMSSON H., The 
Standard of Proof in EC Merger Control – The Impact of Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval, Master Thesis, Faculty of 
Law – University of Lund, 2006. 
409 See VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence : le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue 
des affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 448. According to the author, 2002 had to be surnamed the 
Commission’s ‘annus horribilis’. The annulment of three prohibition decisions led the Commission to change 
and reinforce its internal procedures, including the creation of a Chief economist team, peer review panels 
and increasing the role of the Hearing Officer (see supra subsection 3.3 in Section II of Chapter 1). 
410 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. 
411 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585. 
412 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission (“Schneider”), [2002] ECR II-4071. 
413  FORRESTER I. S., A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 28. 
414 By way of example, in Airtours/First Choice, an important finding in the Commission’s decision was that the 
leading tour operators set capacity mainly by renewing capacity budgeted or sold in the past. The CFI 
conducted its own measures of enquiry on this point and elicited detailed written replies that showed that 
capacity decisions were in fact complex attempts to predict how future demand would evolve; see Case T-
342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paras. 148–181.  
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Regulation to review economic assessments, the CFI proceeded to ‘adjudicate on the merits of 
the Commission’s findings concerning the effects of the concentration on competition’. 415 The extent to 
which these judgments were so groundbreaking led certain commentators to suggest that 
the Court had adopted a new approach to reviewing substantive Commission merger 
decisions. However, the President of the CFI ‘categorically rejected’ these suggestions, 
contending that the Court had instead ‘adjusted the normal approach to reviewing Commission 
competition decisions so as to take account of the peculiarities of all merger cases and, above all, the 
peculiarities of each merger case that it has to review’.416 
While, on the one hand, these judgments effectively prove the EU Courts’ ‘activism’ in 
shaping the content and boundaries of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard, on the other 
hand, they also demonstrate that, despite the emphasis placed by some commentators on 
these cases as evidence of a comprehensive and thorough judicial review carried out by the 
Courts,417 the Commission effectively still enjoys a margin of appreciation in relation to 
complex economic and technical assessments, the existence of which can lead to cases 
having very different outcomes. In particular, when applying the ‘manifest error’ standard, 
the EU Courts have on occasion left aside alternative and arguably equally plausible 
conclusions put forward by applicants, thereby granting a considerable deference to the 
Commission. In these cases, it can be considered that the application of the ‘limited’ 
judicial review standard has determined their outcome given that the EU Courts’ review 
has not been as thorough as it would have been had ‘complex economic assessments’ not 
been involved.   
 
                                                     
415 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 53; see also para 120 where the Court 
found that the Commission had failed to provide ‘adequate evidence’ to support its finding that there was 
already a tendency in the industry to collective dominance (particularly as regards capacity setting). See also 
Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission (“Tetra Laval”) [2002] ECR II-4381, para 246, where the Court held that 
the Commission’s prediction that Tetra Laval would obtain a dominant position on the market for aseptic 
filling machines was ‘not plausible’); and Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission (“Schneider”), [2002] 
ECR II-4071, para 209, where the Court held that the Commission’s conclusion as to the relationship 
between high concentration at the wholesaler level and prices had not been sufficiently demonstrated in law 
(‘ne peut être tenue pour suffisamment étayée’). See LEVY N., European Merger Control Law: A Guide to the Merger 
Regulation, 9th ed., Matthew Bender & Co, 2012. 
416  VESTERDORF B., Standards of Proof In Merger Cases: Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law of The 
Community Courts, in European Competition Journal, March 2005, pp. 3–33. 
417 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 561-562. 
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2.2.1. The Airtours judgment 
On 6 June 2002 the CFI overturned for the first time a prohibition decision under the 
EU Merger Regulation in the Airtours/First Choice case.418 The Commission’s decision had 
prohibited the merger of two UK suppliers of short-haul package holidays (Airtours and 
First Choice) on the ground that the transaction would create a collective dominant 
position in the UK market for short-haul foreign package holidays between Airtours/First 
Choice and the other two large tour operators, Thomson and Thomas Cook. According to 
the Commission, the collectively dominant undertaking would have an incentive to tacitly 
restrict market capacity, leading to higher prices and to the exclusion from the market of 
smaller operators. Airtour’s appeal was upheld by the CFI and in annulling the 
Commission’s decision, the Court determined that ‘far from basing its prospective analysis on 
cogent evidence, [the decision] is vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to 
any assessment of whether a collective dominant position might be created.’419  
Other than providing important guidance on the application of the EU Merger 
Regulation to situations of collective dominance,420 the Airtours judgment is also interesting 
as regards the varying intensity of judicial review applied by the EU Courts within the 
framework of the ‘limited’ review standard. In this case, although the CFI expressly stated 
that it had applied such standard,421 it nonetheless carried out a thorough review of the 
Commission’s analysis, therefore departing from its classical formulation and application.  
This is illustrated, for example, by the CFI’s in-depth review of the Commission’s 
assessment of the definition of the relevant product market. In this regard, the CFI 
                                                     
418 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585. 
419 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 294. In Airtours, the Court concluded 
that ‘the Commission has failed to prove that the result of the transaction would be to alter the structure of the relevant market in 
such a way that the leading operators would no longer act as they have in the past and that a collective dominant position would 
be created’ (para 293) and indicated that ‘the prospective analysis which the Commission has to carry out in its review of 
concentrations involving collective dominance calls for close examination in particular of the circumstances which, in each 
individual case, are relevant for assessing the effects of the concentration on competition in the reference market’ (para 63). 
420 The Court held that a finding of collective dominance requires that three conditions be satisfied. First, the 
alleged oligopolists must be in a position to monitor each other’s market behavior. Without such market 
transparency, the members of the oligopoly cannot be certain that the others are adhering to the strategy that 
maximizes their collective benefits. Second, there must be, in the Court’s view, ‘an incentive not to depart from the 
common policy on the market’. The viability of a collective dominant position thus depends upon the existence of 
deterrents, such as the ability to retaliate against a participant that deviates from the oligopolistic position. 
Third, it must be shown that the actions of competitors and/or consumers would not ‘jeopardise the results 
expected from the common policy’; see Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 62. 
421  The Court stated that the ‘Community judicature…must take account of the discretionary margin implicit in the 
provisions of an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations’; see Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v 
Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 64.   
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reviewed the Commission’s analysis in a very detailed manner before finding that the 
Commission had not committed a manifest error of assessment in excluding long-haul 
package holidays from the definition of the relevant product market.422 Namely, the CFI 
analysed the documents it had in its possession, concluding that the Commission had taken 
various factors into account in reaching its conclusion that short-haul package holidays 
belong to a separate market from that to which long-haul packages belong.423  
The CFI’s analysis was very thorough also in relation to the Commission’s assessment 
of collusive behaviour post-merger. Here the CFI effectively criticized the methodology 
used by the Commission to assess the extent to which capacity decisions adopted by each 
of the major tour operators were sufficiently transparent for collusive behaviour to arise 
post-merger.424  
Moreover, the CFI analysed, of its own motion, numerous documents presented by the 
applicant in order to verify the plausibility and correctness of the conclusions reached by 
the Commission in its decision. 425 In this respect, the CFI even compared the figures 
provided in Airtours’ reply to one of the Commission’s information requests, which were 
not originally cited in the Commission decision.426 The CFI also described that when it 
requested the Commission to produce a market study referred to in the decision, the 
Commission supplied only an extract of a single page which a competitor had annexed to a 
response to a request for information. The CFI also disagreed with the Commission's 
interpretation of that market study, stating that the Commission ‘construed that document 
without having regard to its actual wording and overall purpose, even though it decided to include it as a 
document crucial to its finding’.427 
Thus, although the CFI did reiterate that the Commission had a certain discretion in 
relation to assessments of an economic nature, the judgment pointed out in various 
instances the factual and theoretical shortcomings of the Commission’s analysis. The 
                                                     
422 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paras. 17-48. 
423 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 25. 
424 BOTTEMAN Y., Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence, in Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics, Issue 1, 2006, p. 85. While the Commission decided to look at overall capacity as a whole, the 
CFI considered that since decisions on global capacity stem from a range of individual decisions, the 
Commission should not have limited itself to looking at global capacity. 
425 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paras. 36-41. 
426 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paras. 37-38. 
427 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 130. 
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review carried out by the CFI was formally categorised as a ‘manifest error’ standard,428 
although it arguably seemed to go beyond that standard.429  
On the other hand, even though the Court carried out an in-depth review, in Airtours 
the Court relied on the manifest error of assessment to ultimately dismiss certain 
allegations of the defendants. For example, despite the CFI’s in-depth review of the 
Commission’s assessment of the definition of the relevant product market, the Court 
disregarded some of the arguments put forward by the applicant without providing other 
reasons than the margin of discretion of the Commission. In this regard, the Court 
indicated that ‘in the circumstances of the present case and with reference to market definition, the fact 
that the Commission did not consider decisive (i) changing consumer tastes, (ii) the growing importance of 
substitutability between long-haul package holidays to destinations such as Florida and the Dominican 
Republic, and short-haul packages or (iii) the growth of the market for long-haul packages over recent years 
is not sufficient to support a finding that the Commission exceeded the bounds of its discretion in concluding 
that short-haul package holidays are not within the same product market as long-haul packages’.430· 
 
2.2.2. The Schneider Electric judgment 
On 22 October 2002 the CFI, in the first judgments rendered by the Court under the 
expedited procedure, annulled two Commission decisions in the Schneider/Legrand case.431 
In January 2001, Schneider had announced a takeover bid for Legrand, another French 
company active in the supply of low-voltage electrical equipment. In the first decision the 
Commission prohibited the completed acquisition of Legrand by Schneider, while in the 
second it ordered Schneider to divest all but 5% of the acquired share capital of Legrand.432 
Schneider had appealed the Commission’s decisions which were both annulled by the CFI. 
The CFI found that the Commission’s economic analysis of the competitive effects and 
impact of the merger was flawed and contained serious ‘errors, omissions and inconsistencies’.433 
                                                     
428 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, paras. 26 and 32. 
429 According to WILS P. J. W. ‘[t]he Court of First Instance’s judgments in cases such as Airtours clearly show that, not 
only in cases under Articles 81 or 82 EC but also in merger cases, the Court undertakes an exhaustive review of both the 
Commission’s substantive findings of fact and its legal appraisals of those facts’; see WILS P. J. W., The Combination of the 
Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, p. 5. 
430 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 44. 
431 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071. 
432 Commission Decision C(2001)3014 final declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2283 - Schneider-Legrand). 
433 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, para 404. 
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In its decision prohibiting the merger, the Commission had identified national product 
markets but then had considered the effects of the merger on the basis of trans-national 
and global considerations. The CFI had thus agreed with Schneider that the Commission 
had based its negative assessment on trans-national considerations, without demonstrating 
their relevance at the national level, except in relation to the French market. The Court 
therefore rejected the Commission’s finding that the transaction would create or strengthen 
a dominant position in markets outside France. However, given that the Commission’s 
conclusions as to the existence of a dominant position and adverse effects on competition 
in the French market could be accepted, the errors affecting the decision were not enough 
to lead to its entire annulment. The CFI did however annul the decision on the basis of 
procedural grounds, as in the decision the Commission’s review of the French markets 
included arguments that were not included in its statement of objections.434 In particular, 
while the statement of objections had focused on the overlapping nature of the two 
businesses, the final decision had changed the focus to the preponderant positions held by 
the two undertakings in two distinct but complementary sectorial markets. 435 The CFI 
therefore held that Schneider had been denied the possibility to respond to this objection 
and to offer appropriate remedies, amounting to an infringement of the parties’ rights of 
defense that called for an annulment of the decision. 
In this case, as in Airtours, the Court undertook a detailed factual analysis in which it 
identified ‘errors, omissions and inconsistencies…of undoubted gravity’, 436  while traditionally the 
evaluation of the relevant market would have been considered as belonging to the category 
of complex economic appreciations.437 As to the issue of the intensity of judicial review 
                                                     
434 These defects which had led the CFI to annul the decision were confirmed in part on appeal in front of 
the Court of Justice; see Case C-440/07 P Commission v Schneider Electric SA [2009] ECR I-6413. This also led 
the GC to subsequently find that the Commission should compensate partially Schneider for losses incurred 
as a result of the unlawful prohibition decision; see Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric SA v Commission (“Schneider 
II”) [2007] ECR II-2237. Interestingly, in the latter case, the CFI acknowledged the principle that Article 6(1) 
ECHR accepts the concentration of powers within an administrative authority that does not provide the 
safeguards established in that provision, provided there is the right to access an independent and impartial 
tribunal that can review its decisions. In the CFI’s own words ‘provided that the right to an impartial tribunal is 
guaranteed, Article 6(1) of the Convention does not prohibit the prior intervention of administrative bodies that do not satisfy all 
the requirements that apply to procedure before the courts’ (paras. 182-183). 
435 CHAPPATTE P., BOYCE J., REEVE M., Annulment Proceedings in EU Merger Cases? Worth the Effort?, in 
The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual 
Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.), Bruylant, 2010, pp. 195-196. 
436 Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric SA v Commission [2007] ECR II-2237, para 404. 
437 VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue des 
affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 451. As to the difficulties inherent in identifying the categories of 
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carried out, in the Schneider Electric case the CFI decided not to substitute an arguably 
equally plausible solution proposed by the applicant – the use of the cross-elasticity of 
demand test – for that of the Commission – the test of price sensitivity of overall demand 
for low voltage electrical equipment. Although the CFI partially annulled the Commission 
decision on the grounds that it had committed errors of assessment by overestimating the 
strength of the merged entity, namely on the Italian and Danish markets, it dismissed 
Schneider Electric’s plea concerning alleged errors in the economic reasoning underpinning 
the analysis of the impact of the concentration. In this regard, the CFI found that the 
Commission had not erred in finding that the merged entity would be able to act 
independently of other players and to raise prices on the basis of the low price sensitivity of 
overall demand for low-voltage electrical equipment.438 Moreover, although the applicant 
had submitted an economic report – the ‘second Nera report’ – showing that customers 
reacted quickly to changes in the price of electrical equipment, the CFI considered that the 
Commission was not wrong in using the test of price sensitivity of overall demand.439 The 
CFI was not convinced that that report and Schneider’s arguments demonstrated the point 
it was trying to make. The applicant’s proposal to use an alternative test to measure price 
sensitivity of demand was therefore rejected on the basis that the CFI did not consider it 
sufficiently plausible and proven.440 The question remains however how the CFI would 
have acted in this case if it had considered both parties’ economic theories, Schneider’s and 
the Commission’s, equally plausible, but at odds. It is contended that the existence of the 
‘limited’ review standard bears its effects in these particular situations, as the Courts, 
instead of adjudicating autonomously on the merits of each theory in order to decide which 
should prevail, are led to give preference to the Commission’s assessments and choice. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
assessments that fall under the limited review standard, such as market definitions, see supra subsection 2.3 in 
Chapter 1. 
438 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, paras. 134-146. 
439 Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071, para 142. 
440 In Schneider, the CFI finished its reasoning indicating that ‘it has not been proved to the requisite legal standard that 
the merger results in the creation of a dominant position on the Italian markets for distribution and final panel-board 
components’ and pointed out that since ‘the Commission (...) adopted a prospective approach to the state of competition to 
which the concentration was likely to give rise in the future (...) The Commission was consequently required to explain all the 
more clearly the competition problems raised by the proposed merger’ (paras. 402 and 443). 
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2.2.3. The Tetra Laval judgment: the alleged formulation of a new standard of review  
On 25 October 2002, the CFI in the Tetra Laval/Sidel case annulled two Commission 
decisions prohibiting the merger of two producers of packaging materials and ordering the 
separation of the two companies. 441  In its decision the Commission had declared the 
acquisition of Sidel by Tetra Laval incompatible with the internal market despite the lack of 
horizontal competition between the parties. The Commission’s assessment was largely 
based on the ‘conglomerate’ effects of the merger. The Commission held that, although 
each company operated in separate markets, Tetra Laval’s dominant position in the market 
for carton packaging, combined with Sidel’s leading position in plastic (“PET”) packaging 
equipment, would create a dominant position in the market for PET packaging equipment. 
The Commission relied on the so-called ‘leveraging’ economic theory to find that Tetra 
Laval’s dominant position in one market could lead it to exercise pressure on customers to 
purchase also products in another distinct but close market. Tetra Laval and Schneider 
both appealed against the Commission’s decisions. 
In its judgment, the CFI held that the Commission had overestimated the anti-
competitive effects of the concentration and, in particular, had failed to adequately prove 
that the merged entity would have an incentive to leverage its dominant position on the 
carton packaging market into the PET packaging machine market. The CFI did not dismiss 
the ‘leveraging’ theory on which the Commission based its decision, however it found that 
the Commission’s assessment of the potential for leveraging contained a number of 
important errors. Although the CFI found it would be ‘possible’ for the merged entity to 
engage in leveraging activities in the future,442 the Commission had not demonstrated to 
the required legal standard that the merged entity would have the incentive to use that 
ability. In particular, the Commission had not sufficiently shown which leveraging methods 
could have been used by Tetra Laval or what could have been the consequences of any 
such action. The CFI therefore annulled the Commission’s decision and its findings were 
largely confirmed on appeal by the ECJ in February 2005.443 
                                                     
441 The Court’s judgment resulted in the annulment of the Commission’s second decision ordering the 
separation of Tetra Laval and Sidel; Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381. See, inter alia, 
BAY M. F., CALZADO J. R., Tetra Laval II: the Coming of Age of the Judicial Review of Merger Decisions, World 
Competition 28(4), 2005, pp. 433-453. 
442 See also Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381, para 192. 
443 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. 
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What is particularly of interest in the Tetra Laval case for the debate on the standard of 
review is that the depth of the review carried out by the CFI was such that the Commission 
appealed the judgment on the grounds that the CFI ‘whilst claiming to apply the test of manifest 
error of assessment, in fact applied a different test’.444 The Commission contended that the CFI had 
imposed a new and unduly high standard of judicial review, thereby exceeding its role, 
‘which is to review the administrative decision of the Commission for clear errors of fact or reasoning, and 
not to substitute its view of the case for that of the Commission’.445 According to the Commission, the 
CFI’s insistence that the Commission adduce ‘convincing evidence’ effectively created a new 
standard that unduly limited its discretion and allowed the Court to substitute its views for 
those of the Commission.   
In his Opinion in this case, Advocate General Tizzano stated that the separation of 
powers between the Commission and the EU Courts does not allow the CFI ‘to enter into the 
merits of the Commission’s complex economic assessment or to substitute its own point of view for that of the 
institution’.446 He nevertheless recognized that the Commission’s discretion is not unfettered 
and that while with regards to findings of fact, ‘the review is clearly more intense, in that the issue is 
to verify objectively and materially the accuracy of certain facts and the correctness of the conclusions drawn 
in order to establish whether certain known facts make it possible to prove the existence of other facts to be 
ascertained’,447 by contrast, with regard to the complex economic assessments made by the 
Commission, ‘review by the Community judicature is necessarily more limited, since the latter has to 
respect the broad discretion inherent in that kind of assessment and may not substitute its own point of view 
for that of the body which is institutionally responsible for making those assessments. The fact that the 
Commission enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether or not a concentration is compatible with the 
common market does certainly not mean that it does not have in any case to base its conviction on solid 
elements gathered in the course of a thorough and painstaking investigation or that it is not required to give 
a full statement of reasons for its decision, disclosing the various passages of logical argument supporting the 
decision. The Commission […] is bound to examine the relevant market carefully; to base its assessment on 
elements which reflect the facts as they really are, which are not plainly insignificant and which support the 
                                                     
444 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 19. 
445 Commission Press Release IP/02/1952 of 20 December 2002.  
446 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, 
para 89. 
447 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, 
para 86. On the intensity of the control over facts, see, inter alia, VESTERDORF B., ‘Standards Of Proof In 
Merger Cases: Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law Of The Community Courts’, in European Competition 
Journal, March 2005, pp. 3–33. 
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conclusions drawn from them, and on adequate reasoning; and to take into consideration all relevant 
factors’.448 In essence, according to the Advocate General, the EU Courts must exercise a 
restrained control on the substance of the Commission’s complex and economic 
appreciations, but this can nonetheless be considered an effective control.449 It also held 
that in Tetra Laval’s case the GC had substituted its own judgment for that of the 
Commission for an important part of the analysis. 
The ECJ did not follow the Advocate General’s Opinion, rejected the Commission’s 
arguments, and in doing so clarified the meaning of the ‘limited’ review standard. The 
ECJ’s engagement in this case in defining the ‘contours’ of this notion proves, to a certain 
degree, the role that the EU Courts play in giving content and form to the standard of 
review they exercise.450 The ECJ stated that, ‘[w]hilst the Court recognises that the Commission has 
a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts 
must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature’.451 The 
Court upheld the EU Courts’ right to examine: (1) whether the evidence relied on by the 
Commission is factually accurate, reliable, and consistent; (2) whether that evidence 
contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation; and (3) whether the evidence is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn 
from it. 452  The ECJ also added that ‘[s]uch a review is all the more necessary in the case of a 
prospective analysis required when examining a planned merger with conglomerate effect’.453 Accordingly, 
for the ECJ, the CFI’s requirement that proof of anti-competitive effects of a merger call 
for ‘a precise examination, supported by convincing evidence, of the circumstances which allegedly produce 
those effect’,454 is not a new standard imposed upon the Commission but simply the reflection 
of the essential function of evidence which is to establish convincingly the merits of a 
                                                     
448 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, 
paras. 86–87. 
449  THEOPHILE D., PARMENTIER H., L’étendue du contrôle juridictionnel dans le contentieux du contrôle des 
concentrations en droits interne et communautaire, in Concurrences, No. 1, 2006, p. 41. 
450  See WAHL N., Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited?, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 6: 
‘[a]lthough the limited review and the definition of it seemed firmly fixed in case law from the Court of Justice, a certain change in 
the definition occurred in the Tetra Laval case decided in 2005’. 
451 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 39. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381, para 155. 
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merger decision.455 In this case, the ECJ left unfettered the Commission’s discretion in 
relation to complex economic assessments, and rather focused its conclusions on the CFI’s 
findings of fact and its criticism that the Commission had not adequately proven the 
plausibility of its forecasts. 
It is also interesting to note that in this case the ECJ expanded the content of the 
‘limited’ judicial review standard and, in comparison with previous case law, the differences 
concerned: (i) the reference to ‘whether the evidence contains all the information which must be taken 
into account’, thus a stricter obligation for the Commission to prove its conclusions; and (ii) 
that ‘a review is all the more necessary in the case of a prospective analysis’, which could be interpreted 
as a difference in the review to be carried out depending on which situation is being 
analysed.456 With its statements the ECJ, although denying the creation of a ‘new’ standard, 
clarified the meaning of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard in various directions. First, it 
drew a distinction between the assessment itself and the evidence that underpins such 
assessment. While the EU Courts can and must verify whether the evidence underpinning a 
complex economic or technical assessment is sufficiently strong, in relation to the 
assessment itself, on the other hand, the Commission still benefits from discretion.457 Then, 
having acknowledged the forward-looking nature of assessments concerning mergers, the 
ECJ concluded that a more (not less) careful and stringent review is necessary.458 Merger 
control calls in fact for a perspective analysis that must be exercised with great care, as it 
does not concern events already occurred but rather the prediction of facts that may more 
or less occur in the future if a prohibition decision is not adopted.  
                                                     
455 EHLERMANN C-D., RATLIFF J., The ECJ rules on the standard of judicial review in merger cases and clarifies the 
burden of proof upon the Commission in conglomerate mergers cases (Tetra Laval/Sidel), in e-Competitions, 2005, No. 
37199, p. 2. 
456  See WAHL N., Standard of Review – Comprehensive or Limited?, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 6. 
457 According to certain commentators, the ECJ ‘endorsed a system of “selected” review, whereby the EC Courts’ scrutiny 
only targets a limited set of features of the Commission’s decisions’; see PETIT N., RABEUX L., Judicial Review in French 
Competition Law and Economic Regulation - A Post-Commission v. Tetra Laval Assessment (October 26, 2008); available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1290143, p. 12. 
458 REEVES T., DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, - 14th 
Annual IBC Conference on “An Advanced analysis of Major Developments in the field of EC Competition 
Law and Policy”, Brussels, 17-18 November 2005, p. 127. In the General Electric case the CFI confirmed the 
principle established in Tetra Laval that where the analysis of the competitive harm is prospective the 
Commission will have to conduct its review ‘with great care’; see Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission 
[2005] ECR II-5575, paras. 26-27. 
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The ECJ thus indicated that a more cautious approach towards deference might be 
necessary in the case of prospective rather than ex-post analysis.459  
 
2.3. The case law following the 2002 Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval 
judgments 
While the 2002 cases were certainly welcomed for having brought more rigor and clarity 
in the intensity of the review carried out by the Courts in the merger field, on the other 
hand, the case law following Tetra Laval, Airtours, and Schneider seems to suggest that the 
manifest error of assessment standard is not as comprehensive and thorough as some 
commentators have argued. While the various cases following the 2002 judgments often 
recite literally the standard of review formula elaborated in Tetra Laval, and refer to the in-
depth review of economic assessments that must be carried out, on the other hand, 
considerable room is still left to the Commission’s discretion and its presence seems still 
capable of influencing the outcome of cases. The absence of a ‘correctness’ standard of 
review, and thus the impossibility for the Courts to substitute their views for those of the 
Commission, in particular when there are two equally plausible explanations of economic 
circumstances, is even more relevant in the merger field, where the Commission is called 
upon to make a prospective analysis of what will be the likely effects of a transaction. In 
the following subsections, the analysis of a selection of the more recent case law will thus 
focus on examining the extent to which the existence of the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard may have determined the outcome of cases and how, absent such standard, 
different results could have taken place.  
 
2.3.1. The Petrolessence judgment 
The Petrolessence judgment can be considered an example of a case where the CFI 
rejected what could have allegedly been considered equally plausible arguments proposed 
by the applicant because constrained by the ‘manifest error’ standard.460 This case stemmed 
                                                     
459 This approach seems to have been confirmed by the GC in the recent “Cisco” judgment delivered on 11 
December 2013. In this case the GC emphasized that “[i]n so far as the Commission is thus required to carry out a 
prospective analysis requiring numerous economic factors to be taken into account, it enjoys a margin of discretion which the Court 
must take into account when exercising its power of review. However, that does not mean that the Court must refrain from 
reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of data of an economic nature”; see Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems, Inc. and 
Messagenet SpA v Commission, not yet reported, para 63. 
460 Case T-342/00 Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission [2003] ECR II-67. 
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from the proposed merger between TotalFina and Elf Aquitaine which had been approved 
in Phase II subject to the acceptance of commitments. The Commission had found that 
the merger would lead to the creation of a dominant position on the market for motorway 
fuel sales in France and that, after the merger, TotalFina Elf would have strong incentives 
to raise its prices and/or reduce the quality of its services. TotalFina was therefore required 
to divest, inter alia, 70 service stations to transferees which had to be approved by the 
Commission. TotalFina Elf proposed the divestiture of six service stations putting forward 
Petrolessence as a possible transferee. The Commission rejected Petrolessence’s candidacy 
on the ground that the applicant would not be able to bring about a situation of effective 
competition on the market for the sales of fuels on motorways in France. 
In this respect, it is particularly interesting to analyze the second plea in law put forward 
by the applicant. Petrolessence argued that the Commission had committed a manifest 
error of assessment as regards their candidacy to be the transferees of certain service 
stations. The applicant put forward various arguments to demonstrate that they were 
capable of developing effective competition on the market for motorway fuel sales in 
France. It argued, inter alia, that (i) they had proposed to create restaurants in four of the 
transferred service stations which would be set-up in a period ranging from 18 months to 
two years and already owned buffet bars in the remaining stations; (ii) they owned shops in 
their stations which would allow them to obtain considerable margins while the restaurants 
would be set-up, (iii) the fact that TotalFina Elf would continue owning the Mardyck 
refinery would put all wholesale buyers in the zone where the six service stations in 
question were situated on an equal footing; (iv) the Commission took no account of the 
compensation principle between fuel distribution and shop/restaurant activities; and (v) 
their intention of developing a policy of loss-leader pricing in order to establish their 
credibility in the eyes of consumers should have persuaded the Commission to give priority 
to their candidacy. In sum, Petrolessence argued it was a viable operator capable of 
developing effective competition on the market.   
However, the CFI first stated that the Court’s review ‘must be limited to ensuring compliance 
with the rules of procedure and the statement of reasons, as well as the substantive accuracy of the facts, the 
absence of manifest errors of assessment and of any misuse of power’ and that ‘it is not for the [CFI] to 
substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission’ ; although it is entitled to a ‘close 
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examination in particular of the circumstances which, in each individual case, are relevant for assessing the 
effects of the concentration on competition in the market in question.461  
The CFI interestingly went on and stated that ‘the applicants' present arguments can be accepted 
only if they show that the Commission's appraisal of their candidacy […] is manifestly erroneous. However, 
it must be observed that the applicants have not established that the Commission's appraisal of those points 
is clearly mistaken and it must be concluded that the applicants' present arguments consist in inviting the 
Court of First Instance to substitute a different appraisal of their candidacy for that of the Commission’.462 
It can thus be observed that the CFI was unable to review the factors which the 
Commission had taken into account to assess the candidacy of the potential transferees of 
the service stations, including the applicant. 
 
2.3.2. The General Electric judgment 
On 14 December 2005 the CFI delivered its judgment on the Commission’s decision 
prohibiting the proposed merger of General Electric Company and Honeywell 
International Inc. (“Honeywell”).463 Although the Court upheld the Commission’s decision 
and its findings that the transaction would create or strengthen a dominant position in the 
markets for jet engines for large aircraft, engines for corporate jet aircraft and for small gas 
turbines, it rejected the Commission’s findings on the transaction’s conglomerate and 
vertical effects. These findings were sufficient for the merger to be held to be incompatible 
with the internal market, despite the fact that the Commission had made a number of 
errors in its assessment of the impact of certain vertical overlaps between the parties and 
the conglomerate effects of the merger and that these parts of the Commission’s decision 
were, therefore, vitiated by illegality. 
As to the standard of review, the CFI reiterated the standard described in Tetra Laval, 
restating the existence of a margin of assessment for the Commission, but also that the 
Courts have to adequately review the Commission’s economic assessments since they must 
                                                     
461 Case T-342/00 Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission [2001] ECR II-67, para 102. 
462 Case T-342/00 Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission [2001] ECR II-67, para 103. Commentators have stated 
that where the Commission’s assessment is based upon inferences drawn from primary facts, ‘a more limited 
discretion will be allowed (in other words, it may be easier for the EU courts to control whether the Commission’s assessment was 
manifestly erroneous or not), while a greater margin will be allowed to pure economic assessments’; see B. VESTERDORF, 
Standards Of Proof In Merger Cases: Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law Of The Community Courts, in 
European Competition Journal, March 2005, pp. 3–33. 
463 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575 and Case T-209/01 Honeywell v Commission 
(“Honeywell”) [2005] ECR II-5527.   
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establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, 
contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation, and is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. 464  It also 
emphasized that effective judicial review is even more necessary when the Commission 
carries out a prospective analysis, as is the case when considering conglomerate effects. In 
such cases, the quality of the evidence relied on is particularly important. In this regard, the 
CFI censored the Commission’s analysis of the conglomerate effects of the transaction and 
the evidence it brought in support of its findings as to the probable conduct of the merged 
entity. In particular, it concluded that the Commission had not shown that the merger 
would have created an incentive for the parties to engage in leveraging conduct. One of the 
main criticisms was against the Commission’s failure to assess the possible deterrent effect 
of the unlawful nature of the conduct and thus of Article 102 TFEU, and the circumstance 
that the Commission had relied on General Electric’s conduct in unrelated markets to infer 
its likely future conduct on the markets at issue, without a concrete assessment of the latter. 
As to the Court’s findings on the horizontal overlaps between the merging parties, the 
CFI dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Commission’s prohibition decision on the 
grounds, inter alia, that General Electric had not demonstrated that prior to the merger it 
did not hold a dominant position on the market for large commercial jet aircraft engines. 
The applicant argued that the Commission’s analysis of the horizontal overlap relating to 
large regional jet aircraft engine was vitiated by fundamental errors, such as, inter alia, the 
finding that General Electric’s large regional jet aircraft engine and those of Honeywell 
were in the same market. It contended that the Commission had departed from its previous 
practice according to which each engine ‘family’, with unique features which make it 
suitable for a particular platform, seemed to form a separate relevant market, thereby 
implementing a novel methodology. Therefore, it argued that the Commission had 
considered that General Electric and Honeywell’s engines might be substitutable on the 
sole grounds that some purchasers of the ‘Avro’ aircraft, which is powered by the 
Honeywell engine, might purchase other aircraft powered by General Electric engines. The 
applicant claimed that when the Commission invokes such indirect ‘second level’ 
substitutability, it ought to explain this novel methodology, and, in any event, is required to 
produce empirical evidence of such substitution, which it had not done in this specific 
                                                     
464 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 63. 
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case.465 The applicant’s main argument was that the difference in thrust of the Honeywell 
and General Electric engines was so different that these could not be substitutable.  
The CFI initiated its argumentation underlining that whether ‘an undertaking is in a 
dominant position on a given market is a question of economic appraisal […] in respect of which the 
Commission enjoys a broad margin of assessment. In that respect, the Court’s role is confined to a review of 
whether that appraisal is free of manifest errors’.466 It then rebutted the applicant’s arguments by 
contending, inter alia, that the Commission had mentioned specific cases of functional 
interchangeability between the ‘Avro’ (a four-engine aircraft), powered by the Honeywell 
engine, and other aircraft (a two-engine aircraft).467 However, the CFI granted deference to 
the Commission in relation to its departure from previous case-law and to the fact that the 
Commission had not cited any specific example of instances of competition between the 
four-engine large regional aircraft powered by Honeywell and the two-engine large regional 
aircraft powered by General Electric. Therefore, in essence, the CFI did not question itself 
as to whether the novel method of defining the market by reference to the aircraft mission 
profile - by taking into account the number of seats, flying range and price - was 
appropriate in this case or whether the conventional method used by the Commission in its 
decisional practice would have been more adequate.   
It should also be emphasized that, in this case, although the CFI had found several 
manifest errors of assessment vitiating the analysis carried out by the Commission, it did 
not annul the decision since it considered that the Commission had validly found that the 
criteria under Article 2(3) of Regulation No. 4064/89, establishing that a concentration that 
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would 
be significantly impeded shall be declared incompatible with the internal market, had been 
satisfied in relation to three separate markets. These included the market for jet engines for 
large regional aircraft, the market for corporate jet aircraft engines and the market for small 
marine gas turbines. The arguments put forward by the applicant in relation to these three 
markets, namely, the fact that General Electric and Honeywell’s engines were not 
substitutable, were identical to the ones mentioned supra relating to the market for large 
regional jet aircraft engines, which had been dismissed by the CFI. Therefore, it is dubious 
                                                     
465 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, paras. 475-479. 
466 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 489. 
467 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 526. 
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whether the outcome of the appeal would have been the same had the CFI not applied the 
‘manifest error standard’.  
 
2.3.3. The airline cases: the Easyjet  and Ryanair judgments 
The Easyjet468 judgment is also illustrative given that despite the strong arguments put 
forward by the applicant, the CFI on 4 July 2006 dismissed Easyjet’s appeal against the 
Commission decision to authorize the Air France/KLM merger on the ground that the 
Commission had not committed manifest errors of assessment. The applicant argued, inter 
alia, that the Commission had failed to consider the strengthening of the dominant position 
of the merged entity on the routes on which the activities of the merging parties did not 
overlap, either directly or indirectly. Easyjet also contended that the Commission had 
committed a manifest error of assessment by failing to consider the possible strengthening 
of the dominant position of the merged entity on the market for the purchase of airport 
services and by finding that the CDG and Orly airports were substitutable. 
Concerning the first plea in law, Easyjet alleged that the Commission had failed to 
consider whether the additional benefits resulting from the merger and the increase in Air 
France’s network or its presence at international level would have the effect of 
strengthening its position on those routes. Easyjet thus considered that the Commission 
had departed from its previous decisional practice by not analyzing the broader impact of 
the concentration on non-overlapping markets.469 It also pointed out that Air France had a 
monopoly of 27 of the 42 domestic routes from Paris, that it had 61.8% of the total 
capacity on routes from France and 53% of the total number of slots available at Orly as 
well as 74% of those at CDG airport. The CFI dismissed the applicant’s first plea on the 
ground that it had failed to identify clearly the non-overlapping markets and stated, that, in 
any case, commitments had been offered to remedy possible competition problems on 
overlapping routes.470  
As regards the second plea put forward by Easyjet, the latter argued that Air France and 
KLM were purchasers of airport services, a market which is linked to airport infrastructures 
for which a fee is payable. It also explained that, in accepting commitments to deal with Air 
France’s dominant position in its Paris hub, the Commission implicitly found that the 
                                                     
468 Case T-177/04 Easyjet v Commission [2006] ECR II-1931.  
469 Case T-177/04 Easyjet v Commission [2006] ECR II-1931, para 48. 
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merger would strengthen Air France’s position at CDG and Orly airports in the market for 
the purchase of airport services. Nevertheless, the CFI rejected the applicant’s plea stating 
that ‘[t]he Commission’s acknowledgment of the existence of adverse effects on competition in respect of the 
commercial activities of the parties to the merger at the hubs, without carrying out a precise analysis of those 
markets, is not a manifest error of assessment such as to undermine the legality of the contested decision’.471   
In relation to the third plea, the most interesting for the debate on the standard of 
review, Easyjet argued that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment 
by finding that the CDG and Orly airports were substitutable. It contended that CDG was 
almost twice as far from the center of Paris as Orly and that, in practice, most long-haul 
network carriers had concentrated their activities at CDG, while Orly was used for more 
short-haul intra-European and domestic traffic. In addition, given the differences in 
charges between these airports, low-cost carriers were usually based at the Orly airport. In 
rejecting the applicant’s plea, the CFI explained that the Commission’s method to assess the 
geographic substitutability of the airports by calculating the time required to travel from the 
center of Paris to the airports had not been contradicted by the applicant, given that the 
applicant had adduced no evidence to show that that test was not an important indicator of 
geographic substitutability. More interestingly, the CFI rebutted the applicant’s arguments 
stating that the Commission had correctly found, when assessing the demand-side 
substitutability, that for point-to-point traffic, comprising both time-sensitive and non-time 
sensitive passengers, CDG and Orly were substitutable as they were located in the same 
catchment area and had comparable access facilities. As regards supply-side substitutability, 
although the Commission had taken into account the differences in types of flights and 
charges between airports, given that these only had a ‘limited impact’ on the substitutability 
assessment, the Commission had not committed a manifest error of assessment.472  
This case arguably shows, namely its third plea relating to the various methods of 
assessment which were available, that even though an applicant’s arguments may be 
plausible, the burden of proof on the applicant seems difficult to discharge, in particular to 
demonstrate a manifest error of assessment by the Commission when commitments have 
been accepted to remedy competition concerns and authorize a merger.    
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More recently, in the Ryanair judgment,473 the GC dismissed Ryanair’s appeal against the 
Commission’s prohibition decision of the Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger on the ground that 
the latter had failed to show that the Commission had exceeded the limits of the power of 
appraisal of economic situations that it enjoys under the case-law.474 In this case, Ryanair 
alleged, inter alia, that the Commission had committed manifest errors of assessment 
regarding the competitive relationship between Ryanair and Aer Lingus. As part of this 
plea, Ryanair contended that the Commission had failed to take account of the 
‘fundamental differences’ between both airline companies. In this respect, it argued that 
there were ‘numerous flaws in the econometric analysis carried out by the Commission in accordance with 
the “fixed effects” (or “panel data” method)’ and had therefore proposed to use an alternative 
method; the ‘cross-section regression’ technique.475   
According to Ryanair, by using the ‘fixed effects’ method, the Commission allegedly 
‘overstated the true competitive impact of the airlines on one another’476 and ‘...the Commission’s findings 
are not robust to small changes in the way in which the seasonal effects were taken into account in the model 
used’. 477  After having submitted economic reports undertaken by RBB Economics in 
support of its argument, Ryanair went on to say that the Commission applied ‘inconsistent 
standards in accepting or rejecting factual evidence’ and that ‘[t]he econometric analysis undertaken by the 
Commission does not clearly show that Ryanair and Aer Lingus react to each other’s promotions’. 478   
In dismissing Ryanair’s plea, the GC first reiterated the limits on the scope for judicial 
review in the following terms: 
‘[t]he basic provisions of the [Merger Regulation]… confer on the Commission a certain 
discretion especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature, and … consequently, review 
by the [EU] Courts… must take account of the margin of discretion implicit in the provisions of 
an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations… Whilst the Courts of the 
European Union recognize that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to 
economic matters, that does not mean that they must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s 
interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must they establish, in particular, 
whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that 
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evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.479 
As to the specific circumstances of the case, the GC then went on emphasizing the 
Commission’s margin of discretion by mentioning that ‘it is necessary to refer to the content of the 
contested decision to understand the role played by the price regression analysis during the detailed 
investigation phase. That role must be assessed in the light of the case-law on the Commission’s margin of 
discretion with regard to economic matters’.480   
The GC then explained that the Commission had favored the fixed-effects regression 
technique over the cross-section regression technique proposed by Ryanair because ‘a panel 
regression with route specific fixed-effects could mitigate the omitted variable bias that affects cross-section 
regressions. It considered that that method was “the most suitable to assess the competitive constraint exerted 
by Ryanair on Aer Lingus’.481 The GC argued that ‘the Commission stated in the contested decision 
that, as there are many instances of Ryanair entering or exiting routes on which Aer Lingus was already 
present, the fixed-effects regression analysis was very well suited to assess whether Ryanair’s presence is 
“negatively associated” with Aer Lingus prices’.482 It also added that ‘it is important to bear in mind the 
role given to the fixed-effects regression analysis in the evaluation of the competitive situation. The 
Commission thus stated in the contested decision that that analysis confirmed and complemented the 
conclusions derived from the qualitative evidence, namely that Ryanair and Aer Lingus are close competitors. 
It stated that those results were also in line with the opinion of the majority of the people surveyed during the 
customer survey, from which it is apparent that the parties to the concentration are ‘closest competitors’ where 
other airlines operate on the route’.483 On these grounds, the GC rejected Ryanair’s proposal to 
use the ‘cross-section regression’ technique and concluded that the applicant had failed to 
                                                     
479 Case T-342/07 Ryanair Holdings plc v Commission [2010] ECR II-3457, paras. 29–30. See also former President 
of the General Court VESTERDORF B., Standard of Proof in Merger Cases: Reflections in the Light of Recent Case 
Law of the Community Courts, Conference Paper for the BICCL Third Annual Merger Conference, 6 December 
2004 (‘As regards matters of law, the Community courts exercise full jurisdictional control.  Indeed it is for the Community 
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demonstrate that the Commission had exceeded the limits of its discretion in relation to 
economic matters.484  
 
2.3.4. The Impala case 
The Impala judgment, concerning the Commission’s SONY/BMG decision, 485  is 
particularly interesting for the debate on the standard of review as here the EU Courts 
reiterated their views on the intensity of their control vis à vis complex economic 
assessments made by the Commission.  
As to the facts of the case, in 2004 Sony and BMG notified the Commission of their 
agreement to merge their recorded music businesses into a 50/50 joint venture named 
SonyBMG. On 20 July 2004 the Commission adopted a decision in which it approved the 
merger unconditionally under the old EC Merger Regulation (Regulation No. 4064/89) as 
it considered that the merger would not create or strengthen a collective dominant position 
between the remaining four major record companies (Universal, SonyBMG, Warner and 
EMI) in the market for recorded music. Impala, a trade association representing 
independent music companies, lodged an action before the CFI seeking the annulment of 
the Commission’s decision. It claimed that the Commission committed a number of 
manifest errors of assessment, in particular, by finding that there was not a collective 
dominant position in the market for recorded music prior to the merger and that the 
merger did not strengthen this existing collective dominant position. The CFI on 13 July 
2006 annulled the Commission’s decision finding it was affected by a number of manifest 
errors of assessment. In particular, the two main reasons why it had concluded that there 
was not a collective dominant position on the markets for recorded music (the lack of 
transparency and absence of retaliatory measures) were not adequately supported by the 
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Commission’s reasoning or examination.486 Sony and BMG appealed the CFI’s judgment to 
the ECJ which, on 10 July 2008, annulled the CFI’s judgment.487 Interestingly, one of the 
main claims of the appellants was that the CFI had exceeded the scope of its judicial review 
by substituting its own assessment for that of the Commission and, in doing so, committed 
manifest errors and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence.  
In her Opinion delivered in this case, Advocate General Kokott discussed in detail 
issues relating to the standards and burdens of proof in merger cases and the scope of the 
CFI’s review, concluding that the CFI was correct to find that the Commission had failed 
to state adequate reasons and had committed a manifest error of appraisal.488 From the 
Advocate General’s analysis it is possible to claim that the deference that the EU Courts 
must show to the Commission’s complex economic assessments concerns the 
Commission’s ‘assessment’, rather than the ‘complexity’ or ‘economic’ character of the 
evidence relied upon.489 As Advocate General Kokott explained, ‘the [General] Court exceeds 
the limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of merger control only where the factual 
and evidential position reasonably allows different assessments, the Commission adopts one of them, and the 
[General] Court nonetheless substitutes its own different assessment for that of the Commission’.490 
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Magazine for Global Competition Policy, July 2008, No. 2. 
488 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America 
v Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) [2008] I-4951. 
489 See, inter alia, FORWOOD N., The Commission’s More Economic Approach – Implications for the Role of the EU 
Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel 
Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases: ‘[t]he mere fact that an assessment is made which requires the consideration of (possibly esoteric) economic 
arguments and the examination of economic evidence … does not necessarily make an assessment subject to judicial review a 
“complex” one, subject only to limited control, even though it may make the task of the judge extremely difficult to or burdensome 
… it could be said that what the Court of Justice had in mind, at least in the first thirty years or so of its case law, was that 
‘complexity’ refers more to the nature of assessment that needs to be made, rather than its technical or evidential difficulty’. 
490 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-413/06P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v 
Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) [2008] I-4951, para 240.  
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The ECJ judgment however diverged from the Advocate General’s conclusions and set 
aside the CFI judgment on the basis that the CFI had made a number of errors of law.491  
As to the scope of the CFI’s role in exercising its judicial review powers, the ECJ noted 
that, due to the Commission’s margin of assessment with regard to economic matters, and 
applying the substantive rules of the EU Merger Regulation, the CFI’s review is limited to 
ascertaining that the facts have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest 
error of assessment. The CFI must not substitute its own economic assessment for that of 
the Commission.492 The CFI must, however, establish whether the evidence relied on is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent, complete and capable of supporting the 
Commission's conclusions. Therefore the CFI could not be criticised for conducting an in-
depth examination of the evidence underlying the Commission's decision when considering 
the arguments raised before it. However, the CFI committed errors of law in relation to the 
manner in which some of the evidence was dealt with and the legal criteria applying to 
collective dominance. Therefore, at least part of the CFI’s judgment dealing with the 
examination of the arguments raised by Impala, alleging manifest errors of assessment by 
the Commission, was vitiated by errors of law. The ECJ therefore set aside the CFI’s 
judgment; however, since it considered that the CFI had only examined two of the five 
original pleas of the applicant and was not in a position to give final judgment, it referred 
the case back to the CFI. On 30 June 2009, the CFI made an order stating that the case was 
devoid of purpose and there was no need for the court to adjudicate on the matters 
referred back.493 
 
2.4. Concluding remarks on the standard of review in EU merger control: the 
current rule as it stands 
With the change in formulation of the ‘limited’ standard of review which occurred in 
Tetra Laval, the question remained whether there was still room for the Commission’s 
margin of appreciation in relation to complex economic and/or technical assessments. The 
                                                     
491 The ECJ found that the CFI placed too much reliance on the conclusions in the Commission’s statement 
of objections. Further, the CFI placed too high an investigatory standard on the Commission and erred in 
relying on confidential documents which the Commission could not have relied on. The CFI also 
misconstrued the legal criteria applying to a collective dominant position: it failed to analyse market 
transparency in the light of a plausible theory of tacit co-ordination. Finally, the CFI erred in finding that the 
Commission had failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons. 
492 Case C-413/06 P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and Labels 
Association (Impala) [2008] I-4951, para 145. 
493 Order of the CFI of 30 June 2009 in Case T-464/04 Impala v Commission. 
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examination of the case law above demonstrates that even though the Tetra Laval, Airtours 
and Schneider jurisprudence clarified the meaning of the ‘limited’ standard of review and 
emphasized the need for the Commission to provide more evidence to substantiate its 
cases, it has left the Commission a significant margin of discretion. The answer is thus in 
the affirmative. On the one hand, it is peaceful that there is no margin of discretion for the 
Commission when evaluating facts, which entails that EU Courts may subject to rigorous 
review the accuracy, completeness and robustness of the facts relied upon by the 
Commission. On the other hand, the EU Courts may not substitute their judgment for that 
of the Commission. This entails that a margin of appreciation continues to exist for the 
Commission in relation to the choice of the approach that is best adapted to the hypothesis 
it has to treat.494 In practical terms, this entails that the Commission is still free to choose 
the methodology it wants to use, no theory being inadmissible in so far as it leads to 
convincing results. Thus while EU Courts may annul a decision when the Commission has 
committed a manifest error that calls into question the validity of the conclusions reached, 
they must refrain from overturning the decision when the Commission’s assessment was 
reasonable in the circumstances.495 
This is particularly relevant when the same evidence might lead to different conclusions 
depending on the methodology used in interpreting this evidence. The latter are still today 
decisions that fall within the margin of discretion of the Commission. In these cases the 
EU Courts cannot substitute an alternative and equally plausible conclusion, proposed by 
the parties or conceived on the Court’s own initiative, for the one the Commission has 
reached, in so far as the Commission has not committed a ‘manifest error of assessment’. 
In reviewing the exercise of that discretion, the Courts have consistently acknowledged that 
the ‘Community judicature … must take account of the discretionary margin implicit in the provisions of 
an economic nature which form part of the rules on concentrations’. 496  This has been very well 
resumed in the words of Advocate General Kokott in the Impala case where she explained 
                                                     
494 VALLINDAS G., Le Tribunal et la concurrence: le juge face aux appréciations économiques complexes, in Revue des 
affaires européennes, No. 3, 2009-2010, p. 464. 
495 REEVES T., DODOOT N., Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in EC Merger Law, - 14th 
Annual IBC Conference on “An Advanced analysis of Major Developments in the field of EC Competition 
Law and Policy”, Brussels, 17-18 November 2005, pp. 140-141: ‘the case law of the Courts suggests that the 
Commission is entitled to a broad margin of discretion in relation to its choice of economic theory of harm applied to a case, 
provided, importantly, that the theory in question is consistent with, and is supported by, the underlying facts of the case’. 
496 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 64. See also Case C-12/03 P Commission v 
Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987, para 119. 
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that ‘the [General] Court exceeds the limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of 
merger control only where the factual and evidential position reasonably allows different assessments, the 
Commission adopts one of them, and the [General] Court nonetheless substitutes its own different 
assessment for that of the Commission’.497 
Accordingly, while on the one hand following the 2002 cases the EU Courts have been 
called upon to exercise increased rigor in their analysis in the presence of complex 
economic or technical appraisals, which hardly leads to consider the EU Courts’ review one 
concerning only obvious, irrational or glaring mistakes; on the other hand, the continuous 
presence of the ‘limited’ review test continues to tip the scale in favor of the Commission’s 
appreciations in cases where equally plausible theories could be advanced. This may be 
particularly problematic and hard to justify in cases where the Commission follows a theory 
or methodology which is not consistent with mainstream economics, but shows as highly 
probable an increase in prices, instead of mainstream methodologies or theories that lead 
to less clear-cut results.498 More generally, the risk is that this approach may give too much 
leeway to the Commission in cases where the circumstance that the application of different 
models may lead to conflicting results concerning the possible harmful effects of a merger 
should have effectively led the Commission to not intervene in the first place. 
 
                                                     
497 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-413/06P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v 
Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association (Impala) [2008] I-4951, para 240.  
498 BOTTEMAN Y., Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence, in Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics, Issue 1, 2006, p. 73. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After having examined in the previous Chapters the terms of the debate on the 
opportunity and/or necessity of intensifying the judicial control exercised by the EU 
Courts in competition cases, and after having analysed the EU case law in both the 
antitrust and merger fields on how the standard of review has been described and applied 
over the years, the following Chapter will illustrate the proposals that have been made to 
reform the characteristics of the current system of judicial review. In particular, the analysis 
will focus on the suggestions that have been made to solve the alleged problems raised by 
the limited review EU judges exercise over the Commission’s assessments in the 
competition field within the review of legality ex Article 263 TFEU. A number of these 
proposals entail structural changes to the current system while others could be 
implemented without affecting the general EU architecture in competition cases. An 
attempt will be made to understand the likelihood that institutional changes may be 
implemented in the near future considering the positive or negative views accompanying 
them. As to the proposals that are essentially centred on the EU Courts’ willingness to 
intensify the judicial review they carry out, an attempt will be made to understand the 
likelihood that judicial control may effectively become more intense in the future and, if so, 
which areas of competition law are likely to be interested by this change. 
 
 
2. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM WHICH ENTAIL STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO 
THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ARTICLE 101 AND 102 TFEU 
CASES 
 
Several proposals have been made over the past years that are meant to address from a 
structural and institutional point of view the shortcomings of the current system of judicial 
review in competition cases. A number of these proposals affect directly the review powers 
and the organization of the EU Courts, while others affect more closely the powers of the 
Commission and its organization. Particular attention will be given to those proposals 
which affect more closely the EU Courts and the EU judicial architecture. As to those 
proposals that concern more closely the Commission, to the extent they are conceived to 
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address the criticisms raised by the current characteristics of the judicial review system, they 
will be addressed briefly in this overview. 
 
2.1. Decision-making powers left to the EU Courts or attribution of full appellate 
jurisdiction on the merits  
One reform which is considered highly controversial but at the same time capable of 
addressing ‘many of the concerns, if not all, raised over the years, concerning the compatibility of the system 
with the [ECHR]’,499 foresees the replacement of the current system with a contradictory 
process where the Commission and interested firms argue their positions before the GC, 
which would be in charge of adopting a binding decision.500 The current system would be 
replaced by a new one where the Commission continues to investigate and exercise its 
prosecutorial role, while the decisional power is transferred to the EU judiciary which 
becomes responsible for deciding if effectively there has been a violation of the 
competition rules, including the imposition of sanctions.  
The authors who defend the various variants of this proposal are mainly attracted by the 
circumstance that all the controversies and mysteries surrounding the EU Courts’ ‘limited’ 
judicial review standard in competition cases would be swept away by this solution. The 
contradictory nature of the process would guarantee in fact that the EU Courts not only 
assess complex economic and/or technical assessments, but also evaluate on an equal 
footing the Commission’s and the interested firms’ views. As well described by one author 
‘[i]n a contradictory process, where there is no presumption of legality for the Commission’s position, parties 
will have equality in arms in trying to convince the judges of the merits of their arguments and appraisals of 
                                                     
499 See WAHL N., The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring Compliance with Fundamental Rights, in The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 274; see also LANG J. T. who considers this 
‘the only reform which could lead to a situation clearly compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights’; LANG J. 
T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 
1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, p. 194. 
500 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011. The author cites the proposal advocated by 
Schwarze on 25 September 2009 in a speech at the conference ‘Celebration of 20 years of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities’ at the GC in Luxembourg. This idea is not novel and was already 
explored and discussed in the 1990’s. At that time a number of authors believed the EU judicial review 
system to be unsatisfactory and advocated that adequate protection could only be guaranteed if the decision-
making power was left to an independent judge. According to them, this solution would also ensure that the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR would be respected in competition proceedings; see 
WAELBROECK D. and FOSSELARD D., Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust Procedures be Left to 
an Independent Judge? - The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures, in 
Yearbook of European Law, 1994, Vol. 14, pp. 111-142. 
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complex facts. The judges will no longer review a privileged party’s appraisal in order to find “manifest 
errors”, but will undertake the exercise judges do best, next to interpreting the law: assessing whose position 
is the most probable’.501  
Closely related to the above suggestion in terms of benefits for interested parties is the 
proposal that, rather than foreseeing a structural change in the EU competition architecture, 
leaves unchanged the current distinction between the Commission as investigator, 
prosecutor and decision-maker, and the EU Courts as guardians of the Commission’s 
actions, but advocates for the introduction of a jurisdiction on the merits for the EU 
Courts in competition cases.  
These proposals will be examined in turn in the following subsections. As will be seen, 
the main arguments against these solutions range from practical issues concerning their 
administrative costs of execution,502 and difficulties in their implementation (requiring more 
or less extensive Treaty and/or legislative amendments), to broader concerns relating to the 
difficulty of reconciling these solutions with the principles governing the EU judicial 
architecture established with the Treaties. 
 
2.1.1. The EU Courts as decision-makers 
The proposal of vesting the GC with decision-making powers is highly attractive for the 
present debate on the standard of judicial review as it addresses one of the main lacunae of 
the system, the existence of an impartial view by an independent body of which, among 
two potentially equal positions, is the most probable and should be validated. This solution 
would thus increase the intensity and scope of judicial review of the Commission’s 
                                                     
501 WAHL N., The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring Compliance with Fundamental Rights, in The Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series 
(edited by MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 275. 
502 Certain authors advocate for a strengthening of internal checks and balances within the Commission 
rather than the creation of a system based on prosecution before the EU Courts or a new court created to 
this end, as ‘an intermediate approach…(hopefully) will address the most significant due process concerns regarding the existing 
ECMR system, while minimising the risk that the costs of a full-blown U.S.-style system are incurred’; see Skadden Arps 
Comments on Commission's Green Paper on the Review of the EC Merger Regulation available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2002_council_regulation/skadden.pdf, para 4.3. This view is 
not shared by those authors who argue that the cost advantages of keeping the system unchanged are not as 
obvious as they seem. This argument is based on the consideration that in the current system subsequent 
applications for judicial review are frequent and the decision-making phase risks becoming a superfluous 
anticipation of the work which will later be anyway carried out by the reviewing court; see WILS P. J. W., The 
Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, pp. 10-11. 
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assessments as the final decision is no longer taken by the latter.503 This proposal would 
also be compatible with the requirements of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 
ECHR as the final decision imposing a sanction in a ‘criminal’ or ‘quasi-criminal’ 
proceeding would be adopted by an independent and impartial tribunal.504  
According to certain authors, this solution would be easily attainable from a practical 
point of view as it would not necessarily require an amendment of the EU Treaties. 
According to this view, the power to adopt decisions could in fact be transferred from the 
Commission to the EU Courts relying on Article 103 TFEU which authorises the EU 
Council ‘to define the respective functions of the Commission and the Court of Justice’ in applying 
competition law.505 The EU Courts, in particular the GC, would have the power to decide 
all competition cases and would thus exercise powers of full jurisdiction, as currently the 
case in relation to appeals concerning fines. This view however is not shared by those 
commentators who consider that the conferral to the EU Courts of the power to adopt or 
re-adopt a decision on the merits entails a radical departure from the powers of judicial 
                                                     
503  INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMMISSION, Due process in EU antitrust 
proceedings, Comments submitted on the European Commission's draft Best Practices in Antitrust Proceedings 
and the Hearing Officers’ Guidance Paper, 8 March 2010, p. 8: ‘[i]n an ideal world, we would recommend that the 
Commission would hand over the power to take decisions involving penalties to an independent court or tribunal (whether the GC 
or another community court). Then penalties would be imposed by the Courts not the Commission, resolving the ECHR issue’. 
According to Wils, ‘the arguments in favour of an alternative system in which the European Commission would prosecute 
before the Community Courts would appear to be stronger with regards to Articles 81 and 82 that with regard to mergers’. Wils 
basis his conclusion on the quasi-criminal nature of Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases and on the assumption 
that there are greater risks of prosecutorial bias in these enforcement cases than in merger case; see WILS P. J. 
W., The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, No. 3, p. 12. 
504 Certain authors also remark that should the concentration of powers in an administrative agency issuing 
criminal sanctions in competition cases be condemned as contrary to the right to a fair trial, then a transfer of 
decision-making powers to the courts becomes all the more necessary; see BRONCKERS M, VALLERY A., 
Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities and Which Role for the Courts after 
Menarini (July 5, 2012), in European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, p. 13. 
505 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, p. 221. The author however points out that difficulties 
may arise as the Commission, having the exclusive right of legislative initiative, may not want to pursue measures that do not 
meet its institutional interests. However, these should be overcome by the Commission’s own interest that its procedures not be 
found to be incompatible with the ECHR. See also WILS P. J. W., The combination of the investigative and prosecutorial 
function and the adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis, in Concurrences, 2005, 
No. 3, p. 5. Wils considers that the transfer of decision-making powers in antitrust cases from the 
Commission to the EU Courts would not require a modification of the Treaties as ‘Article 83(1) EC [now 
Article 103(1) TFEU] gives a wide mandate to the Council…[and] this provision would appear precisely to allow the Council 
to transfer the decisional power with regard to Articles 81 and 82 EC from the Commission to the Courts’. Interestingly, 
Wils also considers that prosecution by the Commission before the EU Courts would have been the 
understanding of the Spaak Report preceding the adoption of the EC Treaty; see WILS W. P. J., Principles of 
European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 160. 
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review attributed to the EU Courts, and would thus require an amendment of the Treaty.506 
A further obstacle is that in the merger field Article 103(1) TFEU could not be used as the 
main legal basis for any proposal for change given that the legal basis of the EU Merger 
Regulation is not Article 103 TFEU but rather Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 EC). 
In any event, a reform of this nature and scope require changes to Regulation 1/2003 
and to the EU Merger Regulation (as the Commission would no longer be entitled to adopt 
prohibition or - in the merger field - clearance decisions), and to the Statute and Rules of 
Procedure of the EU Courts. The latter changes would find their legal basis in Article 256(1) 
TFEU that states that ‘[t]he Statute may provide for the General Court to have jurisdiction for other 
classes of action or proceeding’. 507  
This proposal is considered attractive in terms of timing of proceedings as, according to 
its advocates, the length of the Commission’s investigations would remain the same, while 
the length of the new procedure (investigation, application to the GC and GC decision) 
would be the same if not shorter than under the current procedure (investigation and 
decision by the Commission followed by judgment of the GC).508 One of the disadvantages 
of this proposal concerns however the increased workload for the EU Courts, in particular 
the GC. Also, as the GC will engage in economic assessments that were prerogative of the 
Commission and in relation to which it exercised only limited review, it may have to 
                                                     
506 See Andreangeli reporting the comments of Judge Vesterdorf to the House of Lords Select Committee 
discussing the proposal advanced by the Confederation of British Industry to introduce a EU specialized 
panel responsible for the review of merger decisions and, perhaps at a later stage, of all competition decisions; 
ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 237 and footnote 
68. See also Killick and Berghe who consider that: ‘[t]his solution raises significant constitutional questions – it could 
require a change to the Treaties to implement, as well as significant organizational changes. So this is probably best seen as a long 
term goal, rather than a solution in the near term. Few associated with the EU would be keen to suggest Treaty changes after the 
difficulties of securing approval for the Lisbon Treaty – a process which highlighted that changing the Treaty can take many years 
to achieve and is not a short term or even medium term solution’; KILLICK J., BERGHE P., This is not the time to be 
tinkering with Regulation 1/2003 - It is time for fundamental reform - Europe should have change we can believe in, October 
2010; available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/08a7ee59-bbaa-44c8-90a7-
d81d891d637f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7890f325-49b4-43e4-a0a5-
dd7f74b44fc0/Article_This_is_not_the_time_to_be_tinkering_with_Regulation_1-2003.pdf, p. 2. 
507 For an overview of the changes that would be needed to the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 and the EU 
Courts’ Statute and Rules of Procedure see LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European 
Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, pp. 221 and 
224-227. 
508 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, p. 222. 
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require the assistance of economic experts or advocate for the appointment of judges with 
specialised economic knowledge.509 
 
2.1.1.1.The creation of a specialized competition chamber 
Closely related to the above solution is the proposal that recommends the creation of a 
chamber within the GC specialized in competition matters. 510  While the Commission 
would retain its investigative and prosecutorial tasks, the GC would decide on 
infringements of competition law and possibly sanctions through the determinations of a 
specific competition chamber. This solution would ensure that proceedings are fair, 
objective and impartial, and that the review of complex economic and/or technical findings 
is made by judges who are competent in both law and economics. According to certain 
commentators, this solution would be compatible with the present constitutional 
framework as it could be implemented using as legal basis Article 103 TFEU, as illustrated 
above, without the need for Treaty modifications.511 This view is not however shared by 
those commentators who, as seen supra, consider that the conferral to the EU Courts of the 
power to adopt or re-adopt a decision on the merits entails a radical departure from the 
powers of judicial review attributed to the EU Courts, and would thus require an 
amendment of the Treaty, which could be all the more necessary in order to ensure 
consistency and in order to apply equivalent procedures in the merger field. 
 
2.1.1.2. The creation of a competition specialized court  
The creation of a judicial panel competent for competition cases has also been debated. 
Introduced by the Nice Treaty and now having their legal basis in Article 257 TFEU, 
specialised courts attached to the GC can be established by the European Parliament and 
the Council, to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of action or proceedings 
                                                     
509 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, p. 223. 
510  This solution was considered ‘the most satisfactory alternative’ to giving the EU Courts powers of full 
jurisdictional review by Working Group III in its Report produced for the GCLC conference of 11-12 June 
2009; see WAELBROECK D., The Enforcement System for Articles 81 and 82 EC: Time for a Redefinition of Decision-
Making in EC Competition Law, Concurrences, No. 3, 2009, p. 19. 
511 WAELBROECK D., The Enforcement System for Articles 81 and 82 EC: Time for a Redefinition of Decision-Making 
in EC Competition Law, Concurrences, No. 3, 2009, p. 19. 
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brought in specific areas.512 However, given that decisions by specialized courts may be 
subject to a right of appeal before the GC, it has been claimed that they present no obvious 
advantage compared to specialized chambers within the GC or compared to the creation of 
a new court at the level of the GC. 513  Furthermore, given the panel’s ‘lower’ status 
compared to the GC, the implementation of this proposal could meet the practical obstacle 
of not easily finding judges specialized in competition law willing to work for this lower 
court, without considering the amount of criticism this solution can raise in terms of 
prolonging competition proceedings in light of the creation of a third level of judiciary 
review.  
In 2007 a U.K. House of Lords Committee discussed the proposal advanced by the 
Confederation of British Industry to introduce a EU specialized panel responsible for the 
review of merger decisions and, perhaps at a later stage, of all competition decisions. The 
conclusions reached by the Committee in its final report are interesting for the present 
debate as it was considered that the creation of a new judicial body was not appropriate and 
proportionate to respond to the concerns for timely and final review of merger decisions.514 
In particular, the main criticisms against the proposal concerned the circumstance that it 
would increase the complexity of the current framework by adding a new layer of review 
and would not necessarily entail time savings considering the nature of the complex 
litigation. These concerns were also expressed by the President of the ECJ Mr. Skouris who, 
speaking personally, in 2008 considered that the creation of a specialized court for 
competition cases would make the system complex, time consuming and could lead to lack 
                                                     
512  Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, signed at Nice, 26 February 2001, in OJ [2001] C80/1. Article 256 
TFEU establishes that: ‘[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may establish specialised courts attached to the General Court to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of 
action or proceeding brought in specific areas. The European Parliament and the Council shall act by means of regulations either 
on a proposal from the Commission after consultation of the Court of Justice or at the request of the Court of Justice after 
consultation of the Commission’. On the basis of this provision on 2 November 2004 the Council of the EU 
adopted a decision establishing the EU Civil Service Tribunal. The new specialized court, composed of seven 
judges, adjudicates in disputes between the EU and its civil service, a jurisdiction that until 2005 was exercised 
by the GC. Its decisions are subject to appeal on questions of law only to the GC and, in exceptional cases, to 
review by the ECJ. 
513 LANG J. T., Do We Need a European Competition Court?, in Liber Amicorum in honour of Bo Vesterdorf, 
Brussels, 2007. According to the President of the CFI Mr. Jaeger, the proposal to appoint specialised judges 
should be examined with great care and attention by the Member States because difficult to reconcile with the 
generalist nature of the CFI as envisaged by the treaty itself; see JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in 
Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, p. 311. 
514 See ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 236-238. 
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of cohesion given the ECJ’s reduced role in these specialized areas.515 This view is not 
shared by those commentators who consider the creation of a specialized court a serious 
option still to be studied. In particular, the Nice Treaty expressly introduced the possibility 
of a third-level review in certain areas of the law, not necessarily limited to staff cases, with 
the agreement of the Member States, thus any risk of diversity in jurisprudence should be 
addressed with the instruments and remedies provided for in the Treaties, such as Article 
256(2) TFEU which provides for mechanisms for resolving interpretative problems.516 
 
2.1.1.3. The creation of a competition court at the same level of the GC 
Another proposal that has been advanced is that of creating at the same level of the GC a 
new court specialized in competition law. This is normally considered an alternative 
solution to the creation, always at the GC level, of specialized chambers within the GC’s 
own organization. It has been considered that this solution should be pursued only to the 
extent that it is not possible to set up specialized chambers, as the creation of a new court 
raises a number of additional issues, including, among others, the length for setting it up, 
the clear definition of its jurisdiction (in particular for competition cases which overlap 
with other areas of EU law), and coordination of the interpretation and application of EU 
lay by the judges of the new court and the GC.517 
                                                     
515 SKOURIS V., De nouveaux défis pour la Cour de Justice dans une Europe élargie, ERA-Forum, Vol. 9, Issue. 1, 
2008, pp. 99-108. Judge Jaeger shares a similar view and considers that: ‘the creation of a specialist judicial panel to 
deal with competition cases (or even certain categories of competition cases), often put forward as possible solution to the current 
overload of cases pending before the CFI, would not be, in my view, a satisfactory solution. Indeed, not only would it, in fact, 
increase the possibility of delays due to the resulting addition of a possible ‘re-examination’ procedure of CFI appeal decisions 
before the ECJ, but it would also lead to the unacceptable risk of loss of cross-fertilisation advantage within the domain of EC 
administrative law, which is inherent in the current system’; see JAEGER M., The Court of First Instance and the 
Management of Competition Law Litigation, in EU Competition Law in Context, Essays in Honour of Virpi Tiili, H. 
Kanninen, N. Korjus and A. Rosas (eds.), Hart Publishing, Oxford 2009, p. 9. 
516 BELLAMY C., An EU Competition Court: The Continuing Debate, in LIANOS I., KOKKORIS I. (eds.), The 
reform of EC competition law: new challenges, Kluwer Law International, 2010, pp. 50-51. Article 256(2) 
TFEU establishes that: ‘[t]he General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions or proceedings brought 
against decisions of the specialised courts. Decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph may exceptionally be subject 
to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk 
of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected’. 
517 LANG J. T., Do We Need a European Competition Court?, in Liber Amicorum in honour of Bo Vesterdorf, 
Brussels, 2007. According to BARBIER DE LA SERRE, the case for the establishment of a specialised 
competition court will become less and less compelling if the number of competition cases actually diminish, 
which may be a consequence of the increased use of the commitment procedure; see BARBIER DE LA 
SERRE E., Competition Law Cases Before the EU Courts, in The Role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by MEROLA M. and 
DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 100. The proposals for the creation of a judicial panel or a new court 
specialized in competition matters is not novel; see VESTERDORF B., Recent CFI Rulings on Merger Cases, 
Interim Measures and Accelerated Procedures and Some Reflections on Reform Measures Regarding Judicial Control, in EC 
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2.1.2. The attribution of full judicial review powers to the EU Courts  
Another solution that has been advanced to solve the current shortcomings of the 
judicial review system in competition cases is to empower the EU Courts with full appellate 
jurisdiction over all of the Commission’s assessments incorporated in a decision, and not 
only in relation to fines. It is argued that this solution, which would allow for the EU 
Courts to vary all of the contested measure, including the merits of the Commission’s 
decision and not only the amount of the fine, would have the advantage of ensuring ‘an 
open space for litigating the merits of antitrust cases’.518 Currently, under the review of legality, EU 
Courts can only declare the measure examined void, and under the limited judicial review 
standard, the EU Courts do not substitute their own assessments for those of the 
Commission in the case of complex economic and/or technical evaluations. This entails 
that the EU Courts do not carry out a balancing exercise between the Commission’s 
interpretation of facts and evidence and the different interpretations that may be advanced 
by interested parties, as this would encroach on the Commission’s discretion. The 
attribution of full judicial review powers would ensure that the Commission and interested 
parties appear on an equal footing in front of the EU Courts and that their pleas and 
arguments are given the same weight and relevance. Providing the EU Courts with full 
appellate review powers would also address the widespread criticism against the 
concentration of powers in the hand of the Commission as, notwithstanding the 
accumulation of investigatory, prosecutorial and decision-making functions, the 
Commission would have to conduct its activities in the shadow of full review. 
Moreover, certain advocates of this proposal claim that this solution would bring the 
EU competition enforcement system to comply with the case law of the ECtHR on the 
right to a fair trial. According to this view, in the case of non hard-core criminal charges (as 
allegedly the case in the competition field), 519  the ECtHR requires that the appeal 
                                                                                                                                 
Merger Control: A Major Reform in Progress, Papers from the EC Merger Control Conference held in 
Brussels in November 2002 under the auspices of the European Commission Directorate General for 
Competition and the International Bar Association, pp. 79-84. 
518 GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts, in European Law 
Review, 2011, Vol 36(4), p. 475. 
519 Commentators who consider that competition charges belong to the ‘hard-core’ criminal head of Article 6 
ECHR argue that this solution is still incompatible with ECHR requirements because a criminal punishment 
would still not be imposed by a court at first instance; this solution would however contribute to curing the 
defects of proceedings before the Commission; see KILLICK J., BERGHE P., This is not the time to be tinkering 
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jurisdiction not only verify the correct application of the law, but also engage in a complete 
reassessment of the facts and evidence before it (de novo review). Accordingly, the EU 
Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines should also extend to the determination of 
the infringement.520 
According to the supporters of this proposal, the current legal framework would already 
provide for the necessary means to support this transformation, without the need for 
formal Treaty amendments. According to one view, Article 103 TFEU could be used as it 
empowers the Council to adopt secondary legislation that defines the respective functions 
of the Commission and the Courts with regard to competition law, including expansion of 
the Courts’ powers of review (see supra subsection 2.1.1 in this Chapter on Article 103 
TFEU).521 According to another view, the legal basis for the exercise of this unlimited 
jurisdiction in relation to the entire content of a Commission’s decision would be provided 
by Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 16 of the EU Merger Regulation which 
refer to the EU Courts’ ‘unlimited jurisdiction…to review decisions’.522 This view would also find 
                                                                                                                                 
with Regulation 1/2003 - It is time for fundamental reform - Europe should have change we can believe in, October 2010; 
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/08a7ee59-bbaa-44c8-90a7-
d81d891d637f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7890f325-49b4-43e4-a0a5-
dd7f74b44fc0/Article_This_is_not_the_time_to_be_tinkering_with_Regulation_1-2003.pdf, p. 10; and 
GCLC WORKING GROUP, Enforcement by the Commission. The Decisional and Enforcement Structure in Antitrust 
Cases and The Commission’s Fining System, Report prepared from the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC)’s 
Annual Conference “Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe -- Time for a 
Review of Regulation 1/2003” (11 and 12 June 2009, Brussels), available at 
http://www.learlab.com/conference2009/documents/The%20decisional%20and%20enforcement%20struct
ure%20and%20the%20Commission_s%20fining%20system%20GERADIN.pdf, p. 27. 
520 See, inter alia, SLATER D., THOMAS S., WAELBROECK D., Competition law proceedings before the European 
Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, Research Papers in Law/Cahiers juridiques, No. 5/2008, 
College of Europe, p. 33. According to these authors ‘[t]he CFI cannot limit its analysis to “manifest errors of 
appraisals or misuse of power” but should in every case reassess fully the facts and the choice of the appropriate legal and economic 
tests applied to these facts. The “unlimited jurisdiction” that the Community Courts are entitled to exercise should not be limited 
to altering the amount of the fines imposed on companies but should also extend to the very determination of the infringement 
giving rise to these sanctions’ (p. 34). For a discussion on whether de novo review is effectively mandated by the 
ECHR see supra subsection 4.2.4.1 in Section II of Chapter 1.  
521  GCLC WORKING GROUP, Enforcement by the Commission. The Decisional and Enforcement Structure in 
Antitrust Cases and The Commission’s Fining System, Report prepared from the Global Competition Law Centre 
(GCLC)’s Annual Conference “Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe -- Time 
for a Review of Regulation 1/2003” (11 and 12 June 2009, Brussels), available at 
http://www.learlab.com/conference2009/documents/The%20decisional%20and%20enforcement%20struct
ure%20and%20the%20Commission_s%20fining%20system%20GERADIN.pdf, p. 28. 
522 The scholarly debate concerning the scope of application of the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction is not 
novel and has often resurfaced over the years. The controversy finds its origins in the conflicting wording 
used in Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003. While Article 261 TFEU refers to ‘unlimited 
jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided’, Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 refers to ‘unlimited jurisdiction to 
review decisions’. This different wording has led a number of commentators to argue that unlimited jurisdiction 
can be or should be exercised in relation to the whole decision imposing a fine. See, inter alia, FORRESTER I., 
A Bush in Need of Pruning: The Luxuriant Growth of Light Judicial Review, European University Institute, Robert 
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confirmation in certain case law where the EU Courts interpreted broadly their unlimited 
jurisdiction and appeared to consider that the entire decision, not only the part on fines, 
could be modified. 523  According to certain commentators, if the EU Courts are still 
unwilling to engage in such full review and to depart from the deep-rooted interpretation 
of their jurisdiction, incentives could be created by the EU legislator through non-binding 
acts such as resolutions and positions or, if ineffective, through full-fledged legislative 
interventions, not on the Treaties, but more simply on secondary legislation (such as an 
amendment in the EU Courts’ Statute that mirrors the wording of Article 31of Regulation 
1/2003 and Article 16 of the EU Merger Regulation).524  
This view is however not shared by who considers that the passage from a judicial 
review of legality to that of unlimited jurisdiction on the merits would be inconsistent with 
the current legislative framework. 525  The current EU framework would provide for a 
review of legality of the Commission’s decisions on the basis of Article 263 TFEU and an 
                                                                                                                                 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, pp. 
38-40. Forrester contends that ‘it is too cautious to hold that the European Courts have unlimited jurisdiction only over the 
level of the fine in antitrust cases. The CFI has, should have, and should exercise, the broadest possible scope of judicial review 
under Article 229 EC in antitrust cases’ (p. 39); see also GERARD D., EU Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: Why wait? 
Full Appellate Jurisdiction, Now, in CPI Antitrust Journal, December 2010, p. 7: ‘the case law settled in favor of the 
narrow solution…time has come, it is argued, to reverse the trend and to interpret the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction as 
applying to the review of the decisions whereby the Commission imposes fines, i.e., full appellate jurisdiction’. For an overview 
of the historical reasons which would justify the use of Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 as legal basis for full 
appellate judicial review (including the negotiations which led to its adoption and early Treaty commentaries) 
see GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts, in European Law 
Review, 2011, Vol 36(4), pp. 475-477. 
523 See GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts, in European Law 
Review, 2011, Vol 36(4), p. 473, who lists the following cases: Case T-69/04 Schunk GmbH and Schunk 
Kohlenstoff-Technik GmbH v Commission [2008] ECR II-2567, paras. 23 and 41 the GC stated that: ‘[u]nder Article 
[261 TFEU] and [Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003], [the GC and the ECJ] have unlimited jurisdiction in advance 
brought against decisions whereby the Commission has fixed fines and may thus not only annul the decisions taken by the 
Commission but also cancel, reduce or increase the fines imposed’ and that ‘[t]hus the Commission’s administrative practice is 
subject to unlimited review by the [Union] judicature’ (emphasis added). In Case C-534/07 P William Prym GmbH & 
Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG v Commission [2009] ECR I-7415, para 86, the ECJ stated that: 
‘[t]he unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the [General Court] by Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 in accordance with Article 
[261 TFEU] authorizes that court to vary the contested measure, even without annulling it, by taking into account all of the 
factual circumstances, so as to amend, for example, the amount of the fine’ (emphasis added).  
524 This view is based on the wording of Article 256 TFEU which states that ‘[t]he Statute … may provide for the 
General Court to have jurisdiction for other classes of action or proceeding’. The circumstance that the initiative for 
amendments to the Statute must originate from the Court of Justice after consulting the Commission, or vice 
versa, and that thus the Court of Justice may be unwilling to make such a proposal, could be circumvented by 
the Parliament or Council issuing resolutions and/or positions calling for proposals from the Commission. 
See GERARD D., Breaking the EU Antitrust Enforcement Deadlock: Re-empowering the Courts, in European Law 
Review, 2011, Vol 36(4), pp. 477-478. 
525  See GRASSANI S., Jurisdictional vs. “Juris…Fictional” Review in the Land of Menarini, (June 7, 2012), 19th 
St.Gallen International Competition Law Forum ICF - June 7th and 8th 2012; available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2190929, pp. 3-5. 
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unlimited jurisdiction only in relation to fines on the basis of Article 261 TFEU and Article 
31 of Regulation 1/2003 and Article 16 of the EU Merger Regulation. This is also 
supported by the consideration that currently, on the basis of Article 264 TFEU, the only 
remedy the EU Courts have is a declaration that the Commission’s decision is void. This is 
a further argument that the EU Courts are not empowered to substitute their decision for 
that of the Commission. Moreover, it is argued that this power would run contrary to the 
institutional balance introduced by the Treaties between the Courts’ and the Commission’s 
prerogatives, where the recognition of a certain discretion to the Commission is inherent in 
the concept of separation of powers.526 As illustrated by one commentator: 
‘[i]t would be illogical to empower the Union courts to review in full all aspects of a Commission decision 
without limitations, but to forbid them from adopting a judgment substituting the decision. This would 
simply result in a duplication of effort and waste of resources. If, when exercising the review of legality, 
the Union courts cannot adopt the decision that the Commission itself is empowered to adopt, this must 
be because the Commission has a reserved sphere of decision-making which the drafters of the Treaty 
decided should ultimately rest with the Commission and not with the Union courts’.527  
In light of the above, the leading view is that the proposal to introduce full appellate 
judicial review powers over the entire Commission decision would require a Treaty change 
and is considered for this reason hardly practicable until broader consensus is reached on 
the topic.528  
 
                                                     
526 In the Italian Flat Glass case the GC stated that: ‘[a]ccordingly, the Court considers that, although a Community court 
may, as part of the judicial review of the acts of the Community administration, partially annul a Commission decision in the 
field of competition, that does not mean that it has jurisdiction to remake the contested decision. The assumption of such 
jurisdiction could disturb the inter-institutional balance established by the Treaty and would risk prejudicing the rights of defence. 
In the light of those factors, the Court considers that it is not for itself, in the circumstances of the present case, to carry out a 
comprehensive re-assessment of the evidence before it, nor to draw conclusions from that evidence in the light of the rules on 
competition’ (Joined Cases T-68, 77-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, 
paras. 319-320). 
527 NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 1000. 
528 Particularly in the merger field, the possibility that the GC decide definitely the cases under review is 
considered one of the remedies, if not the only, to the length of proceedings and the risk that transactions will 
fail due to review periods; see KINSELLA S., MEIER A., HARRISON P., Judicial review of merger decisions: An 
overview of EU and national case law, in e-Competitions, 2009, No. 29156, pp. 2-3. 
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2.2. The increase in competition specialization within the chambers of the 
General Court or the increase in number of EU judges 
Other proposals which have been advanced to address the shortcomings of the limited 
judicial review standard concern the functional organization of the EU Courts rather than 
the scope and intensity of their judicial review. 
One first proposal moves from the premise that with the expansion of the importance 
of economic analysis in competition cases, the EU Courts may have become more and 
more unwilling to engage in the appraisal of complex economic and/or technical 
assessments due to the lack of the necessary know-how and knowledge. In order to avoid 
that competition cases may be too complicated for generalist judges to adjudicate on, 
leading them to refrain from in-depth analysis of the Commission’s assessments, one 
proposal, advanced in the past to address the problem of the number and length of judicial 
proceedings, could help circumvent this problem. Reference is made here to the suggestion 
of increasing specialization within the chambers of the GC. 529  This proposal would 
contribute to accelerate the treatment of cases, without prejudging the quality of rulings, 
while ensuring that judges have the necessary competences to carry out in-depth reviews of 
the measures under examination. This solution would also have the advantage of not 
requiring a complex and formal Treaty modification, contrary to what might be required 
for the creation of a specialized competition chamber or court, 530  as it could be 
implemented with the agreement of the President of the GC and its judges. This solution 
would also be consistent with the EU Courts’ past practice and with the practice of many 
tribunals in the EU.531 
 Closely related to the above solution, without however changing the current 
generalist nature of the EU judges’ expertise, is the proposal to increase the number of EU 
judges. Certain authors consider an increase in the number of judges an adeguate response, 
                                                     
529 See GARCIA-VALDECASAS R., Le TPICE à la croisée des chemins, in Concurrences, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1-2; 
and BELLAMY C., An EU Competition Court: The Continuing Debate, in LIANOS I., KOKKORIS I. (eds.), The 
reform of EC competition law: new challenges, Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 11. 
530 See supra subsection 2.1.1 in this Chapter for a discussion on the debate on whether Treaty modifications 
would be needed for the creation of a specialized competition chamber or court competent to take a decision 
in competition cases. 
531 GARCIA-VALDECASAS R., Le TPICE à la croisée des chemins, in Concurrences, No. 1, 2008, p. 2. 
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as this would enable the GC to use time more efficiently while ensuring the required review 
of matters of fact and law.532 
In order to address and solve a number of problems raised by the increase in the 
number of cases dealt with, including their backlog and increase in duration, the EU Courts 
in 2011 proposed to change their composition asking for 12 new judges at the GC, 
bringing, at the time, the number from 27 to 39. 533 Over the past years a number of 
different proposals have been made by the EU Courts and Member State representatives in 
order to unblock the impasse on how to improve the efficiency of judicial proceedings. 
Although there seems to be consensus that more judges are needed, it is highly debated 
what the exact number should be and how they should be chosen. On 20 June 2013 plans 
to increase the number of judges at the General Court by 12 to ease the growing workload 
of the EU Court of Justice was backed by the European Parliament’s Committee for Legal 
Affairs. In addition, the committee has proposed that the additional judges be selected 
based on merits instead of nationality. However, diversities in views among Member States 
have impeded this proposal from making any progress which, to date, is still stalled. 
 
2.3. Separation of investigative and adjudicatory functions within the 
Commission 
As examined supra in Chapter 1, one of the main criticisms raised against the current 
system of limited judicial review concerns the extent to which the parties’ procedural rights 
and rights of defense are safeguarded in the competition domain. One of the main 
arguments raised in this context is that the concentration of investigative, prosecutorial and 
decision-making powers in the hands of a single authority, namely the Commission, raises 
the question as to whether such extensive and far-reaching powers are subject to effective 
controls.534 The concentration of functions in the hands of a single administrative body is 
not an unusual feature of many administrative systems,535 however certain authors doubt 
                                                     
532 See, inter alia, NIKOLIC I., Full Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases after KME: A New Formula of Review?, in 
ECLR, 2012, Issue 12, pp. 587-588. 
533 NEWMAN M., CROFTS L., Extra EU judge appointments still divide European States, M-lex, 14 January 2014. 
534 FORRESTER I., Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures, 2009, 
European Law Review, 817, pp. 1-17. 
535 Other EU Member States use two-tier systems in which the national competition authority has the power 
to investigate and make findings of infringements and impose remedies and fines then subject to judicial 
review such as, inter alia, the UK, France and Italy. 
185 
 
that this represents best international practice.536 Furthermore, this is usually considered 
acceptable only if the decisions adopted are subject to checks and balances, in particular, 
effective external control in the form of judicial review by a court. 537 In light of these 
concerns and in order to address the shortcomings of the current architecture of EU 
competition enforcement, proposals have also been made which concern not the judicial 
phase but rather the administrative stage of enforcement proceedings, in order to ensure 
the fairer handling of cases by the Commission. 
One structural proposal foresees the existence of two distinct bodies, one which 
investigates and the other which decides, and whose findings are subject to appeals to the 
GC. One concrete suggestion in order to separate decisional and prosecutorial powers is 
the creation of a new specialized ‘European Competition Agency’. Several different options 
have been advanced in this regard, one that leaves the investigative activities to the new 
agency and the adjudication tasks to the Commission,538 another one that leaves to the 
Commission the investigative activities and gives the decision-making tasks to the new 
agency, and another one that leaves both functions to the new agency. 539  The body 
entrusted with the decision-making task should not only be more specialized and 
professional, but also ‘quasi-judicial’, and separated from the Commission’s normal policy 
functions.  
                                                     
536 GERADIN N. and PETIT N., Judicial Review in European Union Competition Law, in The Role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in Competition Law Cases, GCLC Annual Conferences Series (edited by 
MEROLA M. and DERENNE J.) Bruylant, 2010, p. 40. 
537 According to Nazzini, the level of protection of the parties’ rights during the administrative procedure, 
and not only the characteristics of the Courts’ review, must be taken into account in order to assess properly 
the compatibility of limited judicial review with the right to a fair trial. This author argues that currently the 
guarantees during the administrative procedure are not sufficient for limited review to be compatible with 
Article 6 ECHR. He argues that limited judicial review could be compatible if at the administrative level 
prosecution and decision-making functions were separated. See NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, 
Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in 
CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 979 onwards. 
538 It is considered that a precedent of this type of delegation of investigative powers can be found in the 
Decision creating the European Anti-Fraud Office (“OLAF”; Commission Decision (EC, ECSC, Euratom) 
No. 1999/352 of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office, OJ [1999] L136/20); see GCLC 
WORKING GROUP, Enforcement by the Commission. The Decisional and Enforcement Structure in Antitrust Cases and 
The Commission’s Fining System, Report prepared from the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC)’s Annual 
Conference “Towards an Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe -- Time for a Review of 
Regulation 1/2003” (11 and 12 June 2009, Brussels), available at 
http://www.learlab.com/conference2009/documents/The%20decisional%20and%20enforcement%20struct
ure%20and%20the%20Commission_s%20fining%20system%20GERADIN.pdf, p. 23. 
539 WAELBROECK D., The Enforcement System for Articles 81 and 82 EC: Time for a Redefinition of Decision-Making 
in EC Competition Law, Concurrences, No. 3, 2009, p. 18. 
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Another proposal foresees a functional separation that can be implemented within the 
Commission, without the creation of an external agency.540 In this scenario the separation 
of investigative and decisional functions is achieved by establishing an adjudication unit 
outside DG Competition reporting directly to the Commissioner for competition. While 
DG Competition would retain the power to investigate cases, this new unit would have the 
role of drafting the decision, while the Commissioner would retain the ultimate power to 
adopt the decision together with the College of Commissioners, remaining the ultimate 
decision-maker. 541 This solution would break the link between investigator and who is 
responsible for drafting the decision, while the Commissioner for Competition and the 
College of Commissioners can be trusted to be sufficiently independent and impartial, 
provided safeguards are foreseen to avoid their excessive involvement during the course of 
the investigation. 
In all variants of these proposals, the separation of functions is viewed positively as, 
among other reasons, it allows the interested firms to defend their views on an equal 
footing with the prosecutorial body in front of the decision-making body. This proposal 
would thus potentially address one of the main shortcomings of the current system of 
judicial review which resides in the ‘privileged’ position that the Commission benefits from 
in relation to its complex economic and/or technical assessments, currently overridden in a 
limited number of cases, such as if found to be ‘manifestly erroneous’. The new systems 
proposed have the potential to guarantee that the decision-making body hears all the 
positions and views of the interested parties in order to decide which one is more plausible, 
in addition to the subsequent possibility to appeal this decision in front of the GC. Similar 
proposals would also bring along with them the benefits of de-politicized decision-making 
                                                     
540 See NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), pp. 1002-1003. 
541 In another variant of this proposal the two-tier system would see DG Competition responsible for the first 
phase of the administrative procedure and for the adoption of a first instance decision and, in case of 
disagreement, the Hearing Officer responsible for a full review of the case team’s decision and for issuing a 
‘final decision’ which would be sent to the College of Commissioners for adoption; see MACGREGOR A., 
GECIC B., Due Process in EU Competition Cases, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, 
Vol. 3, No. 5, available at 
http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/due_process_in_eu_competition_cases_following_the_introduc
tion_of_the_new_best_practices_guidelines_on_antitrust_proceedings.pdf, pp. 437-438. For a similar 
proposal, with also the variant of the establishment of an independent competition agency, see FORRESTER 
I. S., Due Process in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures, 2009, ELR, 817, pp. 13-14. 
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mechanisms, and more efficient and effective quality control of fact-finding and economic 
assessments.542 
However, it could still be contended that full compatibility with the right to a ‘fair trial’ 
under the ECHR543 would be respected only where the subsequent review by the GC left 
no space to the decision-making body’s margin of discretion.544 This view is not shared by 
who considers that the guarantees enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR would be respected, 
even preserving a deferential standard of review, where the necessary procedural measures 
have been adopted to ensure a functional separation between the prosecutor and the 
decision-maker within the Commission. This argument is based on the consideration that 
compliance with Article 6(1) ECHR would be guaranteed if, when deference is recognized 
towards the decision-maker, the latter complies with the requirements of independence and 
impartiality.545 This would ensure that the right to an independent and impartial tribunal is 
safeguarded. 
As to the likelihood that these reforms see the light, one important practical aspect is 
whether they would require an amendment of the Treaties. Depending on the answer to 
this question, issues of timing and lengthy disagreements between Member States could be 
avoided. There are however conflicting views on this issue. On the one hand, there is who 
believes that the creation of a new agency would be possible without an amendment of the 
Treaty. The EU legislator, according to this view, would be free to organize decision-
                                                     
542 ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 239. 
543 See supra subsection 4.2.4.1 in Section II of Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion on the different definitions 
of right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR. A different issue is whether this new system would be 
compatible with other due process requirements imposed by the ECHR; for further discussion see LANG J. 
T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under Regulation 
1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, pp. 219-221. 
544 Commentators who consider that competition charges belong to the ‘hard-core’ criminal head of Article 6 
ECHR argue that this solution is still incompatible with ECHR requirements because a criminal punishment 
would not be imposed by a court at first instance; see KILLICK J., BERGHE P., This is not the time to be 
tinkering with Regulation 1/2003 - It is time for fundamental reform - Europe should have change we can believe in, October 
2010; available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/08a7ee59-bbaa-44c8-90a7-
d81d891d637f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7890f325-49b4-43e4-a0a5-
dd7f74b44fc0/Article_This_is_not_the_time_to_be_tinkering_with_Regulation_1-2003.pdf, p. 10. 
545 NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 990. According to Nazzini, 
competition enforcement regimes which are characterised by an administrative decision-maker with no 
guarantees of independence and impartiality and deferential judicial review, are incompatible with Article 6(1) 
ECHR and Article 47(2) EU Charter, and should be remedied not by reforming the intensity of judicial 
review, but by introducing procedures that allow for sufficient safeguards of independence and impartiality of 
the decision-maker. 
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making systems differently than currently the case using as legal basis Article 103 TFEU.546 
On the other hand, there is who believes that an amendment of the Treaty is necessary as 
Article 103 TFEU does not foresee the application of EU competition law, at EU level, by 
any entity other than the Commission and the EU Courts.547 Article 103 TFEU states in 
fact that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, can lay down ‘[t]he appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 101 and 102’; and that these regulations or directives can ‘define the 
respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of Justice of the European Union in applying the 
provisions [of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU]’. Nor could the new powers be attributed to the 
new agency by delegation from the Commission as this would escape any permissible 
delegation powers of the Commission. 548  In any event, independently of whether this 
proposal would require or not any Treaty amendment, it is still controversial whether it 
would obtain the necessary political support. In this regard, it must be recalled that in 1997 
an attempt was made to create a ‘European Cartel Office’ which would have had the 
powers to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the Merger Regulation. This proposal 
failed due to the lack of support from Member States, practitioners and academics. The 
main fears concerned with the creation of a separate competition body were that 
competition policy could be marginalized from other economic policies pursued by the 
Commission and that there was the risk that competition rules could be applied 
inconsistently vis-à-vis the EC Treaty as a whole.549 A similar proposal was reiterated within 
the Convention responsible for drafting the EU Constitutional Treaty but was also 
unsuccessful.550 
The proposal which foresees not the creation of a new agency, but rather only a 
functional separation within DG Competition, would instead have the advantage of not 
requiring Treaty amendments as the ultimate decision-making power remains with the 
                                                     
546 This was the conclusion of Working Group III in the Report produced for the GCLC conference of 11-12 
June 2009; see WAELBROECK D., The Enforcement System for Articles 81 and 82 EC: Time for a Redefinition of 
Decision-Making in EC Competition Law, in Concurrences, No. 3, 2009, p. 18. 
547 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, pp. 216 and 219-220. 
548 LANG J. T., Three Possibilities for Reform of the Procedure of the European Commission in Competition Cases under 
Regulation 1/2003, CEPS Special Report, 18 November 2011, p. 216. 
549 ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 239-240. 
550 NASCIMBENE B., Fair Trial and the Rights of the Defence in Antitrust Proceedings before the Commission: A Need 
for Reform?, 2013, ELR, No. 4, 2013, pp. 573-582. 
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Commission. Here a new procedural regulation, internal delegation and internal 
restructuring are considered sufficient to achieve this solution.551 
 
3. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM CONCERNING THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN COMPETITION CASES 
 
According to certain commentators, in order to enable the EU Courts to carry out a 
thorough review of the Commission’s competition decisions, there are strong arguments 
that no Treaty or institutional reforms are required. Advocates of this position claim that it 
would be sufficient if the EU Courts spontaneously exercised a rigorous approach to 
judicial review by considering all evidence underlying a decision and the conclusions drawn 
therefrom.552 This view would also be supported by the ECtHR jurisprudence as, following 
the Menarini ruling (see supra subsection 4.2.5 in Section II of Chapter 1), it can be argued 
that compliance with the right to a fair trial does not require any structural revolution, 
being enough if within the boundaries of the review of legality, the degree of such review is 
intense and exhaustive.553 The extent to which the principle of effective judicial protection 
leaves room for the existence of deferential judicial review (i.e. the limited review standard 
within the framework of the review of legality) is however still an open debate, with views 
ranging from who considers that ‘[t]he conclusion is inescapable […] under the current system, 
deferential judicial review is incompatible with the principle of effective judicial protection,554 to the more 
nuanced views of the EU judges in KME and Chalkor which, while advocating for more 
                                                     
551 NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 1003. According to Andreangeli, 
this solution is a less controversial alternative and could follow the example of the internal rules that govern 
the organization and functioning of the European Anti-Fraud Office (which has no decision-making powers 
but has the power to gather evidence concerning allegations of fraud) and provide for safeguards that 
guarantee its independence; see ANDREANGELI A., EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights, 
Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 241-243. 
552 See, inter alia, VENIT J. S., Human All Too Human: The Gathering and Assessment of Evidence and the Appropriate 
Standard of Proof and Judicial Review in Commission Enforcement Proceedings Applying Articles 81 and 82, European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy 
Workshop/Proceedings, 2009, p. 4.  
553 This is due to the circumstance that the ‘Italian model of judicial review […] is largely similar to the EU system’ and 
thus the conclusions of the ECtHR in Menarini can be transposed to the EU competition system; see 
GRASSANI S., Jurisdictional vs. “Juris…Fictional” Review in the Land of Menarini, (June 7, 2012), 19th St.Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum ICF - June 7th and 8th 2012; available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2190929, p. 5. 
554 NAZZINI R., Administrative Enforcement, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Law: A 
Comparative Contextual-functionalist Perspective, in CMLR, 2012, Vol. 49(3), p. 998. 
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intense review, still consider legitimate the existence of a margin of appreciation, and thus 
discretion, for the Commission for certain kinds of assessments.  
Within the boundaries of the review of legality, and without having to proceed to any 
institutional or structural change to the EU architecture of competition enforcement, a 
number of proposals have thus been made to increase the degree and intensity of review by 
the EU Courts, thus affording more extensive and exhaustive protection to the interests of 
parties to judicial proceedings. The following subsections are dedicated to the description 
and analysis of those solutions which are meant to address, and possibly resolve, the 
problems raised by the current limited judicial review standard exercised by the EU Courts 
in competition cases, without recurring to structural changes to the EU architecture of 
competition law enforcement. Essentially, these proposals are centred on the analysis of 
the instruments that the EU judges already have at their disposal and could be used by 
them to expand and intensify their review in competition cases. These solutions range from 
an increased use of the measures of procedural inquiry, such as the use of expert evidence 
and reports, in order to have the technical ability to review also the Commission’s complex 
economic and/or technical assessments, to the reduction of the use of the manifest error 
standard only to certain Commission assessments, to the abandonment by the EU Courts 
of the limited review standard and manifest error test altogether.  
From a practical point of view these solutions would not encounter significant 
difficulties, as in the past EU judges have shown to have an important margin of 
manoeuver in defining and exercising their powers of review within the boundaries of the 
review of legality. From the examination of the case law carried out in Chapters 2 and 3, it 
emerges that the existence of the limited standard has not impeded the EU Courts from 
carrying out an in-depth review in certain cases, going in so far as substituting their 
assessment for that of the Commission when they considered themselves knowledgeable 
enough.555 In any event, the very circumstance that the ‘limited’ review standard is not 
mandated by the Treaties and that the EU Courts ‘have been drawing self-imposed distinctions in 
the intensity of their legality review’ would demonstrate that the Courts are perfectly capable of 
                                                     
555 CASTILLO DE LA TORRE F., Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases, in World Competition Law 
and Economics Review, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 339-340. 
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stretching the intensity of their review as far as they consider necessary.556 Whether they are 
willing to do so is another concern. It is evident in fact that the success of each proposal 
will depend ultimately on the EU Courts’ willingness to pursue a certain solution rather 
than another. 
 
3.1. Expanding the EU Courts’ powers of review within the review of legality ex 
Article 263 TFEU: Limiting the ‘limited’ standard of review 
In light of the widespread criticism that the ‘limited’ review standard has caused for a 
multiplicity of reasons which will not be recalled here (see supra Section II in Chapter 1), a 
variety of concrete proposals have been made to curb the problem and give it a satisfactory 
answer. The proposal to limit the use of the ‘limited’ review standard stems from the 
recognition that in the past the EU Courts have made a too extensive and far-reaching use 
of this standard, a practice which should instead be circumscribed to what is only strictly 
necessary. In particular, the concern is that, in light of the difficulties in identifying when an 
appraisal is economically or technically complex, there is a concrete risk that the EU Courts 
subject to ‘limited’ control an excessive number of Commission assessments, including 
appraisals which due to their nature should not benefit from this more deferential approach. 
As stated by one commentator ‘the EU Courts could also reduce the number of Commission 
assessments which they consider “complex”, and engage more openly with economic facts even though they 
may be technically difficult’.557 
Against this framework should be understood the proposal made in 2011 by the 
President of the GC Mr. Jaeger to limit the use of the ‘limited’ standard of review to 
assessments that entail economic policy choices. Although the President of the GC was 
making only his personal views known, given his authoritative role within the EU judiciary, 
the incentive effect of this proposal cannot be underestimated. In particular, Mr. Jaeger 
stressed the need to bring more clarity in the use of the limited review standard in order to 
increase legal certainty and avoid that ‘control that is too loose [apply] to situations that deserve a 
                                                     
556 BRONCKERS M, VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities 
and Which Role for the Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), in European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, p. 11. 
557 BRONCKERS M, VALLERY A., Fair and Effective Competition Policy in the EU: Which Role for the Authorities 
and Which Role for the Courts after Menarini (July 5, 2012), in European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2012, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137524, p. 10. 
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stricter standard of review’. 558 According to Judge Jaeger, it is an error to confuse complex 
economic assessments with complex calculations, studies or data. For these types of 
assessments the Commission should not benefit from a margin of discretion. For him the 
notion of ‘complex economic assessments’ should cover only those situations where the 
Commission has made an economics-based choice of policy. Only when the Commission’s 
appraisal can be ascribed to the boundaries of an economic policy choice may the marginal 
review standard find application. 
It must however be pointed out that this solution is unsatisfactory for who considers 
that the ECHR jurisprudence on the right to a fair trial requires EU Courts to re-assess 
without limits issues of facts and law, including reconsidering complex economic and/or 
technical appraisals, even those based on policy choices.559 According to this view, if Judge 
Jaeger’s proposal is to be welcomed for having brought renewed attention to the possible 
risks of an over-expansion of the limited review standard, it is still far from compliant with 
the requirements of effective judicial protection, given that it still legitimates a certain 
discretion for the Commission, even if only over economic-policy choices. 
In addition, Judge Jaeger emphasized that the EU Courts have the necessary tools to 
undergo a detailed examination of all of the Commission’s assessments that don’t fall under 
the category of ‘economic-policy choices’. His reference was to the measures of inquiry 
that EU judges have at their disposal, in particular the means to get assistance from experts 
on a permanent or ad hoc basis. More generally, in light of the expansion of the importance 
of economic analysis in competition cases, the use of these instruments is capable of 
assisting the EU Courts and of making them more willing to engage in the appraisal of 
complex economic and/or technical assessments.560  
One of the recommendations that is accordingly made to EU judges in order for their 
review to be adequate and effective, is to avail themselves of all the instruments they have 
                                                     
558 JAEGER M., The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the 
Marginalisation of the Marginal Review?, in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011, 
p. 313. 
559 GRASSANI S., Jurisdictional vs. “Juris…Fictional” Review in the Land of Menarini, (June 7, 2012), 19th St.Gallen 
International Competition Law Forum ICF - June 7th and 8th 2012; available at SSRN: 
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560 See contra AZIZI who considers that ‘[e]ven though, in principle, the GC has far-reaching powers to supplement, by 
itself, the findings of fact made by the Commission or may even completely reassess the Commission’s findings of fact, for example, 
by using various measures of inquiry […] actual use of such legal options remains highly theoretical and unrealistic’; see AZIZI 
J., The Limits of Judicial Review concerning Abuses of a Dominant Position: Principles and Specific Application to the 
Communications Technology Sector, in Today's Multi-layered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, Liber 
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at their disposal to this end. This will avoid that competition cases may be too complicated 
for them to adjudicate on, leading them to refrain from in-depth analysis and to rely too 
heavily on the Commission’s assessments. 
 
3.2. Expanding the EU Courts’ powers of review within the review of legality ex 
Article 263 TFEU: Abandoning the ‘limited’ standard of review altogether  
Another solution to address the shortcomings of the ‘limited’ review standard revolves 
around the EU Courts’ willingness to abandon this standard altogether. As mentioned, in 
the competition field, the ‘limited’ standard of review, as currently applied, translates in the 
recognition of discretion for the Commission which entails the impossibility for the EU 
Courts to substitute a different assessment for that of the Commission, where the factual 
and evidential circumstances of the case allow for different appraisals and the Commission 
has opted for one in particular.561 Formally speaking, the parties have to demonstrate that 
the explanation given by the Commission is vitiated by a serious error, one that leads to 
invalidate the entire decision and thus justifies its annulment. The circumstance that a more 
reasonable explanation may exist or is proven to be a more adequate or ‘fitting’ explanation, 
in light of the relevant facts and evidence, is irrelevant, in so far as the parties are not 
capable of demonstrating that the Commission’s theory contains gross errors. This ties 
down the parties, obliges them to limit their claims to an attack against the specific theory 
of harm developed by the Commission.   
As mentioned supra in subsection 4.2.5 in Section II of Chapter 1, according to certain 
commentators, the existence of this margin of discretion of the Commission runs counter 
to the right to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR 
in the Menarini case, circumstance which justifies its abandonment altogether. In light of 
Menarini, certain commentators argue that ‘[a]s a minimum, courts should be free not only to re-
assess without limits issues of facts and law of any given case, but to likewise tackle one of the uncovered 
                                                     
561 As seen supra in Chapter 1, the limited review standard entails that in the presence of complex economic 
and/or technical assessments the EU Courts will only check whether the relevant rules on procedure and on 
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problems raised by the ‘manifest error test’ is that in case of equally plausible views concerning a complex 
economic or technical situation, the Commission’s appraisal will prevail unless it contains a ‘manifest’ mistake. 
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nerves of EU antitrust review: to wit, to openly reconsider complex technical/economic appraisals made by 
antitrust agencies’.562 It has therefore been claimed that ‘the EU courts could abandon the “complex 
appraisals” formula and devise a new description of what they actually do’.563 
It can also be contended that this would be a more adequate solution from a 
competition policy perspective, in the sense that the final objective is and should remain 
that of ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted, thus all the 
solutions that go in this direction, including reducing the risk of type II errors (prohibiting 
what should be allowed), should be valued. This entails that parties should be given every 
possibility to prove the correctness and harmlessness of their actions.  
This is all the more true form a ‘fairness’ perspective. Considering the intense debate on 
equality of arms, due process, respect of procedural rights and so forth, these principles 
remain useless and abstract if interested parties are not given all the judicial weapons 
available in order to dismantle the Commission’s claims. 
In light of the above, when there are two equivalent, reasonable and plausible 
explanations, it can be argued that the Courts should scrutinize more closely and allow the 
parties to prove their case, i.e. leave them the opportunity to demonstrate that their 
appraisal of a complex economic or technical situation is more valid than the 
Commission’s, even in the absence of errors in the latter’s assessment.   
It could also be argued that this solution would not necessarily run counter to the 
principle of separation of powers, which represents the classical explanation for the 
‘limited’ review standard. The Courts have in the past afforded the Commission discretion 
over economic and/or technical assessments, in the sense that they have decided to not 
engage in an analysis of such issues, in order to not have to substitute their appraisals for 
those of the Commission. However, if the Courts were to allow parties in judicial 
proceedings to present on an equal footing a different point of view from that of the 
Commission (no longer leaving a margin of appreciation to the latter), from a practical 
standpoint it could be argued that the classical explanation for deference, i.e. preserving the 
institutional balance along with the recognition that it is the Commission’s competence to 
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shape competition policy, would not necessarily be compromised. It would not in fact be 
the Courts developing ex novo their own theories, but rather the parties (which are in any 
event in the position to have a profound understanding of the markets in which they 
operate and of the consequences of their activities) which are given the chance to offer a 
different explanation from that put forward by the Commission. Allowing the parties to 
present alternative explanations wouldn’t necessarily interfere in the separation of powers 
discourse, as it would not be the Courts developing alternative economic theories or 
theories of harm, but rather the Courts recognizing the greater plausibility of an alternative 
theory presented by the parties (when this theory is more accurate and ‘fitting’ than the 
Commission’s). In substance, this would amount to the recognition that the Commission’s 
theory is somehow vitiated, in the sense that, even if its appraisals are not affected by any 
evident error, the circumstance that there is a different theory that is more adequate to 
explain facts and evidence would necessarily entail that the Commission has overseen 
something it shouldn’t have ignored. 
Finally, compared to a number of proposals examined in the first part of this Chapter, 
this solution has the advantage of not requiring an amendment of the Treaties or of 
secondary legislation. All that would be necessary is that the EU Courts agree with the 
validity of this proposal and that they operate a revirement of their previous case law, a 
mechanism not forbidden by the Treaties and used in the past by the Courts when 
considered necessary. 
The optimal solution would be that in the interest of legal certainty the Courts operate 
this change openly and transparently, i.e. that they engage in a clarification of their past 
practice and that they declare that in situations where two perfectly plausible scenarios are 
conceived and presented, respectively by the Commission and the interested party, the 
Courts have leeway to scrutinize more deeply, analyse more thoroughly and decide which 
should prevail. If the Courts find the moment is not ripe for such a change, they have the 
possibility to embrace this solution less openly, but still effectively from the point of view 
of the players involved. Reference here is made to the way Courts have sometimes applied 
the ‘manifest error’ standard in the past. Case law demonstrates that the Courts have in 
certain cases declared to be using the ‘manifest error’ standard while effectively scrutinizing 
situations very thoroughly. All bite this solution sacrifices to a certain extent legal certainty, 
transparency and brings with it the inherent risk, or perception, of discriminatory 
application of the ‘limited’ standard of review, it would on the other hand meet the 
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interests of the parties concerned, for whom it is less relevant how the Courts define the 
review they perform, in so far as the analysis effectively conducted in practice is thorough 
and exhaustive. This could be considered an interim step in the path leading to the 
abandonment altogether of the ‘limited’ review standard. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
From the analysis carried out until here of a selection of the relevant judgments 
concerning the application of the ‘limited’ judicial review standard in antitrust and merger 
cases, it is not possible to express a uniform view on the extent to which the existence of 
such standard has influenced the EU Courts’ adoption of a more deferential approach 
towards the Commission’s complex economic and/or technical assessments. The 
examination of the scope and intensity of the judicial control carried out and of how the 
application of the ‘limited’ standard of review has evolved over time has revealed a certain 
flexibility on the EU Courts’ side. Since its first formulation in the Consten and Grundig 
judgment and its later applications to abuse of dominance and merger cases, the ‘manifest 
error’ standard has been applied in a variety of forms and intensities, making it extremely 
difficult to frame this notion in conceptually defined boundaries, beyond mere definitions 
that say very little on its true content. 
Notwithstanding, the EU Courts have continued to refer to this standard and to apply it 
when faced with Commission’s economically or technically complex assessments, 
renouncing to exercise comprehensive review in favour of more limited control powers. 
While historically this self-imposed limitation found justification in the need to 
safeguard the EU inter-institutional balance, including the Commission’s prerogatives in 
the competition field, and found support in the Commission’s more sophisticated 
economic and technical expertise, in the past years the use of this standard has been the 
object of a variety of attacks, ranging from arguments based on the Commission’s revised 
role as competition authority and the EU Courts’ sufficient competition law expertise, to 
due process arguments focused on the interests of parties to proceedings and compliance 
with fundamental rights.  
Ultimately, the question remains whether the existence of a margin of appreciation for 
the Commission for certain assessments in competition cases can still be considered 
admissible or whether it runs counter to binding rules of law or opportunity choices. 
Of the reasons illustrated advocating a change or demise of the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard, the most stringent continues to remain the possible incompatibility with the 
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fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter and the ECHR, in particular the right to a 
fair trial. The need to ensure that the interested parties’ right to have access to an 
independent and impartial tribunal capable of guaranteeing effective judicial protection is 
safeguarded, has been one of the main parameters against which the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard has been tested in recent years.  
In 2011 and 2012 a number of international courts, the ECtHR, the ECJ and the EFTA 
Court, intervened in the debate providing their view on the above issues in a set of 
landmark cases, Menarini, KME and Posten Norge. If, on the one hand, these judgments are 
to be welcomed for having brought clarity on the courts’ different views on these matters, 
the diversity of opinions expressed and conclusions reached has not contributed to bring 
unity to the discussion, a final solution to these questions still far from being reached. 
In the EU framework, the EU Courts’ approach, confirmed in recent case law, has been 
that of considering the current characteristics of the system of EU judicial control, 
including the existence and application of the ‘limited’ review standard, compatible with the 
right to a fair trial, notwithstanding the inconsistency of this approach with the opposite 
conclusions reached in other international forums.  
However, in light of the different interpretations of the requirements inherent in the 
principle of effective judicial protection, it is still to be seen whether the EU Courts’ 
approach would pass the scrutiny of the ECtHR, once brought to the latter’s attention after 
the EU’s formal accession to the Strasbourg Convention. Whether the ‘limited’ judicial 
review standard is effectively compatible with fair trial requirements remains thus an open 
question. 
In the interest of time, these discrepancies have not gone unnoticed and, together with a 
number of other arguments that consider changes if not necessary at the least warranted 
and appropriate, have led to advocate for reforms in the way EU judges exercise their 
powers of control over the Commission’s assessments. While the introduction of full 
appellate judicial review powers, allowing, depending on the variants proposed, that EU 
Courts retry or decide cases ex novo, would constitute the most appropriate response to 
most of the concerns raised, on the other hand this solution goes beyond what is currently 
necessary for compliance with the right to a fair trial under the ECHR system, and 
encounters insurmountable obstacles in the lack of consensus for changes that potentially 
encroach on the institutional balance devised by the Treaties and likely require major 
Treaty amendments.  
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Another solution advanced is that the EU Courts abandon the ‘limited’ judicial review 
standard altogether. To the extent this standard is self-imposed and consists in a self-
limitation, EU judges, within the framework of their review of legality, could cease to give 
relevance to the Commission’s discretion or margin of appreciation. This reform, which 
would amount to a revirement jurisprudentiel, would ensure that EU Courts reach a genuine 
opinion on the entire substance of a competition case and that equally compelling and 
plausible explanations of the evidence are examined on an equal footing. It would also not 
require major structural changes to the institutional set up of the competition enforcement 
system. The analysis of the case law has proven the EU Court’s activeness in the past in 
defining the contours of the standard of review, thus the success of a similar solution 
would only depend on the Courts’ willingness to engage in such a change. 
The recent statements of the Court of Justice in KME and subsequent case law 
demonstrate however that the EU Courts are not ready to go down this road. While on the 
one hand the Court of Justice is increasingly more attentive that the Commission’s complex 
economic and technical assessments are thoroughly reviewed, on the other hand it 
continues to legitimize the Commission’s discretion over assessments of this nature. The 
EU Courts’ position is currently to firmly preserve the ‘limited’ judicial review standard in 
its present formulation. 
The abandonment of the limited judicial review standard on the EU Courts’ own 
initiative being unlikely, another tendency which has taken form, and considered desirable 
in the absence of more radical reforms to the EU Courts’ powers of review, is to limit or 
circumscribe its use. A trend started with KME and that finds supporters among EU judges 
advocating restrictions in the recognition of discretion to the Commission, it could be 
considered an interim solution pending a final answer to the question on the system’s 
legality and on the necessity of more in-depth structural changes. 
In parallel, proposals have been made to address the shortcomings of the current system 
of judicial review that affect the organization of the Commission, rather than of the EU 
Courts. A number of these foresee a functional separation of powers within the 
Commission and have the merit of addressing one of the main criticisms to the ‘limited’ 
review standard, i.e. the privileged position enjoyed by the Commission’s assessments in the 
case of economically or technically complex appraisals. Aside from the uncertainties for the 
implementation of these solutions that derive from the differing opinions on the need or 
not for Treaty amendments, similar proposals, if not coupled with other solutions, leave 
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untouched the current system of judicial review and thus unfettered the criticisms that 
concern it. 
As a final remark, the EU Courts’ unwillingness to change the current state of affairs 
concerning the ‘limited’ judicial review standard of their own initiative allows to forecast 
with almost certitude that any future judicial reform will necessarily entail more or less 
extensive structural changes to the system and time-consuming decision-making processes 
involving a plurality of EU institutions. 
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